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COMPUTER AND ANALYTIC MODELS 
OF
FICHTER INTERCEPT CAPABILITY 
by
C S Donovan
This thesis describes a simulation model of fighter operations, and 
sets it in the context of a hierarchy of defence models. The fighter 
model is then applied to two problems which developed from an 
assessment of the contribution of sensors to the air defence of the 
UK. These concern the influence of raid indirect routing and sensor 
information accuracy on the intercept capability of fighters scrambled 
from ground alert. Mathematical models of these two aspects of 
fighter operations are also developed; this dual approach ensures that 
the studies are both analytically understandable and operationally 
acceptable •
Examples are given of the number of fighters from a single base which 
could intercept a concentrated (point) raid against a single offset 
target. In the case of raid indirect routing the main variables are 
the angle of the incoming feint track and the warning distance. In 
the analysis of the effect of sensor information errors the main 
variables are the actual position of the raid when warning is given 
and the errors in raid coordinates, heading and speed due to 
degradation of the warning system. In both cases of indirect routing 
and information errors alternative scramble and control procedures are 
considered.
The work described in this thesis is a step towards an attempt to 
determine the more favourable procedures which a fighter force might 
adopt in the face of subtle raid tactics and degraded sensor 
performance. It also provides an illustration of the interplay 
between mathematical methods and computer models in the analysis of 
fighter operations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis was initiated when the author was a staff member of the 
Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE). It describes the 
development of a simulation model of fighter operations in defence of 
the United Kingdom — the DOAE fighter model. The model is then applied 
to two problems in support of an assessment of the contribution of 
sensors to air defence. These problems concern the effects of raid 
indirect routing and sensor information accuracy on fighter intercept 
capability. Mathematical models of these problems are also developed, 
in order to provide a broad grasp of the interactions between the 
important variables. The thesis is divided into four parts as follows:
Part I provides an overview of the whole thesis. This includes a 
summary of the context in which the fighter model is set, the aim of 
the model, the level of detail within it and its structure. The 
operational problems to which the model is applied are then described, 
and the mathematical models of raid indirect routing and sensor 
information errors are outlined. Finally the conclusions of the thesis 
are presented, both on the interplay between computer and mathematical 
models and on the influence of deceptive raid tactics and sensor 
performance degradation on fighter intercept capability.
In Part 2 of the thesis a detailed description of the fighter model is 
given. An introductory section provides a non-technical survey of the 
structure and assumptions of the model. This is followed by a detailed 
description of each of the model subroutines, in alphabetical order.
An illustrative model input data stream is also included.
Finally, Parts 3 and 4 of the thesis comprise the detailed mathematical 
treatment of the effects of indirect routing and Ground Control sensor 
information errors on the intercept capability of fighters scrambled 
from ground alert.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FIGHTER MODEL SIMULATION
The fighter model was developed as part of a suite of air defence 
models at DOAE. The three principal computer simulation models for 
analysis of the air defence of the U.K. landmass are the Air Defence 
Ground Environment (ADGE) model, which represents the processes of 
gathering information and controlling the air defence system; EVA, a 
model of surface-to-air missile (SAM) air defence systems, and the 
fighter model. The essential components of the three models are 
defined by Jordan (1974); a description of the ADGE model is given by 
Donovan and Sands (1977), while the SAM air defence model is described 
by Thornton (1977, 1978).
Jordan (1974) also outlines the links between the ADGE, SAM and fighter 
operations models. Thornton (1977) puts the SAM model into an 
operational context. The operational setting of the ADGE model is 
given by Coucill (1975a, 1975b) and Coucill and Grainger (1976); ADGE 
operational techniques are summarised in the Central Tactics and Trials 
Organisation (CTTO) Tactics Manual (1978).
3. AIM QF THE MODEL
The fighter model has been developed in order to contribute to DOAE 
studies. These vary widely in their nature and scope, but may be 
summarised as concerned with defence strategy, UK and NATO defence 
policy decisions, and with resource allocation, especially of 
equipment, within the Defence Budget. Studies can range from 
examination of overall force structure to precise questions about the 
specification of particular pieces of equipment. As outlined by Lord 
(1978), examples of such studies are those which seek to determine
a) quantitative comparisons of competing procurement options;
b) tactical deployments to make the best use of specified equipment;
c ) significant gaps in available or proposed equipment.
The prime difficulty in providing techniques with which to address 
these problems lies in matching the amount of detail required to 
achieve operational acceptability on the one hand and to preserve 
analytical understanding on the other. While the fighter model is 
essentially a ’general purpose’ model, it was constructed with the 
investigation of a number of well-defined problems in mind. As 
described by Grainger (1975a) the most pressing category of problems is 
concerned with the effects of electronic counter-measures (ECM) when 
used in a large-scale conflict between technically sophisticated 
forces. In the absence of expensive large-scale trials, a computer 
model offers the best opportunity for deciding whether ECM provides 
significant protection for offensive forces, and whether the ECM should 
be directed primarily against ground-based or airborne surveillance 
radars, or against the fighters’ airborne intercept (AI) radars 
(Hawes, 1975).
Grainger mentions some other problems for which the fighter model would 
be a useful tool. These include the assessment of the value to the UK 
and NATO of early warning means such as NIMROD Airborne Early Warning 
(AEW) and AWACS (Klass, 1974; Boyle and Furlong, 1977; Boyle, 1979) and 
the determination of suitable patrol positions for these aircraft 
(Watts, 1976). A further class of problems is concerned with 
operations or tactical aspects, such as examining the merits of 
maintaining continuous airborne fighter patrols (Combat Air Patrols, or 
CAPs) as opposed to relying on fighters scrambled from ground alert 
(DOAE, 1974; Bourne, 1975; Easams, 1976a); comparing fighter reattack 
policies (Grena'àer, 1968; Goda and Hanks, 1971; Burdon et al, 1977); 
and examining the value of supersonic interceptions (British Aerospace, 
1980; Davies and Van Dijk, 1975).
Further areas of potential application of the fighter model are in the 
fields of weapon and equipment procurement, and in determining the most 
appropriate aircraft, or aircraft configuration, for the air defence 
role under various scenarios (Rose and Hogsflesh, 1974; Chief Scientist 
(RAF), 1974; Midgley, 1975; Chief Scientist (RAF), 1975). The model 
may also be a useful tool in naval air defence analysis. With suitable
input data, the model could be used to investigate the effectiveness of 
land-based maritime patrol aircraft and fighters, and also 
carrier-based fighters. The contribution of tanker aircraft to fighter 
intercept capability can be assessed, as can the comparative value of 
the two types of CAP commonly associated with air defence of naval 
forces - barrier CAPs (e.g. across the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap) and 
force CAPs, in which fighters patrol very much closer to the naval 
forces. Previous studies in these areas include those by Sutcliffe 
(1974) and Bourne (1976), while Forder (1979) carried out an integrated 
maritime air defence analysis, representing all the UK naval air 
defence systems planned for the 1990’s. Rasmussen (1978) surveys the 
threat from the Soviet naval air force.
The fighter model may be used in analyses of the air defence of Western 
Europe. Numerous studies of aspects of NATO air defence have been 
carried out - see, for example, Boulton (1972), Facey (1975) and 
Andrews (1979). Meller (1975) and Gullick (1979) provide some detail 
on the Soviet air threat to Western Europe. A more specialised area of 
application is in the assessment of battlefield fighter effectiveness 
(Donovan, 1976a). This is concerned with the air defence, by fighters, 
of ground forces at or near the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), 
against enemy ground attack aircraft. Both visual and radar detections 
are important in battlefield scenarios, where the duration of enemy 
aircraft penetration behind the FEBA may be very short (Whitaker, 1970; 
Cochram, 1971a, 1971b). Particular parameters of interest in such 
operations are the proportions of ground attack aircraft intercepted 
before and after weapon release respectively (Cocks, 1976).
The model can represent alternative tactics on both the attacking and 
defending sides, and insofar as tactics are explicitly represented, 
details are given in Part 2. It is not the intention of the model, 
however, to define the tactical behaviour of a force, but rather to 
leave tactics as much as possible a function of model input data. A 
long term air defence strategy is not represented; in particular, the 
recovery, turn-round and serviceability of fighters is not simulated. 
These are ’campaign’ level factors (see Chapter 5). As such, the 
fighter model output can be used in an analysis of the interactions 
between fighter intercept capability, raid frequency and attack 
effectiveness, and fighter availability. The factors which contribute 
to fighter availability have been studied extensively - see, for 
example, Collins and Guthrie (1963), Guthrie and Means (1968), Burke
(1974), Midgley (1974) and Hall (1974).
The fighter model is applied in this thesis to two specific studies of 
fighter intercept capability, concerned with raid indirect routing and 
sensor information errors. The interpretation of the model output for 
these two studies led to the development of the mathematical models 
presented in Parts 3 and 4 of the thesis, and is discussed later.
4. MODEL SCENARIO
Many of the characteristics of fighter model scenarios are defined in 
the input data, so that the model may be used to study fighter 
effectiveness in different spheres of combat. We shall concentrate 
here on the primary scenario - air defence of the UK mainland. This 
scenario envisages the incursion into friendly airspace - namely the UK 
Air Defence Region (UKADR) - of a sequence of enemy aircraft raids, of 
variable strength, formation, composition, speed, altitude, timing and 
direction of attack. Details of the likely threat to the UKADR in the 
80's and 90's are given by Bloomfield, Constable and Spencer (1977) and 
by DSTI (1975a).
Both raid tracks and raid targets are represented in the fighter model, 
although the effects of the attacks by the raids on their targets are 
not - this being a 'campaign* level factor. Raids follow pre-planned 
routes to their various targets, or act as 'decoys', forcing premature 
and wasteful fighter scrambles. The specification of targets on the UK 
mainland for attack by Warsaw Pact aircraft is always a thorny issue. 
Donovan and Stead (1978) list some of the most likely UK military 
targets, under a number of headings - UK strike bases, UK maritime 
targets, USAF bases (permanent and reinforcement), RAF dispersal or 
forward operating bases, fighter bases, command and control centres and 
radar installations. (It becomes clear from the geographical 
distribution of these targets - East Anglia, S. England - that the 
Soviet Tactical Air Force is a threat to many of the UK military bases , 
in addition to their Long Range Air Force. Panyalev (1976) shows 
typical combat radii for the SU-19 'Fencer', based on forward 
deployment to East Germany).
Having defined the raid tracks and their targets we next consider the 
early warning and reaction capability of the air defence system. This 
is determined by a number of factors, the first of which is the ability 
of the surveillance system (ground and airborne) to detect raids at 
long ranges (see Borgart, 1977). The ADGE model can be used to 
simulate in detail the initial detection of a raid by ground or 
airborne radars. This, in turn, provides input to the fighter model in 
the form of contours, specified relative to a common coordinate system, 
whereby the times at which raids are first deemed to be detected within 
the fighter model can be determined. The initial detection position 
can also be parameterised in the model, and sensitivity analysis 
carried out to determine its significance in any given scenario.
The effectiveness of ground-based surveillence radars is severely 
limited against low-flying raids. In order to compensate for this gap 
in cover, airborne early warning aircraft are being introduced - NIMROD 
in the UK, AWACS in Western Europe (Ayker, 1975; Driessen and Taal, 
1975). Numerous studies have been carried out into the detection and 
tracking of low altitude targets - for example, Gullick (1974), 
Macdonald (1974) and Litfin (1974). The model input data on estimated 
target position, track and raid strength, together with distributions 
for the errors on these estimates, may reflect information derived 
either via ground-based or airborne surveillance radars. Hence the
fighter model can be used to investigate, at the sector level of 
operations, the contribution of AEW or AWACS to the command and control 
system.
In addition to the initial detection of a raid, its identification as 
hostile also takes place outside the model. Vaughan and Virnelson
(1963) and Boyle (1977) have examined some of the problems concerned 
with the identification of hostile aircraft. Similarly, the control 
and coordination of air defence resources is an activity best simulated 
within an ADGE model. In particular, the allocation policy within the 
fighter model is concerned only with matching the immediate threats, 
rather than directly representing some overall strategy. Nevertheless, 
many of the interactions between the command and control system and 
enemy raids can be represented indirectly in the fighter model, without 
having to simulate the Air Defence Ground Environment, by appropriate 
choice of the relevant input parameters. For example, the 
vulnerability of communications links to jamming (Brown and Schemel, 
1975) can be modelled in terms of degraded timeliness and quality of 
raid track and positional information passed to the fighter 
controllers. The data rate (i.e. frequency of transmission of 
information) may also be reduced by communications jamming.
Having detected and classified an enemy raid as a potential threat to 
the UK, scramble orders are issued to the appropriate fighter bases.
The model simulates the delays in reporting target information, and the 
various readiness levels at which fighters are held. Fighters may be 
scrambled before detailed raid track information is available, in which 
case they fly to pre-planned patrol positions. When raid track 
information does become available, via ground or AEW radars, fighter AI 
radars or visual identification, fighter interception courses may be 
set up. The model represents delays in reporting target information 
and its accuracy (position, speed, heading), for the different sources 
of information. Fighters may refine their interception courses after 
they achieve target detection.
Enemy raids may also be supported by ECM - specialist escort jammers, 
self-screening jamming pods and stand-off jammers (Reed, 1974;
Sundaram, Loomis and Eustace, 1976). Jamming may be directed either 
against the fighters’ radars or against ground and airborne 
surveillance radars (or indeed against radar-controlled missiles 
launched by the fighters). The model represents both barrage 
(continuous) jamming and responsive jamming of fighter radars. In the 
latter case intermittent jamming signals are transmitted in response to 
incident 'threat' radar signals, dependent on the frequency and 
strength of these signals. DSTI (1975b) provides considerable detail 
on Soviet electronic warfare capability. For each airborne fighter and 
raid, at each radar scan, the model calculates a number of signal 
strengths - target radar return, perceived jamming strength, noise and 
clutter intensities - from which are derived a number of signal-to- 
noise ratios. These may then be compared with appropriate threshold 
values to determine whether a fighter has detected a target, and if it 
currently possesses range information on that target. The outcome of 
these comparisons then determines the subsequent behaviour of the
fighter on its attempted interception. (The model may run in two 
modes, deterministic and stochastic. In stochastic mode a probability 
of detection is also calculated and compared with a uniformly 
distributed random variable).
In the timescales envisaged for fighter model scenarios, the Tornado or 
MRCA ADV (Multi Role Combat Aircraft, Air Defence Version - Gilson,
1978) and Phantom aircraft provide the primary RAF area defence 
capability. This influences the choice of signal-to-noise ratios used 
to simulate the fighters' avionics systems. Royal Aircraft 
Establishment reports (1974a, 1974b) provide data on Tornado and 
Phantom avionics system performance, in both clear and ECM 
environments. In particular, they provide numerical estimates of the 
various threshold values with which the fighter-target signal-to-noise 
ratios should be compared.
5. LEVEL OF DETAIL IN THE MODEL
The air defence suite of models must be capable of demonstrating the 
contribution of the air battle to the total land war in Continental 
Europe. Studies of total war can be handled by aggregated models of 
naval, air and land battles^which draw their inputs from more refined 
models and models of the separate campaigns which contribute to the 
outcome of total war. A useful categorisation of model hierarchies is 
given by Nowottny (1980). This was created in order to establish a 
methodology for derivation of naval vessel fighting characteristics, 
and is extended here in order to illustrate the role of the fighter 
model within a total hierarchy of models. Seven levels are shown, 
together with examples of typical model components at each level.
WAR
c a m p a i g n
FORCE
PLATFORM
TOTAL WEAPON
- Land battle in Europe; contribution 
of air operations to the land battle.
- Contribution of fighters to the air battle
Total fighter force within an air defence 
sector, one cycle of operations.
Individual fighter; includes total fighter 
characteristics (endurance, speed, 
acceleration, navigation, survivability, 
etc. ) .
Radar-controlled missiles; infra-red 
missiles; guns.
INDIVIDUAL WEAPON/SENSORS - AI radar; ESM; missiles; fire control
computer, etc.
COMPONENT Radar detection threshold; specific 
tracking algorithm etc.
Hierarchy for Military Modelling
It is essential that, at the start of any study or modelling exercise, 
the principal level of operations and principal elements in the 
analysis (as between, for example, the levels listed above) should be 
identified. Higher levels (of wider implication) than the one of 
particular interest impose criteria or constraints on the analysis , 
while lower levels (of greater detail) contribute input data. The 
process of identifying the main level of operations should include the 
determination of the principal measures of effectiveness. The fighter 
model is essentially a force model. Higher levels, which impose 
criteria on the model scenarios, include air defence battles over 
several days, an entire air campaign (including defence suppression, 
counter- air operations and offensive support in the Central Region as 
well as air defence of the UK) and, ultimately, the whole sea/land/air 
war. Lower levels, which provide inputs to the model, include the 
details of fighter/bomber engagements, the kinematics of fighter flight 
and the process of providing early warning (Lord, 1978).
To answer the sort of questions posed in the previous chapters, a model 
is required in which all fighters controlled from one point are 
individually represented. The air defence sector is thus the lowest 
level at which the model may realistically be set. (The U.K. Air 
Defence Region is composed of three such sectors.) At this level
substantial simplification is necessary, and the model does not attempt
a detailed representation of, for example, air-to-air combat 
(dogfights) or exact missile flight paths. Similarly, the 
representation of fighter aerodynamics is highly simplified.
A number of aims implicit in the development of a simulation such as 
the fighter model influence the level of detail within it. These 
include the following:
represent entities, events and their interactions as realistically
as possible;
minimise the computer running time and program storage space;
make the preparation of model input simple;
make the interpretation of model output simple;
Allowing for an emphasis on areas of particular relevance, the degree 
of sophistication of the model is also designed to be consistent over 
the entitites and interactions represented within the model, and 
consistent with a model at the 'force' level of fighter operations.
The input data required to run the fighter model is explained in full
in Part 2. In any particular application of the model many of the data
items are not relevant. Many of the input variables may also be 
parameterised, in order to conduct sensitivity analyses. Nevertheless, 
in the assessment of the effectiveness of, for example, a specific 
aircraft or aircraft component, a particular threat or a new enemy ECM 
technique, more detailed weapon system models may be necessary, or more 
detailed analytical studies undertaken, in order to derive the
relevant input parameters for the fighter model. With such a 
hierarchical approach to computer and analytical modelling, the 
influence of important parameters - fighter response time, fighter 
radar capability, enemy strength, threat patterns, raid timing, enemy 
jamming capability, etc. - can be measured in the fighter model, at the 
’force' level of operations. Similarly, the fighter model itself can 
provide more highly aggregated information suitable for input to models 
at 'campaign' level of operation. At DOAE these include the Air 
Campaign Model (Douch, 1975) and a similar model in support of an air 
campaign game (Ceorge, 1979). Both Douch and Ceorge describe the way 
in which various tasks such as air defence, counter air operations, 
interdiction and close air support, and the allocation of aircraft to 
these tasks, are represented in campaign models.
Campaign models, in their turn, may be used to provide input data for 
the highest level in the military model hierarchy - war games or 
computerised war games (Shephard, 1963). The methodology by which the 
effects of air campaigns on the land battle are assessed is described 
by Lord, Donovan and Lee (1976), Donovan (1976b) and Dyer (1976). A 
major element in the calculation of the effectiveness of air campaigns 
is the role of aircraft attack effectiveness - see, for example. King 
(1975a, 1975b). The NATO Deployment Model (Dare, 1972) is a 
computerised war game, requiring detailed assessment by models such as 
the fighter model for its calibration. A number of campaign or 
theatre-level air battle models have been developed in the US; these 
include AIR-2 (Honningstad and Kerr, 1973), NEWAIR (Harreschou and 
Kerr, 1975; Roros, 1976) and IDA Tactical Air Model (Lowell et al,
1979). The bibliography by Berg (1980) lists a number of air battle 
and air defence simulation models developed on behalf of US defence 
agencies .
The process of aggregating results from detailed models to provide 
calibration and input data for higher level models is well developed in 
the field of land battle modelling. The two primary land battle models 
used at DOAE are the Battle Group Model and the Corps Model (Beare et 
al, 1974; Witts, 1974). The models interface by condensing results 
from the Battle Group model of combat, involving several weapon types 
on either side, into a form in which the performance of each force as a 
whole can be represented. In particular, two related problems are 
solved within this interface:-
a) a technique is developed by which the strength of a battle group 
can be calculated from knowledge of its component weapons;
b) a measure of the ability of one battle group to cause attrition to 
another is derived.
These two measures are fundamental to the Corps model assessment of 
battle. The Battle Group and Corps models, and the progressive 
refinement of the interface between them, have been well documented 
(e.g. Dare and James, 1971; Richardson, 1976; James, 1976; James, 1977; 
Richardson, 1977; Richardson and Dunkerley, 1977). Howes and Thrall 
(1973) provide a similar methodology for constructing a system of
weapon weights from weapon effectiveness tables, obtained from detailed 
simulation.
As a final example of a hierarchical approach to model-building, Aris
(1977) provides a hierarchy of techniques in a field of mathematical 
physics. This includes an analysis of the level of detail and domain 
of applicability for six models of a diffusion process.
6. OTHER MODELS OF FIGHTER OPERATIONS
A number of quite substantial simulation models of fighter operations 
have been developed over the last few years. No existing model 
appropriate to U.K. air defence analysis represents ECM with fighter 
operations at the level of detail required by DOAE. Two of the models 
closest to that required for DOAE studies were developed by EASAMS 
Ltd., and examined in detail by Grainger (1975b). These were the 
Multiple Engagement Simulation Model and the Fighter Deployment Battle 
Model (FDBM) (EASAMS, 1973). Shipman (1974) used the FDBM for a study 
of threat evaluation and fighter allocation, examining simple tactical 
and operating procedures. EASAMS has also written a number of models 
for more specific applications. EASAMS (1977) is a study of the 
Phantom interception system in an ECM environment, while EASAMS 
(1976b) is an interception model created in order to assess the fire 
control and radar systems of an interceptor up to the point of weapon 
release. This represents in detail the Phantom F4-M with AWG-12 radar. 
An interesting feature is a simple pilot model, modifying steering 
errors produced by the fire control computer.
Another model which simulates both fighters and enemy aircraft in too 
much detail for our requirements is given by Welp, Brown and Rea
(1975). This is a Monte-Carlo simulation of opposing aircraft flights 
during an entire mission, including communications, navigation, 
refueling, target detection, target identification, attack and weapon 
detection. It is also worth mentioning the powerful modelling tool 
COMO-III, developed at Shape Technical Centre (STC) for NATO defence 
analysis (Mann, 1967; Happel and Mulders, 1970; Dockery, Leiser and 
Aitken, 1976). Rather than a model, COMO is a simulation modelling 
system, permitting direct interaction between the decision-maker and 
the (critical-event) simulation.
It is useful to note some of the more detailed models and analyses 
which could provide data input to the fighter model in particular 
studies. For example, missile flight time and lethality, as a function 
of range, missile/target geometry and ECM conditions, are model input 
parameters. EASAMS (1969) describes a computer model of the Sidewinder 
infra-red missile, while EASAMS (1971) studies the homing ability of 
the Sparrow semi-active radar missile. Eok (1973) predicts Sparrow 
lethality against Soviet fighter aircraft, while Lawrence and Cairns
(1976) have developed a hybrid simulation of the Sky Flash missile and 
its radar environment. Schenk (1976) analyses the evolution of the 
Sidewinder family of air-to-air missiles, culminating in the AIM-9L 
’Super-Sidewinder* - an infra-red missile with a head-on attack 
capability.
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For a force level model, the fighter model goes into considerable 
detail in its radar detection routines - i.e. in the calculation of 
target signal strengths, enemy aircraft jamming strategies and 
consequent jamming signal strengths, and pulse and pulse doppler 
clutter levels. The report by RAE (1974b) indicates additional aspects 
of the responsive interaction between modern fighter radars and Warsaw 
Pact airborne jammers, together with fighter radar reversionary modes 
and detection thresholds. Forsyth and Penwick (1976) describe the 
SPEARS air warfare model in which several alternative detection 
criteria are presented.
The fighter model does not represent directly the tracking process 
which follows target detection, nor the generation of radar false 
alarms and the consequences of such false alarms. While it is felt 
that such detailed representation is more appropriate in lower level 
models, the modular nature of the fighter model allows the inclusion of 
routines such as automatic multiple target tracking (British Aircraft 
Corporation, 1975) and generation of radar false alarms (Skolnik, 1962; 
Bishop and Murray, 1975). Wong (1974) presents an analysis of the 
problem of correlating radar returns with aircraft tracks, given limits 
on aircraft manoeuvrability and acceleration.
The representation of visual detection and identification in the 
fighter model is elementary, with accurate visual detection assumed to 
occur when an enemy aircraft comes within a fixed distance from a 
fighter. This distance is specified in the input data, as a function 
of the fighter type. Seyb (1967) and Sparre (1971-72) have analysed in 
detail the mechanics of visual detection. Their methodology includes 
physical laws relating the contrast between a target and its background 
environment (e.g. meteorological visibility) and the target’s apparent 
contrast, to the position of the fighter aircraft relative to the 
target. It also includes empirical relations between the eye's 
capability to detect a target in a single glimpse, the target's 
apparent contrast, its angular distance off the fighter pilot's line of 
sight, and the target's apparent size. They also refer to such factors 
as cockpit design, pilot search policy and enemy raid formation 
structure.
The fighter model contains a set of subroutines which simulate fighter 
re-attack sequences. In these routines the raid structure is 
represented in more detail than when calculating initial interception 
courses, for we are searching for subsequent targets to attack within 
a raid. As mentioned earlier, the model does not simulate the details 
of air-to-air missile firings, gun attacks and the associated attack 
and evasive manoeuvres, nor counter-attacks by the enemy bombers or 
possible escort fighters. In particular, fighter casualties are not 
represented. Air-to-air combat is an area of air operations which has 
been studied extensively. Anderson (1972) reviews methods of assessing 
attrition in air-to-air engagements, while Greene and Huntzicker (1967) 
discuss the mechanics and geometry of air-to-air engagements. British 
Aerospace (1977) studies the air combat capability of a particular 
aircraft (AST403), while Beecham (1972) and Vincent et al (1976) 
analyse the kinematics of air combat and the missile avoidance problem 
respectively. Welp and Brown (1974) assess a number of models of 
air-to-a/V combat".
II
7. MODEL STRUCTURE 
Event Processing
The model is an 'event-based' simulation, as opposed to a 
'time-stepping' simulation; any significant occurrence to an entity in 
the model is called an event for that entity. For example, events for 
enemy raids include track-change points and weapon-release; events for 
fighters include take-off, change of acceleration or fuel-consumption 
rate, and detection of target. At an occurrence of any event all 
relevant consequences of that event are considered and, in particular, 
any new events which are generated must be set up. The heart of the 
model is simply a list of all events and the data associated with each 
event - the time at which it is to occur, the type of the event and the 
entity to which it occurs. As each event occurs and its consequences 
are examined this list is amended as necessary, with new events being 
inserted and cancelled events deleted.
A number of methods have been proposed for storing and updating lists 
of events - see, e.g. Lave (1967), Nance (1971) and Babich, Grason and 
Parnas (1975). The method of linked lists is adopted in the fighter 
model, based upon the algorithm of Lambeth (1978). This method carries 
out the three functions of event scheduling routines - scheduling 
future events, executing events in the proper simulated time sequence, 
and updating the clock variable which represents time - with economy of 
computer processing time and list storage space. A demonstration of 
the advantages of linked list event-scheduling routines, in terms of 
reduced computer processing time, is given by Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1978). In the Lambeth algorithm, each event is placed in any free 
cell of an array, and has stored with it a pointer to the next later 
event. Events generated during a simulation run can be stored in cells 
vacated by events which have already been processed. Pointers to the 
next event and to the end of a linked list of free cells are held 
externally; a special value of a pointer indicates the end of a list. 
Removal of the current event from the list of events and placing its 
cell on the free list does not require large amounts of data to be 
moved in store; only the values of pointers are changed. This applies 
also to the insertion of a new event, and the deletion of an unwanted 
event.
More advanced event-sequencing algorithms, based on the idea of linked 
lists, are given by Wyman (1975) and Vaucher and Duval (1975).
Mode of Operation
Two versions of the model have been written, a stochastic ('Monte 
Carlo') version and a deterministic ('expected value') version. In the 
Monte Carlo model, whenever the value of a random variable is required, 
it is derived from the appropriate distribution using a random number 
generator. The uniform random number generator used in the fighter 
model is that described by Hall (1979), which is particularly 
appropriate to a computer with a 24 bit word length. A survey of 
uniform random number generators is given by Jansson (1966). Random
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variables from a normal distribution are obtained by the simple method 
of adding a number of independent samples from a uniform distribution. 
More efficient techniques for generating normal random variables are 
given by Box and Muller (1958), Tocher (1963) and Marsaglia and Bray
(1964).
The results of the simulation are also random variables , and to obtain 
reliable information concerning their average values the program must 
be run many times with independent sets of random numbers. Currently 
the model uses a single seed from which are generated the several 
random number streams used in the stochastic version of the model. It 
is a minor extension to allow each random number stream its own seed 
(Mihram, 1976). Each replication terminates either after a 
predetermined simulation time or when the fighter force is annihilated.
The fighter model has only elementary statistics collection, namely 
estimates of the mean and standard deviation of random variables.
There is considerable scope for implementing more powerful statistical 
techniques. The model is a terminating simulation, so that more 
techniques are available for statistical analysis of the model output 
than for 'steady state' simulations. Law (198^) examines a number of 
techniques for deriving confidence intervals for the mean values of 
random variables in terminating simulations. He also derives stopping 
rules for such simulations, i.e. rules which determine the number of 
independant replications necessary to produce required confidence 
intervals, with a specified relative or absolute width. (Law and 
Kelton (1978, 1979) survey fixed sample size and sequential procedures 
for constructing confidence intervals of steady state mean values). It 
would be valuable to assess the effectiveness of such techniques if 
incorporated in the fighter model.
In the deterministic model, on the other hand, each time a random 
variable is required, its use is replaced by a process intended to 
represent the 'expected result' of using the range of values which it 
can take. For this reason deterministic models are sometimes referred 
to as 'expected value' models. The model in its deterministic form has 
the advantage of being comparatively fast, and of being able to display 
the effect of small input changes which may be lost in the distribution 
of results from the equivalent Monte Carlo model. In its stochastic 
form, the model can offer guidance on specifically probabilistic 
questions, and it provides a means of calibrating the deterministic 
model.
We can assess the differences between the two versions of the model in 
terms of the combat cycle described by Smith (1968) - sightings, 
decision-taking, physical movement of combat units and firing.
Sighting - The two versions of the model differ in the representation 
of the fighter radar detection process, and in the estimation of raid 
position, speed and heading.
13
Decision-Taking - There is no difference between the two versions in 
the representation of decision-taking. All such processes in both 
versions are deterministic. To a large extent they are conditional 
upon input data, so that alternative decision processes can be 
investigated parametrically. These processes are not so complex that 
it was felt necessary to utilise interactive simulation techniques - 
see, for example, Ulvila and Brown (1978) and Modelski (1978). In such 
simulations all decision-making processes need not be formalised within 
model algorithms - players have freedom to make decisions during the 
execution of the simulation.
Physical Movement - In stochastic mode errors in the fighter heading 
are sampled from normal distributions, while in deterministic mode the 
model assumes a systematic heading error has been specified.
Firing - In stochastic mode the missile kill probability (P^) is 
compared with a uniform random variable to determine if an enemy 
aircraft has been killed. In deterministic mode fractional numbers of 
aircraft are allowed and exactly Pj^ aircraft are killed after a 
successful fighter attack.
Model Output
We list here typical elements which may be included in the output from 
most runs of the fighter model. Firstly, it is always useful to record 
at an appropriate point in the output the important input parameters. 
These could include the following factors.
a) Whether the run was stochastic or deterministic.
b) If stochastic, how many replications.
c) The time-span represented in the run.
d) The number of raids, and the proportion of each raid consisting of
escort jammers.
e) The number of fighter bases, with their names.
f) The number of fighter types, with their names.
g) Details of the timeliness and accuracy of the raid track 
information provided to the fighters by Ground Control.
h) Details of the fighter readiness levels.
i) Number of fighters scrambled on first detection of a raid; number 
of fighters scrambled when raid track information is available; 
ratio fighters: enemy aircraft required when the strength of a raid 
i s known.
j) Name of the radar type in each fighter type; whether each fighter 
type has a data-link, and/or a track-while-scan radar.
k) Some details on the performance of each missile type.
The primary measures of effectiveness in the fighter model are the two 
factors which would be of immediate application in a ’campaign’ level 
model - number of targets attacked successfully by the raids, and 
number of enemy aircraft shot down by fighters. In any particular 
study, statistics could also be collected on the following factors, 
under the broad headings of raid performance and fighter performance. 
Data may be presented for each fighter type and then accumulated or 
aggregated over all fighter types, or fighter bases.
a) Time from fighter take-off to start of first interception.
b) Co-ordinates of points where enemy aircraft shot down.
c) Total missiles fired.
d) Total enemy aircraft killed or damaged.
e) Fighter fuel/missiles still on board when forced to return to base.
f) Sortie duration.
g) Times at which enemy aircraft shot down.
h) Comparative success of fighters from different bases.
i) Reasons for failure of fighters to complete interceptions (e.g. 
raid track-change; raid passes through missile engagement zone; 
target already destroyed by another missile).
j) Effect on fighter intercept capability of ground radar or fighter 
radar tracking errors.
k) Comparison of the number and effectiveness of attacks by the 
various fighter types.
Verification and Validation
Considerable effort has been spent in verifying the mode/-, i.e. in 
ensuring that it behaves as it is planned to behave under well-defined 
circumstances. The verification procedure includes four of the five 
model acceptability criteria developed by Hermann (1967) and summarised 
by Mihram (1972).
1. Internal Validity - using model replication, and holding model 
inputs constant, to determine whether the variance of the responses 
is not too large;
2. Face Validity - using subjective opinions regarding the surface 
impressions of the model’s realism. (So-called 'military 
judgement’ - extremely important if the model, and study results 
produced using the model, are to have credibility amongst the 
military and civilian study sponsors).
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3. Variable-Parameter Validity - ’Sensitivity testing’ to ascertain 
whether the effects of changes in the model’s variables are 
compatible with comparable alterations in the modelled system.
4. Hypothesis Validity - examination of the sub-system relationships 
assumed within the model.
The fifth criterion - event validity - is now more commonly called 
validation (Fishman and Kiviat, 1967) - i.e. testing the agreement 
between the behaviour of the simulation model and the real air 
battle. Fortunately there has been no opportunity to validate the 
model in its principal scenarios. It may be possible to validate 
sub-sections of the model against operational trials - see, for 
example. Central Tactics and Trials Organisation (1975b & 1976), 
Parkinson et al (1978) and Clark et al (1978). Such validation is 
inevitably of limited value in a force or campaign level model; it 
is far more practicable and useful lower down the model hierarchy, 
at the total weapon, individual weapon or sensor, and component 
levels. Care must also be taken when extrapolating documented 
results on combat to the scenarios envisaged for the fighter model, 
namely intense combat between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. For 
example Herzog (1975) quotes an exchange ratio of 334:5 for 
air-to-air combat in the 1973 Middle East war.
8. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL - RAID INDIRECT ROUTING AND SENSOR 
INFORMATION ERRORS
The fighter model has been used in support of a major study at DOAE 
(Study 250), which investigates the influence of sensors on fighter 
intercept capability - see Bloomfield and Spencer (1977). In 
particular., the study considers the effects of the type and number of 
sensors on the proportion of enemy aircraft raids which are 
interceptable, and examines the sensitivity of fighter capability to 
changes in the warning distance (i.e. the distance at which the raid is 
detected, and identified as hostile and a threat). Before we consider 
the specific applications of the fighter model it is worthwhile to 
summarise the various components and interactions involved in an air 
defence battle. Of these components, the contributions of sensors, 
together with fighters, surface-to-air missiles and command and control 
systems, are assessed by Lord, Bloomfield and Spencer (1978). Lord and 
Spencer (1977) provide an elementary examination of an air defence 
battle, in which they address the problem of how the influence of 
sensors on fighter intercept capability fits into the overall analysis 
of air defence capability.
a ) Defence Components
The effectiveness of the air defence system - and indeed of the 
attacking aircraft - is measured in terms of the damage caused to 
the primary target system. The specification of this system is a 
major element in air defence analysis, since the loss or otherwise 
of primary targets is the major influence of the air defence battle
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on both the overall air campaign and the land and sea battles. 
Primary ground targets could include, for example, U.K. strike 
bases , naval dockyards, maritime headquarters , nuclear submarine 
bases, USAF bases (permanent and reinforcement), U.K. dispersal 
bases (i.e. forward operating bases), fighter bases, command and 
control centres, Fylingdales Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, 
air defence radars and sector operations centres (see, for example, 
Clark (1975)).
The principal aim of the air defence system is to reduce damage to 
these primary targets. Note that a significant degree of
protection against enemy aircraft attack may be provided by passive
defences. These could include, for example, the siting of strike 
aircraft in bomb-proof shelters and revetments; the camouflage of 
aircraft and ships; the use of dummy aircraft as spurious targets 
for low-level air-to-ground attacks and the dispersal of strike 
aircraft to the perimeters of their airfields.
The great weakness of passive defences is that they do not inflict 
losses on the attacking aircraft. In the face of passive defences 
only, enemy raids can continue flying sorties against the primary 
targets indefinitely, and whilst on a sortie they are not 
restricted in the amount of time spent over the target area in
detecting, identifying and attacking specific targets. The role of
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and fighters is to inflict losses on 
enemy aircraft, to force them to abort their missions and to 
minimise their attack effectiveness over the target area. These 
weapon systems can be classified as point defences and area 
defences. Point defences are short-range SAM systems - e.g.
Rapier - permanently and securely located around important targets. 
By definition they should provide considerable protection to these 
targets, but not necessarily to any other targets. Area defences, 
on the other hand, comprise medium and long-range SAMs 
(Thunderbird, Nike) and fighters; these are flexible weapon 
systems, designed to provide protection over a wide area. Area 
defences also generally pose a significantly greater threat than 
point defences to transitting enemy aircraft. The location of the 
fighter bases can be a significant factor in determining fighter 
effectiveness. Lord and Spencer (1978) provide some examples of 
the comparative cost-effectiveness of fighters and point defences 
for given passive defences of offensive military airfields, over a 
spectrum of possible threats. They also consider the conditions 
under which an appropriate mix of fighter and point defences might 
be considered. The choice of area defence system is strongly 
dependent on the magnitude of the threat, the targetting policy of 
the attacker, and the efficiency of the warning and control system.
There are other considerations in the comparison of fighter and 
missile systems which are not examined here. Chief among these is 
the fact that future war is likely to be graduated, and our 
response in times of tension has to be correspondingly graduated. 
Fighter aircraft are admirably suited to provide such a response, 
as opposed to SAM systems. This problem is summarised by
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Lord (1978), who raises the question of the balance between a 
'dynamic’ defensive system (founded on fighters and a complex 
communications, command and control system and oriented towards 
operations in peace and tension as well as war), and a ’static’ 
defensive system (based on medium and short range SAMs and passive 
defences and of great deterrent value, but only likely to be 
operational in time of war).
The final air defence component to be described is the control 
system. Composed of sensors and a C^ (Command, Control and 
Communication) system, it controls and co-ordinates the defensive 
response. The sensors may be Ground Control radars, airborne 
radars (Nimrod Airborne Early Warning aircraft). Continental Early 
Warning, fighter aircraft and SAM systems, and of course 
information received from strategically situated observers.
Borgart (1977) discusses the various means of detecting attacking 
aircraft. The control system comprises ground-based and airborne 
command centres, with advanced data handling technology 
(Sutherland, 1976) to process the information received from the 
various sensors; this information may be of varying accuracy, 
dependent upon its source, and may only be received intermittently. 
The control system must also identify the raid as hostile (Boyle, 
1977) and co-ordinate the defensive response - alert fighter bases 
and scramble aircraft; alert SAM systems; activate passive 
defensive measures (e.g. deploy dummy targets and disperse strike 
aircraft); re-deploy sensors such as AEW aircraft or transportable 
ground-based radars; activate ECCM responses in the face of enemy 
ECM, for ground-based radars (Central Tactics and Trials 
Organisation, 1975a)> or airborne radars (e.g. Ayker, 1975;
Driessen and Taal, 1975).
Bloomfield, Littlejohn and Spencer (1977) summarise some plans and 
concepts of operation for all these defence system components - 
fighters, SAMs, tankers, AEW, ground radars, main and dispersal 
aircraft bases, communications and command and control. Central 
Tactics and Trials Organisation (1978) provide more detail on 
operational techniques for the Air Defence Ground Environment (i.e. 
C^ + sensors) in the United Kingdom Air Defence Region (UKADR).
b ) Threat Components
Again, we begin the summary of the threat components with the 
primary target system. The enemy will attempt to destroy or 
disable these targets at the risk of the loss of his own attacking 
aircraft. These factors - damage caused to primary targets, enemy 
bombers and fighter-bombers lost, and enemy offensive sorties 
committed to attack U.K. targets which could have been used in 
support of the land battle elsewhere - are the means by which the 
outcome of the defensive air battle influences the overall air 
campaign, and hence the land battle. It is worth noting that the 
primary target system as perceived by the enemy may not necessarily 
coincide with that as perceived by the defence.
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The damage to the primary targets is inflicted by attack weapons, 
and we assume here that these are carried or launched by attack 
aircraft. The attack weapons may be free-fall bombs, guided bombs 
or missiles, stand-off missiles (i.e. self-powered missiles, with 
or without a homing capability, launched at some distance from the 
targets), and rockets or guns. The number of attack aircraft 
required to destroy or incapacitate chosen targets is a major 
factor in assessing the likelihood of attack. The attack 
effectiveness, and therefore the damage inflicted on the primary 
target system, is balanced against the defence effectiveness, i.e. 
the number of aircraft which must be committed to enemy raids in 
order to reach the targets in sufficient strength for an effective 
attack, and the total enemy losses suffered in transitting to and 
from the target area and in carrying out the attack.
Finally, major contributing factors to attack effectiveness are the 
enemy's support measures and tactics. Support measures include, 
for example:
escort jamming aircraft, or self-screening jamming pods 
attached to the attack aircraft;
stand-off jammers to degrade ground-based surveillance radars 
or fighter radars;
escort fighters to protect the attack aircraft while in transit 
and over the target area.
Tactics could include:
spacing and timing attacks in order to saturate ground 
defences ;
co-ordination of multiple attacks from all points of the 
compass ;
varying the altitude of transit in order to reduce the warning 
time given to the defence system;
use of dog-legs or indirect routing by the raids in order to 
confuse the fighter defences.
Bloomfield, Constable and Spencer (1977) summarise the 
(conventional) air threat to the U.K. in the late 1980's, while 
DSTI (1975a, 1975b) provide a more detailed analysis, particular of 
Soviet ECM capability.
In order to analyse the effect of the major sensor parameters certain 
simplifying assumptions were made in Study 250. In particular, it was 
assumed that:
(i) raids attack their targets along direct tracks;
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(11) the information provided to the fighters by Ground 
Control is accurate.
Assumption (i) relates to the tactics adopted by enemy raids while 
travelling towards their targets. Assumption (ii) should correspond 
to an enemy attack in ’clear' conditions, or at least with ineffective 
ECM support.
In this thesis we address the problems raised by relaxing these 
particular assumptions, and investigate the influence of bomber 
tactical routing and raid tracking accuracy on the intercept capability 
of fighters scrambled from ground alert. The two operational aspects 
of this study are analysed independently. In studying raid indirect 
routing it is assumed that the information provided to the fighters by 
the sensors through Ground Control (CC) is accurate. In the analysis 
of the effect of CC information errors, it is assumed that raids fly 
along direct tracks to their targets. (Here CC information could also 
refer to information received via AEW aircraft. Clark (1975) has 
investigated the probability of a fighter detecting a raid as a 
function of the accuracy of AEW track determination).
The fighter model was used extensively in the early phase of the study 
of the effects of raid indirect routing on fighter intercept 
capability. Having defined a reasonable measure of effectiveness 
(namely, the number of fighter interceptions achieved), several graphs 
were produced which summarised the study results. These are 
essentially the graphs presented as Figures 2.13 - 2.16 in Part 3 of 
the thesis. It was evident from these results that, even with highly 
detailed simulation output, no clear explanation of the convoluted 
shape of some of the graphs was possible. (The explanation of the 
derivation of the fighter model results was complicated by the 
inadequacy, of a numerical technique for calculating possible 
interception courses in the version of the model as first used in the 
study. Under certain conditions it underestimated the number of 
fighters scrambled against enemy raids, and hence underestimated the 
number of interceptions achieved). While the level of detail in the 
model made it operationally acceptable, the model results were not 
analytically understandable, so that robust conclusions of practical 
value could not be guaranteed. Consequently it was decided to examine 
raid indirect routing analytically, concentrating on the essential 
features of the problem. This approach was successful, in that the 
interactions between the various elements of the problem became 
evident, and the results of the study were more meaningful. The broad 
features of the problem are identified with the aid of the analytical 
model, while the significance of more involved or interactive elements 
can be examined with the simulation model. Part 3 of the thesis 
presents an extended and comprehensive version of this analytical 
model.
In the light of the study of raid indirect routing, the balance between 
a mathematical approach and the use of a simulation model was better 
planned for the analysis of the effects of sensor information errors.
An analytical model was constructed in order to appreciate the
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complexity of the interactions within the problem. Thô model 
concentrates on determining the maximum acceptable error in the
estimate of the raid track such that a fighter can still intercept the
raid, as a function of its 'warning distance'. This maximum acceptable 
error is calculated for an arbitrary delay before fighter take-off , and 
so the method can be applied to fighters scrambled at regular intervals
after the warning is received.
Only after the development of the mathematical model was the simulation 
model used in the study. The simulation includes factors which are of 
operational significance but are difficult to represent analytically.
It also calculates the fighter intercept effectiveness in a form which 
is difficult and time-consuming using the analytical model alone - viz. 
the number of interceptions achieved (out of a total of 20 fighters 
scrambled), as a function of the error in the estimate of the raid 
track, for a fixed warning distance. A detailed presentation of this 
analytical model, together with a summary of the use of the fighter 
model, is given in Part 4 of the thesis.
9. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF RAID INDIRECT ROUTING AND 
SENSOR INFORMATION ERRORS
In this Chapter we outline the mathematical models used to examine the 
effects of raid indirect routing and sensor information errors on 
fighter intercept capability. Many of the assumptions underlying the 
models are common to the studies of both raid indirect routing and 
sensor information errors. We outline these assumptions first before 
describing the aspects peculiar to each study.
The models consider a single fighter base defending a single offset 
target against attack from a concentrated (point) raid. The 
co-ordinate system utilised in the geometric analyses could be derived, 
for example, as in Figure 1. This illustrates the principal numerical 
inputs in the examples chosen in Parts 3 and 4. The fighter base 
providing the fighter defences represents Coningsby (at the origin of 
co-ordinates), while the y-axis represents a 'target axis'. Fighter 
interceptions are regarded as successful only if they are achieved 
before the raid penetrates the target axis, with attacks coming from 
the hemisphere x > 0. This introduces a form of area defence and 
eliminates the need to define an expected target system, or to specify 
which fighter bases are likely to defend particular targets. With this 
convention we may take the raid target to be the intersection of the 
raid track with the target axis. In the numerical examples considered 
later we take this point to be half-way between the fighter base and 
its nearest neighbour along the target axis, i.e. Leuchars (see Figure 
1). The distance perpendicular to the target axis at which detection 
by CC sensors first occurs is called the warning distance. A number of 
the values of warning distance considered in the examples are 
sufficiently small so as to correspond to low-level attacks, at high 
subsonic speed. It can be seen from the assumptions described here, 
namely:
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(i) single fighter base;
(ii) point raid;
(iii) 'area defence' of a target axis;
(iv) maximum target offset along this axis;
(v) low-level attacks;
that the scenarios considered in the numerical examples are in a number 
of respects pessimistic for the fighter defences. Favourable 
conclusions concerning the viability of the fighter defences which can 
be drawn under these circumstances are then likely to hold also under 
more favourable conditions for fighter operations.
Following initial detection of the raid there is assumed to be a
delay for sensor and GC processing and transmission --
followed by a reaction delay representing the readiness level of the 
fighters. It is further assumed that, during these delays, the raid is 
identified as hostile and approaching (i.e. does not consist of 
stand-off jammers, patrolling outside defended airspace and emitting 
noise or deception jamming in support of the attacking raids), and is 
in sufficient strength to warrant fighter scramble. There is also a 
delay between each fighter scrambled for take-off. No limitation is
assumed in the analysis on the number of fighters at the base, although
in the numerical examples presented there are taken to be at most 
twenty.
Because of the underlying assumption that raid penetration is carried 
out at low-level, which places severe constraints on the upper speed 
limits of both the enemy raids and the fighters scrambled from ground 
alert, the fighter and raid profiles during the period in which raids 
are vulnerable to fighter attack are approximated by constant speed. 
Interception is represented by 'collision', the coincidence of the 
fighter and the raid on their respective tracks , with no allowance made 
for offsets for forward or rear engagements, or for re-attacks.
Indirect Routing
The raid is assumed to fly one feint leg, at the end of which it heads 
directly for its target. The position, speed and course of the raid at 
first detection, and at its track-change, are assumed correctly 
estimated by Ground Control. The raid track-change point is assumed to 
be pre-planned by the attacker, i.e. as opposed to evasive manoeuvre in 
direct response to fighter attack.
The maximum allowable fighter take-off delay for successful 
interception is used as a measure of fighter effectiveness. In the 
numerical examples, results are also presented in terms of the number 
of interceptions achieved before the raid reaches its target.
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Four scramble and control policies are examined, as described below.
The analysis is simplified considerably if interceptions are 
categorised into three distinct types. The effects of different raid 
feint tracks and warning distances on the number of interceptions 
achieved of each type may then be studied for the different scramble 
and control policies .
Scramble Policies
I Scramble is continued as long as interception is
expected to occur before the target axis.
II Scramble is continued as long as fighters possess a
geometrically feasible interception course.
Ill The feint leg is ignored and fighters fly along the
target axis to a patrol position located directly over 
the target.
IV Scramble is continued as long as fighters can expect to
intercept within a specified time (or distance) from 
the fighter base.
Categories of Interception
(i) Interception on the feint leg.
(ii) Interception on the second leg of the track by fighters
re-allocated from expected interceptions on the feint 
leg, as a result of the raid track change.
(iii) Interception on the second track-leg by fighters
scrambled to intercept the second track-leg. This
comprises all interceptions under scramble policy III, 
while under the other policies it corresponds to 
fighters scrambled to intercept only after detection of
the track-change by the warning sensors.
Because of the assumed accuracy and timeliness of the GC information, 
the fighters' radar detection performance may be ignored in this 
initial analysis. Thus it is assumed that, if an airborne fighter does 
not detect the raid track-change, it is nevertheless informed by Ground 
Control, after an appropriate processing delay, of its new interception 
course against the raid on its second track-leg. Further, it is 
assumed that the reaction delay to the track-change by fighters which 
are operating on GC information is equal to the reaction delay to the 
track-change by fighters which have already detected the raid and are 
operating autonomously.
The raid and fighter geometry is illustrated in Figure 2. The 'target' 
is at the point T with co-ordinates (0,y-j- )• Each feint track has an 
associated feint angle ^ » i*e. the angle between the x-axis and the
feint track. Given the feint angle , the feint track is fully defined
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by specifying its point of intersection F with the target axis , or the 
distance from the feint track to the target, measured perpendicular 
to the target axis. The track-change angle 0 is the angle between the 
feint track and the second track-leg. Six configurations of the feint 
track and the second track-leg are considered in Part 3, and Figure 2 
illustrates one of these, in which the raid feints north of the target 
and ^ > 0 .  This case represents the geography underlying the numerical 
examples discussed later.
The raid travels at a constant speed U and is first detected at the 
point S, with co-ordinates (x^, y^), where Xq is the warning 
distance. The raid changes track at the point C, which is defined 
either by the track-change angle 9 or the feint time tg, which is the 
time spent on the feint track after initial detection. Following this 
initial detection there is taken to be a fixed delay Dp for Ground 
Control processing and transmission of the sensor information, followed 
by a further reaction delay D^ representing the readiness level of 
the fighters. There is also a delay Dg between each fighter 
take-off, after which fighters fly with constant speed V.
If the first fighter scrambled also suffers the delay Dg then the 
total delay before take-off, D, for the I-th fighter scrambled is given 
by :
D = (Dp + Dj.) + I.Dg (I = 1, 2, 3 ...). (1)
Finally, it is assumed that, whether or not a fighter is capable of 
detecting the raid track-change on its own radar, it adopts if 
practicable its new interception course against the second track-leg 
after a delay D^ with respect to the time of the track-change.
Examples
The analysis of the number of interceptions achieved in each category, 
under the various scramble policies, for different feint tracks and 
warning distances, is presented in Appendices A and B of Part 3. Here 
we describe simple examples which are of interest and practical 
significance. In these examples the geographical scenario is shown in 
Figure 2. Fighters are assumed to fly at the same speed as the raid 
(V = U) and are assumed able to respond immediately to the track-change 
(D(, = 0), which is taken to be at right angles to the feint track 
iO = )  • It is easily seen that equation (1) relates the maximum 
allowable take-off delay for successful interception to the 
corresponding number of interceptions, so the measure of effectiveness 
can be taken as the number of interceptions achieved before the raid 
reaches its target. These examples are analysed in detail in Part 3, 
for a range of numerical inputs. The outcome of this analysis is then 
discussed, and conclusions drawn as to the conditions under which 
indirect routing is beneficial to a raid, in terms of reducing the 
number of successul interceptions.
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Sensor Information Errors
Errors in the initial Ground Control estimates of raid position, speed 
and heading at initial detection are considered. A pessimistic case 
for the fighters is examined, in which the initial erroneous GC 
estimate of the raid track is not updated, with presumably more 
accurate information, as the raid continues its approach. Hence 
fighters must themselves detect the raid before they correct their 
courses. This provides a ’worst-case' background for the study. In 
the analysis of sensor information errors it is assumed that raids do 
not engage in indirect routing but fly directly towards their targets. 
The measure of fighter effectiveness is the maximum acceptable 
error in the estimated raid track which still allows a fighter to 
intercept, expressed as a function of the timeliness of the warning 
provided by GC. (The analysis is then extended, by use of the fighter 
model, to give values for mean fighter intercept effectiveness for 
normally distributed errors with zero mean). Expressions are first 
derived for the maximum acceptable error under which fighters are 
scrambled (for scramble policies I, II, and IV, as defined in the study 
of raid indirect routing). The maximum acceptable errors that still 
enable a scrambled fighter to achieve radar detection of the raid are 
then determined. Finally, if a fighter detects the raid, the 
feasibility of it correcting its course and intercepting the raid is 
determined; if an interception is possible then the final interception 
point is calculated.
Fighters are assumed to have deterministic radar detection capability, 
defined by the radar range and angle of scan. Within the sector of the 
circle defined by these parameters a fighter detects with 100% 
probability, while it has zero probability of detection outside this 
sector. (This deterministic radar range parameter can be derived from 
a graph showing radar detection probability as a function of range, 
under given operating conditions).
Table 1 and Figure 3 summarise the raid parameters considered in the 
analysis. The x- and y-coordinates of the raid at first detection are 
termed the warning distance and offset respectively. The raid is 
believed to be first detected at the point Sj with co-ordinates 
(xf, yf), estimated speed Uf and estimated heading ; it is in 
fact first detected at the point with co-ordinates (x^, y^), 
speed and heading Given the scramble time and the initial
fighter heading (determined by the GC estimate of the raid track), 
three parameters determine the fighters’ capabilities - speed V 
(assumed constant), radar range R and angle of scan +0( •
Examples
The numerical examples presented in Part 4 refer to a raid which is 
flying at the same constant speed as the fighter and on a direct track 
to the target which is perpendicular to the target axis, so that
V =
and
V't = 0.
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In the analysis of the various conditions for scramble, fighter 
detection of the raid, feasible interception and successful 
interception (i.e. before the raid reaches its target), errors in 
estimating the initial raid coordinates, speed and track are studied 
independently. A full discussion of these examples is given in Part 4.
10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis we have described the construction of a simulation model 
of fighter operations. This is an event-based simulation, set at the 
level of an air defence sector, which can run in either deterministic 
or stochastic mode. It concentrates on the representation of fighter 
radar, ECM and command and control. The role of the fighter model in a 
hierarchy of defence modelling techniques is illustrated.
The fighter model is applied to two operational problems in air 
defence, namely, the effects of raid indirect routing and sensor 
information errors on fighter intercept capability. Several 
deficiencies became apparent in the application of a detailed 
simulation model to these problems without additional mathematical 
analysis (cf. Lord (1978)):
- the model did not give an early enough quantitative appreciation 
of the interplay between the important variables;
- insufficient importance was paid to the wide range of numerical 
uncertainty in practically all the input data;
there was an over-striving for depth of 'realistic’ detail in order 
to achieve operational credibility and acceptance.
Mathematical models of both these aspects of fighter operations were 
constructed. These models concentrate on a deterministic treatment of 
the interactions between the important elements in the problems. This 
’dual’ approach of combined mathematical and simulation modelling was 
successful, in that the study results were both analytically 
understandable and operationally acceptable. The use of the simulation 
model was better planned, to include operational factors which were 
difficult to represent analytically, or to present information in a 
form which would have been impractical or time-consuming using 
analytical models alone.
OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS
Raid Indirect Routing
Ample warning distance tends to negate any possible advantage to the 
raid of indirect routing. For a target offset by about 100 nm from the 
fighter base, and for warning distances between 200 nm and 300 nm, the 
fighter intercept capability depends quite strongly on the scramble 
policy. There exists a range of raid feint angles which can 
drastically reduce the number of possible interceptions if a
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conservative scramble policy is adopted. By being prepared to scramble 
against an identified raid without close regard to the estimated 
position of interception the defence can nullify the possible 
deleterious effects of well-planned indirect routing.
It should be noted that, at the level at which this analysis is set, 
the possible disadvantages of such scramble policies are not considered 
here. These include, for example, the situation in which fighters are 
out of action at base for refuelling after an ’optimistic' scramble 
when further raids penetrate their specified area of cover.
Sensor Information Errors
If a reasonable warning distance can be achieved realistic errors in 
estimating the raid parameters do not degrade the fighter intercept 
capability, provided the range at which the fighters detect is not 
itself seriously degraded. The warning distance necessary depends on 
the number of fighters required to intercept the raid. To achieve 20 
interceptions from a single fighter base against a raid on a 
perpendicular track to a target offset by about lOOnm, errors in 
estimated offset distance and raid heading appear to be potentially the 
most serious. The assumed ability of the fighter radar to maintain its 
detection capability (by bearings-only analysis against self-screening 
jamming), together with the fighters’ assumed ability to respond 
quickly to a detection, contribute significantly to their ability to 
tolerate GC sensor information errors.
The results presented go some way towards a classification of the more 
effective procedures which the defence might adopt in the face of 
deceptive raid tactics and degraded sensor performance. They indicate 
the value of ample warning distance to the fighter defences, together 
with early, resolution of raid size in order that sufficient fighters 
may be scrambled quickly, albeit not necessarily with well-defined 
interception courses. However, the numerical examples presented are in 
no way definitive; they are selected to display certain facets of the 
problems although many interactions between variables remain 
unexplored.
TABLE 1
PARAMETERS INVOLVED IN THE ANALYSIS
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RAID PARAMETERS AT INITIAL DETECTION
Actual
x-coordinate(warning distance) 
y-coordinate (offset) 
range from fighter base 
bearing ” " "
heading
speed (constant)
Estimated by Ground Control (GC) 
X r
Speed (constant) 
delay before take-off 
radar range 
radar angle of scan
U.
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PART 2.1  
GUIDE TO THE 
FIGHTER MODEL
INTRODUCTION
1. Three complementary models representing the major components of air 
defence operations - Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE), fighters and 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have been developed at DOAE. This paper 
describes the Fighter Model.
2. The aim is to give a general description of the model and to suggest 
ways in which it could be further developed in Parti/, while Part IX  is a 
detailed description of the model structure. The introductory paragraphs 
of Part describe the general scenario to be represented and the model 
structure, and list the event types included in the simulation. These are 
followed by sections covering enemy raids, fighter activities, command and 
control, threat matching and fighter allocation, a summary of the main 
sequence of events for fighters, AI radar and jamming, and fighter response 
to AI detections. Some technical details on the event processing of fighters 
are then described, while the final sections of Part summarise the most 
important assumptions made in the model and outline possible extensions 
which could increase its scope and applicability.
3. Part 12 of the paper explains the processing of each subroutine in 
the model, taken in alphabetical order. Annex A is a glossary of the 
variable names which occur in the model, while Annex B is an example of a 
simple test data file for use with the model. This gives some idea both of 
the scenarios envisaged and of the sort of data which will need to be collected 
for any study involving the model.
4. The model represents operations at the level of an air defence sector; 
at this level substantial simplification is essential. In particular, it 
was considered that the detailed representation of missile flight paths, 
fusing and lethality and the representation of dog-fights could not be 
included in a fighter model at this level without making it impossibly 
complex. The model concentrates on the representation of AI radar, ECM and 
command and control, whereas the representation of fighter aerodynamics
is highly simplified. Performance data on acceleration and fuel consumption 
rates in various flight profiles must be specified, for each fighter type, 
in the input data; the model does not calculate these parameters itself.
MODEL SCENARIO
5. The scenario envisaged for the model concerns the incursion into 
friendly airspace - for example, the UK Air Defence Region (UKADR) - of
a number of subsonic or supersonic bomber raids, with possible support from 
specialist escort jammers and stand-off jammers. The duration of the incursion 
is determined by the time taken for the bombers to fly from the limits of 
early warning cover to their targets and back again. Enemy aircraft will be
vulnerable to attack throughout this i)crio(J.
6. The model can represent alternative tactics on both the attacking and 
defending sides, and insofar as tactics are ex])l icitly represented, details 
are given at the appropriate places in the paper. It is not the intention 
of the model, however, to define the tactical behaviour of a force, but 
rather to leave tactics as much as possible a function of model input data. 
It is important to note that a long term air defence strategy is not 
represented, and it is not currently planned to incorporate such a campaign 
analysis facility in the model. In particular the recovery, turn-round and 
serviceability of fighters is not directly represented. Also the allo­
cation policy is concerned only with matching the immediate threats, rather 
than representing some overall strategy.
7. Regions of airspace prohibited to fighters (eg Missile Engagement 
Zones) are represented in the model by series of straight-line boundaries 
which fighters may not cross.
MODEL STRUCTURE
8. The model is an 'event-based' simulation, any significant occurrence 
to any entity in the model being called an event for that entity. For 
example, events for bomber raids would include track-change points; events 
for fighters include take-off, change of acceleration or fuel-consumption 
rate, and detection of target. As a final example, the total radar and 
ECM picture is updated throughout a model run, the time-interval between 
occurrences of this process corresponding roughly to the scan-time of the 
fighters' radars. The event which triggers this process is called the 
radar-scan event.
9. At an occurrence of any event all possible consequences of that 
event are considered and, in particular, any new events which are generated 
must be set up. Thus if there is little activity at any stage in a model 
run few events will occur and hence computer time will not be wasted in 
needless updating. Conversely, if there is a great deal of activity in
a short period of time, each event will be considered and acted upon 
separately,in chronological order. Thus the heart of the program is simply 
a list of all events and the data associated with each event - the time 
at which it is to occur, the type of the event and the entity to which it 
occurs. As each event occurs and its consequences are examined this list 
is amended as necessary, with new events being inserted and cancelled 
events deleted.
Mode of Operation
10. Two versions of the model have been written, a stochastic ('Monte 
Carlo') version and a deterministic ('expected value') version. In the 
Monte Carlo model, whenever the value of a random variable is required,
it is derived from a suitable distribution using a random number generator. 
The results of the simulation are also random variables, and to obtain 
reliable information concerning their average values the program must 
be run many times with independent sets of random numbers. In the deter­
ministic model, on the other hand, the use of each random variable is 
replaced by a process intended to represent the 'expected result' of using
Again because of the possible Ground Control(GC) reaction delay, 
this is done via a subsidiary event, type 20.
Event type 3 corresponds to the first detection of a raid by Ground 
Control. It is generated when the raid crosses warning line 1 
(pàra 29). A specified number of fighters is scrambled to a holding 
CAP on a least-time-to-CAP basis. After take-off these fighters search 
for enemy raids on their AI radars.
Event types 4 and 13 correspond to the acquisition of track information 
on a raid by Ground Control. Event type 4 is generated when the 
raid crosses warning line 2 (para 29) and event type 13 when a fighter 
achieves bumthrough on the raid. The processing associated with 
these events is very similar. Fighters already attacking the raid 
are given new interception courses. A specified number of fighters 
is required to attack the raid once track information is available; an 
attempt is made to meet any shortfall, preferably from fighters cruising 
to or on CAP, or else from unallocated fighters on alert at the 
fighter bases.
Event type 5 corresponds to the acquisition by Ground Control of 
accurate information on raid strength. It is generated either when 
a raid crosses warning line 3 (para 29) or when a fighter is 
sufficiently close to the raid to resolve it on its AI radar. The 
input data contains a parameter which specifies the ratio of fighters: 
enemy aircraft which GC attempts to achieve when the strength of a 
raid is known.
Event type 6 is the most complex event in the model. It corresponds 
to the updating, at a specified frequency, of the complete radar 
and ECM picture for each fighter and raid. In particular it deter­
mines, for each fighter and raid, the raid signal strength at the 
fighter, the total jamming experienced by the fighter when it is 
illuminating the raid and the fighter's background noise and clutter 
levels. Knowing these values the fighter's response to the raid is then 
determined.
Event type 7 is a fighter take-off. The fighter's first change of profile- 
point (event type 8) is set up at take-off.
Event type 8 corresponds to a fighter reaching a profile-point, at 
which its acceleration or fuel consumption rate changes; each event 
type 8 generates its successor.
Event type 9 Fighter arrives on CAP and
Event type 10 Fighter reaches a CAP point.
A distinction between these two events is only drawn in order to make 
the arrival of a fighter on CAP distinct from its ensuing progression 
through the CAP points.
Event type 11 Fighter returns to base. This event is generated 
if a fighter, unable to continue a planned interception, cannot
reach any of the pre-defined CAP patterns. While flying back to 
base the fighter may detect and attack enemy raids on its AI radar.
Event type 12 Fighter reaches its expected interception point.
The measure of fighter effectiveness adopted in the model may be 
event type 12 (collision) or event type 16 (missile splash); this 
is controlled by input data. With either measure, if a fighter's 
interception course is so much in error that it reaches its expected 
interception point without even detecting its target, the planned 
interception is abandoned. If the fighter has detected its target 
and the measure of effectiveness is event type 16, this event is 
ignored while the fighter continues its attack. Otherwise, if 
collision suffices as a measure of fighter effectiveness, it is 
unnecessary to model reattack sequences, so that (after printing 
interception information and collecting statistical data) no 
further processing is required at this event.
Event type 13 GC acquires track information from a fighter.
The processing associated with this event is very similar to 
that of event type 4; the two event types enable the source of 
track information on a raid to be identified.
Event type 14 recalculates a fighter's interception course, after 
a track-change by its target.
Event type 15 spare.
Event type 16 missile splash. The missile kill probability, P^, is 
calculated; this depends upon the missile type, the ECM conditions 
and the hemisphere of the attack. In stochastic mode a random variable 
determines if a kill has been achieved, while in deterministic mode 
fractional numbers of enemy aircraft are allowed and exactly P, aircraft 
are eliminated. The fighter then enters a reattack sequence to 
choose its next target.
Event type 17 missile launch check. This event tests at discrete 
intervals the range from a fighter to its target to determine if it is 
within missile launch range. It it is not the next event type 17 
for this fighter is generated, while if it is within range a 
missile is launched and the missile splash event (type 16) is 
generated.
Event type 18 Fighter released after a turn. The simplification 
is currently adopted that the spatial movement of a fighter during 
a turn between attacks in a reattack sequence may be neglected, 
ie its x-and y-coordinates remain frozen. This event releases a 
fighter at the end of such a turn in order that it may continue on 
its next planned interception.
Event type 19 spare.
Event type 20 is generated by a raid track-change (event type 2).
It tests if there is any shortfall in the number of fighters attacking 
the raid after its track-change. If so it attempts to meet this 
shortfall, preferably from fighters cruising to or on CAP, or else 
from unallocated fighters on alert at the fighter bases.
THE REPRESENTATION OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT
12. The model is designed to represent attack by a number of groups of 
enemy aircraft. The size of each group can be varied - anything from a 
single aircraft to a large rectangular array of aircraft. The flight 
path of each group is specified by a series of line segments, each 
segment being flown at constant heading, speed and height. Bomber 
weapon release occurs at a pre-specified track change point. Raids and 
fighters are interactive inasmuch as the jamming output of a raid may depend 
upon the number, type and strength of the radar detections of that raid
by the fighters. Detections do not affect the raid tracks, ie fully 
interactive raid behaviour, incorporating evasive manoeuvres, is not 
model led.
13. Enemy aircraft are vulnerable to attack whenever they are outside 
designated SAM engagement zones, and they remain vulnerable even when 
returning eastwards having completed their missions. The event sequence 
of a raid terminates if all the aircraft within the raid are killed.
14. Two types of aircraft may be present within a raid; bombers (which 
may be self-screening jammers) and specialist escort jammers. Fighter 
escorts are not modelled. It is not possible to represent continuously 
the 3-D position of every fighter and every enemy aircraft in the model - 
this would make the program far too inefficient. The representation of 
the detailed structure of enemy raids is therefore varied according to 
the requirements at the time. A raid is normally considered as con­
centrated at a point, for example when interception courses are calculated, 
and the jamming output of a raid is normally considered as a point source 
of jamming. Providing the group of aircraft described in the model as a 
'raid' does not extend over too great a distance, this is a reasonable 
approximation. The structure of a raid is considered in detail only in 
determining:
a. Its radar cross-section, in terms of the cross-sections of 
its constituent bomber-type and specialist jammer-type.
b. A resolution factor, viz the ratio of the width of the raid 
(as perceived by a fighter) to the beamwidth of that fighter's 
radar when it illuminates the raid. It is a crude measure of 
the number of independent glimpses of a raid which a fighter 
acquires when its radar scans through it, and is used in determining 
the probability of detection of the raid by the fighter and the 
effective jamming power of the raid.
c. The number of aircraft in the raid, referred to in this paper 
as the raid size; the point at which a fighter determines raid 
g^2G of course depends upon the aircraft spacing within the raid.
(It is assumed that raid size is determined accurately by actually
8resolving the raid on the fighter's radar rather than by crude 
estimation from the total radar echoing area).
d. The next target within a raid for a fighter in a reattack 
sequence.
15. It is worth mentioning here a point of notation. The standard 
grouping of enemy aircraft in the model is a rectangular array of aircraft 
in m rows and n columns, where m or n or both may equal 1 (see figure 0.1). 
This of course is an idealised structure, and may not at all approximate 
to the raid structure in the particular scenarios under consideration. 
Nevertheless, since any number of such groups may be defined in the model, 
clearly a raid of arbitrary size and shape may be specified by an approp­
riate combination of such groups. For the sake of simplicity only, the 
single group of aircraft illustrated in figure 0.1 is taken in the rest 
of this paper to be a typical raid, while the columns of such a raid are 
referred to as flights. So far it has not been necessary to represent 
individual enemy aircraft explicitly. The numbers of each type of aircraft 
within each flight of a raid must be specified in the input data, but the 
positions of individual aircraft within a flight are not specified. After 
a successful missile-firing the type of target killed is decided by sampling 
from a suitable distribution.
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FIGURE 0.1. TYPIC AL STRUCTURE OF AN ENEMY RAID
Notes:
This is an example of a group of 12 aircraft; the 
separations dx, dy are specified in the input data.
THE REPRESENTATION OF FIGHTERS
16. When a model run starts, fighters will be either already airborne 
in loiter patterns, or waiting at air bases in queues to be scrambled.
The control routine, depending on available information, then allocates 
fighters either to intercept enemy raids or to particular CAPs, whence 
the fighters are free to make their own detections and interceptions using 
AI radar. Interception courses are more or less accurate depending on the 
degree of control available and the accuracy of track information. When 
interceptions finally occur, fighters attack enemy aircraft with either 
radar or infra-red homing missiles. Fighters, having completed first 
attacks, may reattack further aircraft either in the same raid or in 
other raids. The following paragraphs each describe a specific aspect
of fighter operations.
Flight Paths
17. Flight paths are represented by storing for each aircraft type a 
number of flight profiles in the form of velocity: time points and fuel- 
consumption rate: time points, approximating the actual performance of 
the aircraft. Different profiles can be envisaged for different 
fighter altitudes, different enemy altitudes and different fighter store 
configurations (drop-tanks in particular). These profiles will be 
specified as input data using the available estimates of fighter performance
18. Each fighter is only permitted to intercept and engage an enemy air­
craft if this leaves it with enough fuel to return to a base and since 
the fuel consumed during combat is unpredictable, threshold fuel levels 
are set beyond which certain activities are prohibited. In-flight 
refuelling of the fighters is not included in the current version of the 
model.
19. The model incorporates the effects of altitude only implicitly, via 
data. Two principle aspects of fighter operations are importantly affected 
by altitude considerations :
a. A climb usually requires either more time or more fuel (usually 
considerably more of the latter) than a descent or level flight over 
the same horizontal distance. This aspect of altitude can be 
included in the velocity: time and fuel: time curves used for 
assessing flight profiles.
b. The pulse and pulse doppler clutter calculations involve a 
degree of approximation at present. The clutter experienced by
a fighter depends on its altitude and orientation in the vertical plane 
and the model does not regularly update these parameters.
Air-to-Air Missiles
20. The fighter model represents both radar and infra-red homing missiles.
For each missile a representation of the maximum and minimum launch 
envelopes is stored, together with the corresponding time-of-flight, as 
a function of target aspect angle. The effectiveness of a missile after 
launch is represented as simply as possible by a series of kill probabilities.
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which are a function of two factors:
(i) Whether the attack is essentially forward hemisphere or rear 
hemisphere.
(ii) The ECM conditions prevailing, at time of launch for infra-red 
missiles and atmissile-splash for radar missiles. (The difference 
is because radar missiles need to be guided during their flight).
Three such conditions are modelled:
a. Clear
b. Home-on-Jam (HOJ). In this mode the fighter, having 
achieved bumthrough and so adopted an autonomous interception 
course, is denied current range information. In the model the 
fighter is assumed to continue on its interception course and 
to launch a missile when within the launch envelope. Any 
degradation in missile effectiveness when it is launched in 
this reversionary, mode is subsumed into the final missile 
lethality.
c. Angle-on-Jam (AOJ). This mode gives the lowest kill 
probability, it being the reversionary mode when the fighter 
has no range information.
It is left to the input data on missile launch envelope and kill prob­
ability to reflect the fact that IR homing missiles are normally only fired 
successfully in a rear hemisphere attack, while radar homing missiles can 
be fired from behind or ahead of the enemy, the latter being preferred.
The effect of an altitude difference between a fighter and its target on 
missile kill probability, in a snap-up or snap-down attack, is not 
represented.
Air bases
21. During the time-period envisaged for the fighter model scenarios, it 
is not expected that turn-round of returning fighters at air bases will 
contribute significantly to the air defence effort. Hence air bases are 
represented very simply as queues of aircraft able to take off at regular 
time intervals when required, and aircraft returning to base are subsequently 
ignored. Apart from its position and the numberand availability of its 
aircraft, an air base has no other significance in the model.
CAPS
22. CAPs are represented in the model by a series of points, and fighters 
fly straight lines between these points in a specified order; thus CAPs 
of arbitrary shape and orientation may be defined. Fighters on CAP 
cruise at an input height, speed and fuel-consumption rate. All aircraft 
on CAP utilise their radars to detect enemy targets; fighters may also 
be tasked to close-controlled interceptions from CAP. Hence CAPs are 
treated both as a means of detection and as a source of fighters.
II
COMMAND AND CONTROL
23. The aspects of command and,control represented in the fighter model 
are those activities of an SOC (Sector Operations Centre) or a CRC 
(Control and Reporting Centre) which particularly affect fighters. This 
is not done by modelling any components of the control centre, but by 
concentrating on the interactions between the control centre and the fighter 
force.
24. Two general principles characterise the command and control routines 
and while they are not thought to be unrealistic, they do illustrate the 
somewhat ideal approach used:
a. The decision-making is effectively short term, each 
decision being a more or less immediate response to a new
item of incoming information. This approach is quite deliberate, 
since it simplifies the logic and matches the fairly short term 
scenario featured in the model, but it does omit any longer term 
considerations such as planning for special enemy raids expected 
in the future, and at no stage does it analyse the deployment of the 
whole air defence fighter force.
b. The other principle of note is that the allocation of fighters 
to specific targets is not changed unless interceptions become 
impossible.
25. There are four control modes currently represented in the model - 
close control, broadcast control, data link control and autonomous control. 
These control modes are not represented directly, but implicitly via their 
effects on fighter operations; in particular, the control mode of a 
fighter determines its communications delays and heading errors.
26. Whenever possible, a fighter will be close-controlled along its 
interception course. If there are insufficient intercept controller 
positions available it is directed by broadcast control, which is normally 
subject to increased error and delay. When a fighter has detected its 
target, it is assumed in the model to be released from its intercept 
controller, if any, and to operate autonomously.
27. Command and control is represented as an information-processing 
function, and the control of fighters can be broken down into three items:
a. Maintaining an up-to-date picture of the current situation, as 
regards both enemy threats and friendly aircraft, as a basis for 
decision-making. In addition, the future availability of air 
defence fighters, as regards crews, aircraft, bases, etc forms an 
important part of the total picture.
b. Deciding how best to meet the current threat and any 
anticipated future threat.
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c. Implementing the decision of b., in the form, of tasking 
individual aircraft. Details of the representation of these 
items in the model are given below, while the next section 
considers item b. in more general terms.
28. The structure of the control routine in the model is straightforward; 
each new piece of information received is analysed and then acted upon, 
after an appropriate time delay. Information either originates exogenously, 
to represent the acquisition of information by Air Defence Ground Environment 
(ADGE) radars,or else it is generated when some event occurs to some
entity in the model; for example, fighters may report details of a kill 
or an enemy track-change back to the control centre. For simplicity, 
only a limited number of information categories are represented in the 
model; they are described in the following paragraphs.
29. A detailed representation of ground-based EW or AEW radar is not 
attempted. Instead, within the model information about enemy raids is 
generated, with appropriate errors and communications delays, either by 
the fighters themselves or when the raids cross a series of three 
'warning lines'. Each warning line is represented by a series of line- 
segments, the positions of which are data inputs to the model. Data in 
this form can be generated by a model of the Air Defence Ground Environment, 
or it can simply be generated manually. Warning line 1 corresponds to 
first knowledge of the existence of the raid, line 2 to knowledge of its 
present position, velocity and altitude, and line 3 to knowledge of the 
raid size. The following paragraphs describe the processing carried out 
within the model when this information becomes available.
Initial Detection of an Enemy Raid
30. This is the most limited category of information concerning an enemy 
raid represented in the model, comprising knowledge of its existence, but 
with only very rough quantitative information. Initial detection occurs 
when a raid crosses warning line 1, which could correspond to, eg, the 
limit of UKADGE radar coverage. When a raid crosses this line a number 
of fighters (up to a maximum specified in the input data) are scrambled 
to a holding CAP. The fighters are chosen on a least-time-to-CAP basis, 
assuming that they fly to the CAP in a cruise profile. After take-off 
their own radars begin operating in the search for enemy aircraft. With a 
fast raid, of course, detections may occur even before the CAP is reached.
Raid Track Information
31. Information on raid position, speed and heading is generated when 
a raid crosses warning line 2. Delays and errors in the estimates of 
these parameters, representing degraded communications, can be specified 
in the input data. Note that this information may also be generated by 
any fighter which is tracking the raid on its radar. Errors in the 
estimates of the raid parameters are assumed to be generated from normal 
distributions with zero mean. Each fighter type has specified as input 
its air-ground communications delay together with the standard deviations 
of its error distributions. Regardless of where the information came from 
the model then finds and allocates a number of fighters to intercept
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the raid. These are chosen on a least-time-to-intercept basis, assuming 
the appropriate interception profile has been selected; the number of 
fighters allocated is specified in the input data. The interception 
algorithm also takes into account fuel and out-of-bound limitations and 
heading errors.
32. A raid track change, after the generation of its initial track 
information as described above, also comes into this category. When this 
occurs in the model, every fighter allocated to the raid is tested to see 
if it can still intercept. (For example, a fighter may no longer be able 
to intercept because of inadequate fuel reserves, or because the new 
interception point is outside the permitted fighter area). If a fighter 
can still intercept, its new interception course is adopted, otherwise it 
is allocated to another raid, if possible, or else it cruises to a 
holding CAP. A new fighter is found to replace it in the attack on the 
original raid, again on a least-time-to-intercept basis.
Raid Size Information
33. Raid size information consists of a useful indication of the number 
of aircraft in the raid. It is generated either when a raid crosses 
warning line 3, or by the fighters themselves when the raid gets sufficiently 
close to be resolved on their AI radars. This information enables the 
number of fighters assigned to the raid to be changed to meet the des­
ired fighter: attacker ratio (specified in the input data). Is is of 
course possible that a raid may never reach warning lines 2 or 3, if for 
example it flies at very low level in the absence of Airborne Early 
Warning (AEW), or if it is designed as a deliberate spoof, with limited 
penetration of defended air-space.
Information that a Fighter is 'Free"
34. Fighters become 'free' for further tasks in the model either when 
an enemy raid is completely destroyed, or when a planned interception 
is no longer feasible, perhaps because the enemy has changed track. A 
'free' fighter is provisionally sent to a CAP, where it continues 
searching on its AI radar for new targets; it is also available for 
reallocation by Ground Control to attack another target.
Information that a Fighter has Detected its Target
35. This information is of significance because, in the model, it 
represents the assumption of intercept control by the fighter,possibly 
freeing an intercept position at the control centre for another close- 
controlled interception.
THREAT MATCHING AND ALLOCATION POLICY
36. One of the major objectives of a sector controller must be to 
maximise the number of enemy aircraft shot down within his sector. In 
addition he will have several subsidiary objectives, such as minimising 
his own losses and protecting key points from attack. It is however 
impossible to define in advance an 'optimum' strategy, guaranteed to meet
these objectives better than any other. In practice neither the exact nature 
of the enemy threat nor the time-horizon of interest can be known in advance, 
and variations in either of these factors can make major differences to 
the effectiveness of any given strategy.
37. The strategy of the controller cannot therefore be quantified by any 
formal algorithm, and in the model it takes the form of a set of flexible 
guidelines, as follows:
a. Share out the defence resources among enemy threats in 
proportion to their 'importance* (input data).
b. Intercept a given enemy raid with the nearest available 
fighters, to save time and fuel.
c. Maintain a reserve capability to deal with future 
contingencies.
d. Make aircraft deployments flexible (eg use CAPS as staging 
points).
e. Keep interceptions and recoveries flowing smoothly so 
that bottlenecks do not develop at bases.
38.Threat evaluation in the model is straightforward, the importance of a 
given enemy raid being measured by two parameters, namely its size and 
the time at which it is expected to enter a designated target area. This 
simplification ignores such problems as the different possible weapon-loads 
per aircraft in the raid, and the difficulty in determining the raid's 
target if it adopts a zig-zag flight path. The sector controller is 
assumed to possess accurate and up-to-date information on his own air 
defence resources - the positions, velocities, fuel and weapon states of 
the fighters,and also the situation regarding aircraft availability at
air bases.
39. The allocation policy adopted in the model is then as follows. On 
first ascertaining a raid's track, generally before information is 
available on its size, a fixed number of fighters is allocated, on a least­
time- to-intercept basis, to intercept the raid. Later, when raid size 
information becomes available, further fighters may be allocated until a 
specified fighter: enemy aircraft ratio is reached. In the current 
version of the model the time to the target area is ignored, on the grounds 
that the order in which the raids are first detected is a realistic proxy 
order of priority.
40. Note that the fundamental criterion used for choosing fighters to match 
threats is that of 'least-time-to-intercept'. This is not unreasonable, 
but may not always represent the 'best' policy. For example, while fuel 
consumption and limitations are taken into account, in some scenarios the 
desire to conserve fighter fuel rather than minimise bomber penetration
may be the dominant factor. Nevertheless it was felt that enemy pene­
tration distance should be the factox given prominence in the model logic.
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FIGHTER MAIN EVENT SEQUENCE
41. Figure 0.2 shows very briefly the main sequence of events for 
fighters, excluding details of the AI radar processing which is described 
later. The following notes should help to explain the features of the
flowchart:
(1) When receiving a new assignment a fighter may be on the ground 
at an air base,or already in the air. Any scramble time must there­
fore be allowed for in evaluating the new fighter course, but this 
point is not worth showing separately on the flowchart.
(2) A fighter will be assumed to fly to the nearest point of a 
CAP at cruise speed, before beginning to fly along the CAP line.
(3) In principle a fighter can receive new orders from ground 
control at any time, instructing it to change to some new task.
In fact changing the tasking of a fighter under close control or 
autonomous control is avoided, unless the fighter's current mission 
becomes impossible (such as when its target is destroyed, or when it 
can no longer intercept due to a track change by its target).
(4) The time for which fuel lasts follows from the fuel consumption 
rate at the CAP cruise speed and the fuel threshold beyond which 
insufficient fuel is left to carry out an interception and return to 
base.
(5) For the purposes of this flowchart close control, broadcast 
control and control by another fighter via a data link are 
indistinguishable.
(6) In a correctly set-up interception AI detection should occur 
some time before the calculated interception point. It is necessary 
to impose a time limit on AI detection, however, to deal with the 
case in which the adopted interception course may be so much in 
error that target detection is not in fact possible.
(7) The action taken when a fighter fails to detect its target 
is to provisionally send it to CAP while it selects a new target, 
if possible, on the basis of its AI radar returns.
(8) The section of flowchart below this point, illustrating the 
fighter response to an AI detection, is expanded in more detail in 
figure 0.5.
(9) Having fired one missile (or two at once, possibly, this option 
being represented by suitable input data), the fighter pilot has 
the choice of either reattacking the same aircraft, if it is still 
alive, or of attacking some other aircraft in the raid. The action 
actually taken is a function of the structure and speed of the raid, 
and is expanded in the description of the reattack subroutines.
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THE REPRESENTATION OF AI RADAR AND JAMMING
42. The section of the model dealing with radar and jamming uses as much 
computer runtime as the rest of the model put together. This is partly 
because a complex process is being modelled, (radar echoing areas change 
significantly with azimuth angle, requiring frequent signal strength 
reassessment, while each jammer can in principle respond to every radar 
transmitter) and partly because radar calculations are inherently time^ 
consuming, requiring large numbers of floating-point multiplications. The 
design of the radar routines has therefore received particular attention, 
with the emphasis on simplification where possible.
43. The only type of radar explicitly represented in the model is the 
fighter A1 radar, capable of operating in three distinct modes - scanning, 
tracking and lock-on. More advanced radars can in fact track targets 
while still in the scanning mode - 'track while scan'. Two types of jammer 
are represented, the stand-off jammer emitting continuous barrage jamming, 
and escort and self-screening jammers, which form part of each enemy raid 
and will generally respond actively to detected threat radar signals.
Each escort or self-screening jammer may operate in one of three modes - it 
may jam continuously, like the stand-off jammers; it may jam only those 
radars which it detects continuously (ie radars which are sufficiently 
close to be detected at the sidelobe level, or which are locked-on to 
the jammer), or finally it may also be capable of jamming scanning radars, 
during their paint only.
44. The processing of radar and jammer behaviour is carried out in self- 
contained subroutines. The general structure of these routines is deter­
mined by the need first of all to evaluate the radar signal strength 
detected at each jammer, then to generate the response of each jammer, and 
finally to determine the performance of each radar in the presence of 
jamming and clutter, and hence determine the response of each fighter.
There are three distinct logics involved in this process - jammer detection 
logic, jammer response logic and fighter response logic. Flowcharts 
illustrating the particular logics in the current version of the model
are given in figures 0.3-0.5. The self-contained nature of these sub­
routines means that different jammer logics and pilot tactics can be 
substituted with relative ease.
45. The total radar and ECM picture is updated regularly during a run of 
the model, by the radar-scan event. The first task at each event is to 
update the positions of all airborne fighters and raids. This determines 
all ranges and angles which may be required later. The jamming power of 
each raid is then determined; depending on the nature and sensitivity of 
the jammers, various detection and response logics could be chosen. The
cumulative effect of these jamming responses upon each fighter's
detection of each raid is then calculated, together with the clutter, 
noise and target signal strengths. The signal-to-total noise ratio (SNR), 
jammer/noise ratio (J/N), signal/jammer ratio (S/J) and probability of det­
ection can then be found, for each fighter-raid pair. Knowing these values, 
the response of each fighter can finally be determined.
46. Figure 0.3 is a flowchart of the radar and jammer routine, and the
following notes enlarge upon some of its features.
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(1) Between calls of the radar routine, the positions of all 
aircraft will in general change, altering ranges, look angles
and aspect angles. This alters all radar and jammer strengths, both 
because of the changes in range and the effects of jammer and echoing- 
area polar diagrams. Changes in aircraft position and velocity also 
affect the magnitude of radar clutter returns.
(2) In the first section of the radar routine the term 'jammer' 
refers only to responsive jammers: stand-off jammers need not be 
considered since their jamming output is predetermined.
(3) 'Jammer detection logic' refers to the way in which incident 
radar signals are perceived by the jammer - either they are not detected 
at all, or they are continuously detected and jammed, or they may only
be detected and jammed intermittently.
(4) 'Jammer response logic' refers to the way in which the band­
width of the jammer output depends on the perceived incident radar 
signals.
(5) The second jammer loop does include stand-off jammers.
(6) The results of the radar and jamming calculations comprise 
values for radar signal strength S, perceived jammer strength J
(in the direction of the same target) and radar clutter strength C.
AX radars operate in pulse doppler mode; pulse clutter calculations 
can be incorporated in the program when the criteria used by the 
aircrew when selecting pulse/pulse doppler modes can be quantified.
The radar noise power, N, is specified in the input data for each
radar type. The signal-to-total noise ratio, SNR, is then given by:
SNR=S/(C+J+N)
The criteria for acquisition of range are simply comparison of SNR,
J/N and S/J with the relevant threshold values (specified in the 
input data), as is the criterion for initial detection in the deter­
ministic version of the model. In the Monte-Carlo version it is more 
appropriate to calculate a detection probability, which is then 
compared with a random number from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1
(7) These calculations are performed for each fighter and at each 
occurrence of the radar-scan event. If a fighter is already allo­
cated to a particular raid,they are performed for that raid only.
If a fighter is not allocated to a target they are repeated for 
each raid, in the hope of finding it a suitable target.
(8) The response of each fighter can now be determined, as 
explained in paras 49-52.
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Jammer Logic
47. The jammer logic for responsive noise jammers is illustrated in 
figure 0.4; it shows how each jammer responds to each radar. (Stand-off 
jammers are assumed to emit continuous barrage jamming). A detection 
threshold must be specified in the input data for each jammer type. If
the sidelobe strength is greater than this threshold, the radar is continuously 
detected and therefore continuously jammed. The sidelobe strength is specified 
in the input data simply as a power (in dB) down on the mainbeam strength.
If the mainbeam strength is beneath this threshold, the radar is un­
detected and, unless it picks up jamming directed at another fighter, it 
is unjammed by this jammer. If the mainbeam only is greater than this 
threshold, and the radar is in a locked-on mode (see figure 0.5), then the 
radar will be continuously detected and therefore continuously jammed.
If this is not the case, the radar is still in a scanning mode. Now, the 
input data must specify, for each jammer type, whether it can respond to 
scanning radars during their paint only. If the jammer has this capability, 
it jams the radar during its paint only; otherwise, this scanning radar 
goes unjammed by this jammer.
48. The principle of the jammer response is that a jammer concentrates its 
power into the minimum possible continuous frequency band. If just one 
radar is detected within the frequency band of a jammer transmitter it is 
spot-jammed, over a fairly narrow bandwidth (an input quantity). If 
several radars are continuously detected within the frequency band of one 
transmitter, the model assumes that jamming power is transmitted continuously 
over a bandwidth just encompassing the highest and lowest detected 
frequencies. Finally if the jammer detects any scanning radars, and it can 
respond to these during their dwell-time, if necessary it increases the 
above bandwidth to jam these radars during their dwell-time only.
FIGHTER RESPONSE LOGIC
49. For a given fighter and raid, the routines just described calculate 
at regular intervals the radar signal strength, perceived jammer strength, 
clutter strength and radar noise power. The ensuing fighter response
to the raid, in view of these values, can best be described in terms of 
the values of a control variable MODER(IF), where IF denotes the fighter 
serial. This variable can take integer values from 0 to 13. The control 
variable MODEC(IF) is also useful; this is essentially a simplification of 
MODER(IF), taking values only from 1 to 4. The fighter response logic is 
based on the relationship between the various values of MODER(IF), which 
are as follows:
MODER(IF)=0 if fighter IF is allocated to scramble but has not yet taken off.
M0DER(IF)=1 if fighter IF is on CAP or cruising to CAP.
M0DER(IF)=2 if fighter IF has full information on its target raid, in
clear conditions; it has locked-on to acquire range and 
track (ie not via a Track-While-Scan radar) and adopted 
an interception course.
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M0DER(IF)=5 if fighter IF has a radar missile in flight, ,in clear ECM 
conditions.
M0DERÇ1F)=4 if fighter IF has reverted in the face of jamming to Home-on- 
Jam (HOJ) mode, from M0DER(1F)=2 (ie full information with 
radar locked-on in clear conditions).
M0DER(1F)=5 if fighter IF is on a Broadcast Control interception and has 
not yet detected a suitable target raid.
M0DER(1F)=6 if fighter IF, in the face of jamming, has adopted a lead-
pursuit course on its target.
M0DER(1F)=7 if fighter IF has a radar missile in flight, in Angle-on-Jam
(AOJ) mode.
M0DER(1F)=8 if fighter IF has full information on its target raid in clear 
conditions via its Track-While-Scan (TWS) radar (ie it has not 
locked-on); it has adopted an interception course.
M0DER(1F)=9 if fighter IF has reverted in the face of jamming to HOJ mode,
from M0DER(1F)=8 (ie full information via TWS radar in clear 
conditions).
M0DER(1F)=10 if fighter IF has a radar missile in flight, in Home-on-Jam 
(HOJ) mode.
M0DER(1F)=11 if fighter IF is on a Close Control (CC) interception and has 
not yet detected its target.
M0DER(1F)=12 if fighter IF is on a Data Link (DL) controlled interception, 
and has not yet detected its target.
M0DER(1F)=13 if fighter IF, originally on a CC or DL control interception,
has detected its target but not yet acquired range information, 
and is continuing on the CC or DL interception course rather 
than adopt an autonomous lead pursuit course.
The values which the control variable MODEC(IF) may take are as follows:
M0DEC(1F)=1 if fighter IF is on CAP or assigned to fly to CAP.
M0DEC(1F)=2 if fighter IF is on, or assigned to, a EC interception.
M0DEC(1F)=3 if fighter IF is on, or assigned to, a CC or DL interception.
M0DEC(1F)=4 if fighter IF is, after achieving a detection, attacking a
raid under autonomous control.
50. Figure 0.5 shows the sequence of events for a fighter from the
moment when A1 detection occurs to the point at which a missile is launched.
Equivalently, it shows the relationships between the various values of
MODER(IF) and MODEC(IF). The combination of multiple ECCM facilities and
human behaviour in the cockpit makes this period complex and unpredictable
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in detail, and the representation in the fighter model must inevitably 
simplify the situation considerably.
51. On its first entry to the response logic routine, a fighter always has 
MODER(IF)=1,5,11 or 12; similarly M0DEC(1F)=1,2 or 3, depending on the 
figher's allocated role. After achieving a suitable detection MODEC(IF)
is set equal to 4 to represent the assumption of autonomous control by the 
fighter. From this point onwards the fighter response, represented by 
the value of MODER(IF), depends upon whether it has a TWS radar, whether 
it is currently in clear conditions or in HOJ or AOJ mode, and whether it 
is within missile launch-range. Finally, if a fighter on a CC or DL 
interception course detects its target but does not bumthrough, it may, 
depending on input data, continue on its original course or adopt a lead- 
pursuit course.
52. The following notes enlarge upon some of the features of figure 0.5:
(1) For the purposes of this flowchart, close control and data link 
control need not be distinguished.
(2) When a fighter changes to autonomous control. Ground Control is 
informed to enable any intercept controller to be freed for other 
tasks.
(3) The model treats Track-While-Scan (TWS) radars differently from 
normal radars, for the former need not lock-on to acquire range. In 
the model the fighter is deemed to have acquired range on its target 
when the signal-to-total noise ratio exceeds an input threshold value; 
the threshold for TWS radar may differ from that for non-TWS radar.
(4) When a fighter does acquire range on its A1 radar, it adopts a 
new interception course.
(5) It is conceivable that at some point the fighter's signal-to-total 
noise ratio is less than the TWS threshold but greater than the thres­
hold required to lock-on and acquire range information. Nevertheless 
it is assumed that a fighter with TWS radar continues on its course 
until it can acquire range via TWS rather than attempt to lock-on to 
acquire range, which will normally provoke responsive jamming.
(6) This assumes that if a fighter has already been given an inter­
ception course by Ground Control (or via a Data Link), it will 
continue on this course until it acquires range, rather than adopt
a lead-pursuit course. This tactical option is specified by the 
input data.
(7) Tlie positions of all fighters and raids and their bearings from 
each other are periodically updated by the radar routine and at each 
entry to the radar routine this must be checked. This change of mode 
is carried out at missile launch, for radar missiles only. Radar 
missiles need to be guided during their flight so the monitoring of 
the prevailing ECM conditions, which affect the missile lethality.
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is continued. This is simplified in the model so that missile 
lethality can, for a given type of attack (forward or rear 
hemisphere), take one of three values only. These correspond 
to launch or splash in clear conditions, in HOJ mode (relying 
on memory of range information), and in AOJ mode (in which range 
information has never been available to the fighter’s weapon system), 
It is assumed that the ECM conditions at launch affect the lethality 
of infra-red missiles.
(8) The signal strengths of all radars and jammers are periodically 
assessed by the radar routine, and jamming can therefore intervene 
at any time and divert the A1 radar into the Home-on-Jam (HOJ)
ECCM mode; conversely, bumthrough could be achieved. The criteria 
for these transitions are based on thresholds of the signal: 
jamming and jamming: noise strengths.
(9) Missile launch I represents a missile fired in clear (or 
near clear) ECM conditions, under which it should have maximum 
lethality.
(10) Home-on-Jam involves tracking the jamming target in angle 
only, using previously obtained values of range and closing 
velocity to estimate its current track. Although a fairly 
effective attack course can be flown (in the model the fighter 
continues to fly its original interception course), the method 
is subject to errors, which in the model are subsumed into the 
final missile lethality.
(11) This corresponds to launch in Angle-on-Jam mode, when the 
fighter has no range information at all. It gives the lowest 
missile lethality, because of the possibility that it is not 
actually within the launch envelope when its weapon system 
signals that launch-point is reached. (The determination
of this point is based upon the rate of change of the bearing 
of the target from the fighter, and is subject to error).
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EVENT PROCESSING OF FIGHTERS
53. There are two aspects of the event processing of fighters which merit 
special attention.
1. Directed Lists of Fighter Serials
54. The list of fighter serials is directed in order to facilitate 
searches for fighters IF, in the order in which they were first scrambled, 
within a specified range (MODEl,M0DE2) of control mode MODEC(IF), ie 
fighters IF such that:
14MODE 1^MODEC (1F%M0DE2<4 (0.1)
The structure adopted also facilitates the elimination of a fighter serial 
from the list of active fighters if it runs out of fuel or ammunition.
Its serial then becomes available for reallocation.
55. Each fighter serial IF has a successor lUP(lF) and a predecessor 
IDOWN(IF) such that:
1UP(1D0WN(IF))=ID0WN(IUP(1F))=1F (0.2)
The variable IFM(l) stores the serial IF of the first allocated fighter 
with M0DEC(1F)=1, for 1=1,2,3,4. If there is no fighter with control 
mode 1, then 1FM(1)=0. Finally, 1FM(5) stores the first fighter serial 
available for allocation.
56. When a fighter is allocated for take-off it is henceforth identified 
by a serial; its prospective control mode K, which determines its proposed 
role, must be specified (K=l,2,3 or 4). The serial JF of the first fighter 
with control mode greater than K is then determined; if there are no such 
fighters then:
JF=1FM(5) (0.3)
The serial IF to be allocated is simply:
1F=1FM(5) (0.4)
The next available serial is updated by setting:
1FM(5) = IUP(1FM(5)) (0.5)
The required value of MODEC(IF) is then defined:
M0DEC(1F)=K (0.6)
It is necessary to change the lUP and IDOWN pointers of IF and JF, so 
that IF is positioned at the end of the list of fighters in mode K, and 
points to the first fighter with control mode greater than K (or the first 
available fighter serial, if there are no such fighters). Finally, if
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IF is the only fighter in mode K (so that 1FM(K)=0) then IFM(K) is reset:
1FM(K)=1F (0.7)
57. Conversely, when fighter IF with M0DEC(1F)=K is removed from the list
of active fighters the serial JF of the fighter immediately above IF in
the list is obtained from:
JF=1UP(1F) (0.8)
IF is removed from its current position in the active fighter list and 
placed below 1FM(5). The serial IF becomes available for reallocation - 
in fact it becomes the first such serial - by setting:
1FM(5)=1F (0.9)
Finally, if IF was the first fighter in mode K, IFM(K) must be reset. If
IF was the only fighter in mode K then it is set equal to zero, otherwise
it is set equal to JF.
58. Consideration of fighters with control mode K within a specified 
range (MODEl,M0DE2), so that:
1 ^  MODEUK^MODE2^4 (0.10)
is similarly straightforward. The serial IFl of the first such fighter is
found (if 1FM(K)=0 for M0DE1<K(M0DE2, then 1F1=0). If IFlj^O subsequent 
fighters within the required range of control modes are obtained simply 
from the lUP array. The last such fighter is IDOWN(JF), where JF is the 
first fighter with control mode greater than M0DE2 (or IFM(5), the first 
available fighter serial, if there are no such fighters).
2. Cancellation of Fighter Events
59. Every event in the fighter model is uniquely identified by three 
parameters - its type, the time at which it is due to occur, and the 
entity (raid or fighter) to which the event refers. Every event (except 
planned take-off) which refers to a fighter, namely event types 8,9,10,11, 
12,14,16,17 or 18, can be cancelled if required. For example, if a fighter 
detects a raid it may abandon its cruise to or on CAP (event type 9 or 10) 
and instead adopt an interception course or a lead-pursuit course; when
a raid changes track all fighters attacking it cancel their previous inter­
ception courses and adopt new ones, etc.
60. When an event for fighter IF is first generated^ a pointer to the 
event data is stored in one of the variables LOCEVFl(lF), L0CEVF2(1F) 
or L0CEVF3(1F). This enables the event data to be easily accessed if it
should later be necessary to cancel the event. When such an event is
cancelled, or when it actually occurs, the relevant pointer is reset
to zero. A simple test at the beginning of the event-cancelling routine 
then prevents the possibility of a time-wasting search through the event
list to delete an event which no longer exists.
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61. Three variables suffice for this purpose because, at most only three 
events can be simultaneously pending for a fighter. The set of fighter 
events may be partitioned into the following three mutually exclusive sets,
with the given one-one correspondence between sets and pointers:
(i) LOCEVFl(lF) points to either event type 7 (take-off) or 
event type 8 (change of profile-point), exactly one of which must 
be pending for fighter IF.
(ii) L0CEVF2(1F) may point to an event type 9 (arrival on CAP), 
type 10 (arrival at a subsequent CAP point),type 11 (arrival back 
at base), type 12 (arrival at expection interception point), or 
type 14 (recalculate fighter interception course after a raid 
track-change), at most one of which may be pending. If none of 
these events are pending then the fighter is on a lead-pursuit course 
and LOCEVF2(1F)=0.
(iii) L0CEVF3(1F) may point to an event type 16 (missile-splash), 
type 17 (test for missile-launch range), or type 18 (end of fighter 
turn after an attack), at most one of which may be pending; other­
wise LOCEVF3(1F)=0.
MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS
62. Useful applications of the model to air defence problems will 
depend on the acceptability in any particular case of the assumptions 
incorporated. For convenient reference these are summarised below in two 
groups; first those which are fundamental to the structure of the model 
and then those which are relatively easily changed to suit the represen­
tation required.
Structural Features
(1) Enemy raids do not respond actively to being attacked, 
except in the case of jamming. They do not inflict damage 
on the fighters, and escort fighters are not represented.
(This particular assumption is discussed in more depth in 
paras 67-70).
(2) Enemy raids (which can consist of a single aircraft) are 
considered as single points, except for those calculations des­
cribed in para 14.
(3) The model is essentially two-dimensional, elevation angles not 
being represented.
(4) Information concerning enemy raids is generated in 
three stages: initial detection, knowledge of raid track 
parameters, and finally the number of aircraft in the raid.
(5) Of the radar types which occur in an air defence 
environment, only fighter A1 radar is explicitly represented.
(6) The performance of A1 radars is generally expressed 
simply in terms of S/N, J/N and S/J ratios.
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(7) In general, once an initial radar detection has occurred, 
the corresponding target is assumed to be detected continuously 
thereafter, if only as a jamming spoke.
(8) Communications jamming, CW-beam jamming and 'deception 
ECM* are not represented.
(9) Fighters are allocated to raids on a 'least-time-to-intercept* 
basis.
(10) The internal components of a control centre are not modelled 
explicitly, though their effects, in terms of communications delays, 
accuracy of information and command decisions, are represented in 
simplified form.
(11) Except as regards defence resource limitations, the 
assignment of fighters to each enemy raid is basically independent 
of the assignment to every other raid - the whole air defence 
force is not 'optimised'.
(12) Air bases are treated simply as sources of fighters, and are 
characterised by position and fighter generation rate only.
(13) Close and broadcast control are only distinguished 
implicitly by their effects on fighter courses - the actual 
transmitted messages and information are not represented.
(14) The detailed flight-paths of air-to-air missiles are not 
represented - only the time of flight and the terminal lethality.
(15) It is assumed that identification (IFF) is perfect. 
Non-Structural Features
(16) Enemy raid tracks consist of a series of straight 
sections at constant speed and altitude.
(17) Bombers and specialist escort jammers are assumed to 
be equally likely targets.
(18) Lock-on is assumed to occur when the signal-to-noise ratio 
exceeds a threshold value (specified in the input data).
(19) Initial allocations of fighters to targets are not changed 
unless interceptions become impossible.
(20) The particular jammer logic chosen for the model is 
described in paras 47-48.
(21) In-flight refuelling is not represented.
(22) The order in which enemy raids are detected is used to 
define their order of priority as targets.
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(23) It has been implicitly assumed that several responsive 
jammers can operate near each other without mutual interference.
EXTENSION OF THE MODEL
63. The model as it stands can make a contribution to defence studies 
involving fighters. As for any further development of the model, the 
following are some of the more obvious extensions which promise to be 
cost-effective, in terms of the programming effort involved and the 
increased scope and applicability of the model.
Fighter Allocation
64. An important feature of the model is that the allocation to each 
enemy raid is carried out independently (subject to resource limitations,
of course), ie the air defence force is not 'optimally matched' to the total 
threat. While this is probably a reasonable approximation to what actually 
would happen, it does take a rather narrow view of the total situation, and 
several simple modifications could be incorporated in future versions of 
the model:
a. The desired fighter: enemy aircraft ratio, specified in 
the input data, could be reduced as fighter resources become 
depleted, so as to maintain some sort of reserve capability.
b. The ratio could be modified to bias allocation in favour of 
raids near their targets.
c. Flexibility could be increased by not insisting that fighters 
necessarily adopt the least time to intercept course.
d. The density of fighters at any particular location could be 
used to influence their likelihood of being selected for an 
interception.
Measures of Effectiveness.
65. In a model in which fighters suffer no losses, the obvious measure 
of effectiveness is the number of enemy aircraft shot down. The following 
factors may also be of interest in any particular study:
a. The remaining weapon load of returning fighters. If, for 
example, this was too high, it could indicate that fighters were 
running out of fuel before they had used up all their missiles. 
(Possible remedies could include carrying additional fuel tanks,
or reducing the speed limit on interceptions). It could also suggest 
a poor missile mix, or a poor balance between front and rear 
hemisphere attacks.
b. The mean time to interception. An increased interception 
speed would reduce this time, but would increase fuel consumption 
and reduce the overall fighter endurance.
Part 2 - p.31.
Para. 56.b should be extended as follows.
The most immediate extension of the model should be 
to represent fighter and raid flight profiles in three 
dimensions rather than two^ i.e. fighter and raid 
altitude should be modelled directly. This will allow 
more detailed fighter flight profiles to be specified in 
the input data, and it will enable the full capability of 
the clutter routines described later to be incorporated 
in the radar and ECM calculations. It will also allow 
for more detailed specification of missile performance, 
as a function of fighter and raid relative height, aspect 
angle and velocity.
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c. The mean time spent searching for targets. This quantity 
is a function of AI radar performance, GAP positioning and the 
altitude and intensity of the enemy attack, and may represent 
a significant expenditure of fuel.
Some Technical Points
66. This paragraph briefly mentiones some extensions to the model of a more 
technical nature:
a. The representation of information received by a fighter via the 
reversionary modes of kinematic ranging and dog-leg ranging, in a heavy 
ECM environment, could be included.
b. The missile launch envelopes and corresponding time of flight 
envelopes are at present functions of target aspect angle only. If 
the data are available this could be extended so that they were also 
functions of raid and launch altitude, and aircraft velocities.
c. When in Home-on-Jam mode, the missile lethality could be allowed
to be a function of enemy aircraft spacing. The lethality of some radar 
homing missiles can be seriously degraded if the jammers fly at a 
critical separation.
Fighter-Enemy Aircraft Interaction
67. There is considerable scope in the model to increase the responsiveness 
of the enemy to attack by fighters; the following paragraphs consider some 
factors which could be included.
Escort Fighters
68. A simple method of representing the effects of escort fighters is as follows 
Up to the launch of the first AA missile by an attacking fighter, nothing is ' 
changed by the presence of escort fighters, though one of these may be shot down 
in mistake for a bomber. Subsequently, however, fighters of the two sides
meet and after a suitable period of combat, not represented in detail, 
fighters of one side or the other emerge victorious, either to continue 
escorting the raid or to continue attacking it. A simple way of representing 
the combat is to pair off each fighter of the smaller force with one from 
the larger force, assessing the result of each 1:1 combat using a random 
number, taking into account the appropriate capabilities of the aircraft.
69. One could of course represent escort fighters in the same detail as 
air defence fighters, and allow dogfights, etc to develop accordingly. This 
would seriously increase the complexity of the model, probably increasing 
the run-time by a factor of two.
Evasive Manoeuvres by Enemy Bombers
70. If evasive action by the bombers is to be represented, the modelling 
penalties of doing so depend upon the degree of interaction between the 
bomber and attacking fighter. If the evasive response of a bomber is entirely 
automatic, the modelling task is considerably easier than if each aircraft
has to be continuously modelled to decide what is to happen next. Any 
predetermined manoeuvres by the enemy can already be catered for by the model.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE 
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1. MASTER SEGMENT
The MASTER segment contains very little processing. Subroutine INPUT 
reads all the input data and performs all processing which is independent 
of the replication machinery - calculation of the times of each raid 
track change and the times at which each raid crosses each warning line, 
etc. Subroutine REPINIT carries out all the initialisation and event 
generation necessary at the beginning of each replication, while subroutine 
EVENTS conducts all event processing, including the subsequent generation 
of events, associated with that replication. After the final replication 
subroutine OUTPUT calculates and prints statistics on a number of random 
variables, data on which has been accumulated (in subroutine STATS) during 
the model run.
Data items are input in the units most commonly used for those items, as 
shown in the illustrative data file (Annex B). These are then converted 
to the internal program units - radians, metres, seconds, pounds, watts 
and MHz.
2. BLOCK DATA SEGMENT
This segment sets the values of constants used in the model - Tt, 4X% clATf 
and f/y180 (denoted by DEGRAD), together with constants used only in the 
clutter calculations. These are NSEARCH, the number of points at which 
the range of a pulse doppler clutter integral is searched for singularities;
E, the level of accuracy required in determining these singularities;
RE, the effective earth's radius and NINTP, the number of intervals into 
which the integration range is subdivided in the numerical calculation 
of pulse and pulse doppler clutter integrals.
3. SUBROUTINE COLLISION
This routine is called from subroutine INTCALCONTROL to calculate the 
expected interception point of a fighter with a raid. When range and 
track information on a target become available in the model, either 
to a fighter or to Ground Control, a straight-line interception course, 
normally involving accelerated flight, is calculated for the fighter.
Time delays for communication and for the fighter to scramble or achieve 
the correct heading are allowed for in subroutine INTCALCONTROL, as are 
errors in the estimate of the raid track. These factors affect the values 
of the following parameters, which are calculated in subroutine INTCALCONTROL:
(RELX,RELY): the estimated initial raid position relative to the fighter;
(RAIDVX,RAIDVY): the estimated initial components of the raid velocity;
RVT : the estimated initial raid speed.
These parameters are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The interception geometry is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Using vector 
notation the raid is initially at ^  relative to the fighter, with velocity 
V. Without loss of generality we may take the initial time t=0. Tlie
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problem is to find a fighter course to give minimum-time interception.
The interception profile for this fighter must already have been specified 
so that its distance-time relationship, denoted by sit), is known. Here 
flight consists of a series of constant acceleration segments. If the
direction of this minimum-time interception is given by a unit vector e,
the interception occurs when t is such that ~
. is = ^  f v t  (3.1)
ie when
s"‘= (3.2)
where
H o ’’ 1 ^ 1
Now, suppose the interception occurs during the i-th leg of the profile. 
Reset the time-origin to ^  , the time at the beginning of this leg; 
is the time relative to the start of the interception at ^  =0 and is known. 
Let T = time to interception after the beginning of this leg, so that the 
distance travelled by the fighter in interception is
( o a <lTi,rh}  (3.3)
where are its distance travelled and speed at the beginning of this
leg (both known) and
is its acceleration on the leg. Note that and are all non-
negativer
With this change in notation, equations (3.1) and 3.2) show that inter­
ception occurs on the i-th leg when T is such that
es = +t)
ie when
li.fïtff2iioivklïr-^v^r^ (3-6)
Note that and are both positive, though the term in T,
2 \T , may be negative.
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If we define
then interception occurs when J^=0. We therefore must solve a quartic in 
T for the least positive root. The coefficients of this quartic are as 
follows :
7"^ ,* — always negative or zero
-r^ • — f. ]/,
• ' always negative or zero
positive or negative (3.8)
positive or negative (negative for an 
approaching target)
T^j always positive, otherwise interception
—  — <• would already have occurred.
This quartic is set up, examined, and if appropriate solved, for each 
leg of the profile, until at least one positive root appears, ie 
until interception becomes possible. If there is more than one positive 
root on that leg, the smallest is chosen.
Bearing in mind the sign ambiguities, Descartes rule of signs gives 
the following four cases to be considered in the search for roots of 
the quartic:
Case Sign of the coefficient Number of sign changes
rp 4 p ^ T^ T T^
(i) - - + + + 1 :^1 positive root
(ii) - - + - + 3 ^3 positive roots
(iii) - - - + + 1 < 1  positive root
(iv) - - - - + 1 < 1  positive root
We also know that since is positive and the coefficient of t "^ is 
negative, there is at least one negative root and one positive root.
Thus except for case (ii) above, there is exactly one positive root of 
the quartic, which is best located by Newton-Raphson iterative approximation 
from , since/J'' is positive there.
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Case (ii) is more complicated; it corresponds to
> D
(3.9)
M 2 ^ * y k ) , v - Z s i  Vi < 0
If it is possible for there to be more than one root in the segment, 
approach from the left in the iterative approximation is essential, and 
must be positive for guaranteed Newton-Raphson convergence.
' T ' P  .
In fact
(3.10)
Figures 3.3 to 3.6 provide more specific illustrations of the conditions 
corresponding to each of the above four cases.
The representation of the above algorithm in the fighter model is 
illustrated in Figure 3.7 and the following notes refer to details of 
this flowchart.
(1) ST0 corresponds to , the distance travelled at the beginning of 
each profile-leg.
(2) R20 represents the factor , so that its initial value is
V2 is the square of the raid speed, while 
RV(? represents the factor ; its initial value is j^ y
(3)(a) The fighter type is denoted by IFTY and it is assumed that 
profile 2 is used for the interception. The serial, INIT, of the last 
profile point reached is already known and the examination of the fighter 
profile to determine on which leg the interception occurs begins at
this point. The variable T0 corresponds in the above notation to 2^  .
(b) TSTARTS takes into account the fact that the fighter may begin 
its interception between profile points.
(c) On return to subroutine' INTCALCONTROL, 1MPOSS=0 or 1 if interception 
is possible or impossible respectively.
(4) In the above notation,
TNEXT=TPPT(2,IFTY,1+1) corresponds to t_+^
VI = VPPT(2,IFTY,1+1) " " V. .
(3.11)
DT = TNEXT-T0 ” "
ACC = FPPT(2,1FTY,I) " " fi
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(5) At the beginning of the calculation, if the fighter has positive 
acceleration the origin is taken to be the current fighter
position (T0,V0 ) - see Figure 3.8:
- (V1-V0)
° V1-VPPT(
T0=TSTARTS-TNEXT-(DT)
new old vi-VPPT(2,IFTY,INIT)) (3.12)
new
(6) The coefficient of T^,T and T°, denoted respectively by C02,C01 and 
CONST, are given by expressions (3.8)
(7) If the acceleration on ^his leg,ACC, equals zero, then from (3.8) 
the coefficients of T and T are zero so that the quartic reduces to 
a simple quadratic equation. If this possesses a valid solution the 
expected interception point can be derived immediately from the calculated 
time to interception; if not, the variable IMPOSS is set equal to 1 and 
control is returned to subroutine INTCALCONTROL.
(8) This test distinguishes case (ii), in which there may be 1 or 3 
roots in a segment, from cases (i), (iii) and (iv), in which there is 
at most one root in this segment.
(9) To determine whether it is necessary to conduct a Newton-Raphson 
iteration in this segment the constant term CONSTNEXT of the quartic 
corresponding to the next segment is calculated; an iteration is carried 
out only if CONSTNEXT is negative. Certain preliminary variables must 
be calculated:
(a) /?2/= (3-13)
Now
so that
nil - RZp = } ~ I y h r  
' rc,rh)tz(i>^ v^tc).v*klUtu,-h)]
le
^ 7 « [ l . 0 * R V ^ - h \ l z * V T ]  (3.14)
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(b) Ryi ‘ (Rj> ryht,).V (3.15)
Now
y [ t u r t h ) .  y
m - R y ^  = h r ( t i „ ~ t i )  (3.16)
(c) ST1--S^ ,, (3.17)
SO that
le
Now
so that
le
Si
sTt-srp - Sif, -Si
Then from expression (3.8):
CONSTNEXT = tV t c n t  - S^{.f!
le
CONSTNEXT = U Z h  {^Ttf (3.19)
(10) If CONSTNEXT is positive, no root of the quartic occurs on this 
profile-leg. The variables t.,v^,
and s^ are all updated and the next profile-leg is considered.
(11) In the unlikely event CONSTNEXT = 0 interception occurs just as 
the fighter reaches the end of this profile-leg. In this case the 
variable T is set equal to DT= the time to interception
TINT calculated from
TINT=T0+T-TSTARTS
The coordinates (PX,PY) of the expected interception point relative 
to the fighter's initial position may then be found immediately.
(12) This carries out a Newton-Raphson iteration, with the initial 
approximation at the left-hand end of the profile-leg. If a root,
T, is found the time to interception and the expected interception 
point may be calculated immediately.
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(13) This carries out a Newton-Raphson iteration, with the 
initial approximation at the right-hand end of the profile leg.
FUNCTION DBTOABS
This Function is called from subroutines INPUT and GAINREAD to 
convert input data expressed in decibels to their corresponding 
absolute values.
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4. SUBROUTINE DELETE(LOSE)
This routine is called to delete an event for fighter IF from the event queue 
When any such event which may later be deleted is first inserted into the 
event queue, the nointer to the event data is stored in one of the variables 
LOCEVFl(lF), L0CEVF2(IF) or L0CEVF3(1F); otherwise these pointers are 
always set equal to zero. The pointer to the event which is to be deleted 
is brought into this routine in the parameter list, and is denoted here 
by LOSE. If LOSE=0, the event has either already occurred (in which 
case the pointer is reset to zero in subroutine EVRESET) or it has 
already been cancelled;regardless, no action is taken. Otherwise, subroutine 
DELEVT is called with parameter LOSE to delete this event from the event 
queue. Subroutine DELETE then resets the pointer LOSE to zero and 
control returns to the calling routine.
The above three variables suffice to refer to all events pending for 
fighter IF, since at most three can be pending simultaneously (see 
subroutine EVRESET). Thus these variables are not restricted to referring 
to unique events; they may each refer to one of a set of mutually 
exclusive events. The variable L0CEVF2(IF) may point to an interception 
event (type 12), an arrival at a CAP point (event types 9 and 10), arrival 
back at base (event type 11) or an event type 14 (recalculation of fighter 
interception course after a raid track-change), since, for a given fighter, 
at any time only one of these event types may be pending. Similarly,
LOCEVFl(IF) may refer to a fighter take-off (event type 7) or a change 
of profile - point (event type 8). L0CEVF3(IF) may refer to a pending 
missile-splash (event type 16), an event type 17 (missile launch-range . 
test) or an event type 18 (fighter turning to carry out a further attack 
within the reattack sequence).
Subroutine DELETE is called in the following circumstances :
(i) from subroutine EVENTS, at event type 2. When a raid changes 
track, every fighter IF currently attacking that raid has a new 
interception course calculated, taking into account the fighter 
and Ground Control reaction delay. This processing is carried out 
at an event type 14. The interception event (type 12) is cancelled, 
while L0CEVF2(IF) is reset to contain the pointer to the event
type 14 for fighter IF.
(ii) from subroutine EV12, which sets up an interception (event 
type 12) for fighter IF. The event to which L0CEVF2(1F) previously 
pointed is cancelled (ie type 9,10,11,12 or 14) and the new interception 
event inserted into the event list; L0CEVF2(1F) is reset to contain
the pointer to the new event.
(iii) from subroutine EVENTS, at event type 16. When a fighter
achieves a missile splash against a raid, the corresponding interception 
event, type 12,which represents the expected collision of the fighter 
and raid becomes irrelevant and so is cancelled.
(iv) from subroutine EV9, when a fighter is no longer able to
continue with a planned interception. The interception event is
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cancelled and the fighter is either sent to CAP (event type 9) or 
returns to base (event type 11). L0CEVF2(IF) is reset to contain 
the pointer to the event type 9 or 11 respectively. Any possible 
missile-splash or launch-range test or reattack is also cancelled 
by a call to subroutine DELETE with parameter L0CEVF3(IF). Finally, 
the pending event type 8 (change of profile point) is cancelled 
by a call to subroutine DELETE with parameter LOCEVFl (IF). A new 
event type 8, corresponding to the next profile point due in 
profile 1, the cruise profile, is then generated either here or in 
subroutine EV8.
(v) Before a new event type 8 (change of fighter profile point) 
is set up in subroutine EV8, which may be called from a number
of routines, the previous event type 8 which was pending for that 
fighter is always cancelled by a call to subroutine DELETE with 
parameter LOCEVFl (IF).
(vi) When a fighter is deleted from the list of active fighters 
all of its pending events are cancelled by calls to subroutine 
DELETE with parameters LOCEVFl(IF), L0CEVF2(IF) and L0CEVF3(IF).
(vii) If in subroutine RADEVENTS a fighter adopts a lead-pursuit 
course, it cancels any planned interception event (or possibly,
if it was previously cruising to or on CAP, an event type 9 or 10).
(viii) Within the reattack sequence (subroutine RAIDKILL), if fighter 
IP's target is destroyed by another fighter its planned interception 
and possible missile launch or splash are cancelled. An attempt
is then made to find.another target for the fighter in subroutine 
REATTACK.
(ix) In subroutine REATTACK interception courses are calculated 
against all targets to determine which raid, or flight within a 
raid, can be attacked most quickly. If a fighter is within a reattack 
sequence without having achieved burnthrough, attacking in AOJ mode, 
the choice of next target is retained although the (corresponding 
interception event is cancelled. The fighter then continues on a 
lead-pursuit course until burnthrough is achieved or it launches
a missile in AOJ mode.
(x) Finally, it is also assumed in subroutine REATTACK that 
after an attack a fighter turns onto a new attack heading at constant 
angular velocity. The pending event type 8 (change of profile 
point) for this fighter is then delayed by the time taken to 
complete this turn.
5. SUBROUTINE DELEVT(LOSE)
This routine is called from subroutine DELETE to delete an event 
relating to fighter IF from the event queue. (None of the possible raid 
events - track-change or crossing a warning line - may be cancelled, 
unless the raid is totally annihilated, since raid evasive manoeuvring 
is not represented; see subroutine RAIDELIM).
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When an event for fighter IF which may later be deleted or cancelled is 
first inserted into the event queue in subroutine PUTEVT, the pointer to 
the event data is returned to the calling routine and stored in one of the 
variables LOCEVFl(IF),L0CEVF2(IF) or L0CEVF3(IF). Then, if this event must 
later be deleted, the search for its location in the queue is greatly sim­
plified. Also when such an event either occurs or is cancelled, the 
re1event pointer - LOCEVFl(IF),L0CEVF2(IF) or L0CEVF3(IF) - is reset to 
zero, in subroutine EVRESET or DELETE respectively. A test on the value 
of this pointer at first entry to subroutine DELETE therefore ensures that 
the event queue is never searched unnecessarily to cancel an event which 
has not been generated or has already been cancelled.
The pointer to the event which is to be cancelled is brought into sub­
routine DELETE in the parameter list. If this is already zero no 
action is taken, otherwise it is brought into subroutine DELEVT, as the 
pai'ameter LOSE. Tlie relevant event is then deleted from the queue; the 
cell thus emptied is returned to the free-cell stack and the next-free- 
cell pointer is updated. Finally, on return to subroutine DELETE the rele­
vant pointer is reset to zero.
6. SUBROUTINE DEVIATION
This routine is called from subroutine OUTPUT to calculate the mean, 
standard deviation of the mean, standard deviation and variance of a 
random variable X over n replications, where and ^ ^ z  are
known (X^ is the value of X on replication i). ^
7. SUBROUTINE DOTPROD(X,Y,VX,VY,ANGLE)
This subroutine may be called from subroutines COLLISION, JPOWER,LAUNCHTEST, 
RADAR and SOJPOWER. It determines the angle (9 { O  ^  ^ ÏÏ ),as illustrated 
in Figure 7.1. The vectors r (X,Y) and V (VX,VY) are specified in the 
parameter list. (Any translation of axes, so that the point P is 
effectively at the origin of coordinates as shown in the Figure, is 
carried out in the calling routine). The equation used is
r . V  = (X.VX+Y.VY)= jrj|;Vjcoi£> (7 .1 )
The angle ^ is denoted by ANGLE in this subroutine and is returned in the
parameter list.
8. SUBROUTINE ERRORS
If the model is running in stochastic mode (M0DERUN=1) this routine selects 
random variables PE,QE,RE and SE from a N (0,1) distribution to be 
applied to errors in the estimates of the raid parameters (x-coordinate, 
y-coordinate, speed and heading respectively) in the calculation of fighter 
intercept courses. If the model is running in deterministic mode
(MODERUN=0), thesefour variables are all set equal to 1.0 at the beginning
AS
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of the run in subroutine INPUT and no action is taken in this routine.
9- SUBROUTINE EVENTS
This is the primary routine in the Fighter Model and is called from the 
MASTER segment once per replication. All the processing associated with 
every event generated is either executed in this routine or in subroutines 
called from this routine.
Preliminary Processing
The parameters T, lEV and IF which define the next event to be processed 
are retrieved from the event list via subroutine GETEVT. T is the time 
at which the event is due to occur, lEV is the event type and IF (or IR) 
is the serial of the fighter (or raid) to which the event refers. (Two 
events, types 1 and 6, do not refer to specific fighters or raids, so 
that 1F=1R=0). Subroutine EVPRINT prints these three event parameters, 
while subroutine EVRESET resets, if necessary, one of the three fighter 
control parameters LOCEVFl(IF),L0CEVF2(IF)or L0CEVF3(1F), (These are used 
to simplify the event cancellation procedure; they store pointers to pending 
fighter events, so that they may be easily located in the event list and 
then deleted. In particulary if a fighter event is not deleted and 
actually occurs, the relevant pointer must be reset to zero). The clock 
is updated (ie the variable TIME is set equal to T) and the trace switched 
off or on as necessary (controlled by the input parameters TRACESTART and 
TRACEEND). Tlie processing for the event proper can then begin. There are 
currently 18 different event types ; the processing associated with each 
event is reached via a COMPUTED GO TO statement.
Event Type 1 - End of Replication
This event is generated at the beginning of each replication in subroutine 
REPINIT, and it terminates the replication. Although most scenarios should 
come to a natural conclusion it is useful to be able to stop a replication 
at a pre-determined time.
Event Type 2 - Raid Track-Change
This event either executes or generates all the processing associated 
with a raid track-change. - For convenience the starting-point of a raid 
is defined as a track-change, sb that the first event type 2 for each raid 
is generated at the beginning of each replication in subroutine REPINIT.
The raid serial IR having already been determined, subroutine NEWTRACK is 
first entered. This routine resets the kinematic raid parameters (position, 
heading, speed and height) and sets up the next track-change. (If the raid 
has reached the end of its final track-leg it is 'deactivated' by setting 
L0CEVR(IR)=0). On returning from subroutine NEWTRACK the variable 
INOCHANGE is checked to determine if the raid track has actually changed, 
for the weapon-release point must be specified as a track-change point and 
the raid need not necessarily alter speed, height or course after weapon- 
release. If there is no track-change or the raid has reached the end of its 
pre-defined track, no action is taken and the program returns to examine
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the next event. Similarly, if the event type 4 for this raid has not 
been generated, so that no track information is available to Ground Control 
(GC) the track-change effectively remains undetected so that again no 
action is taken.
If there are fighters already attacking this raid CNATTACK(IR)>0) sub­
routine ERRORS is called. In stochastic mode this selects random variables 
PE,QE,RE and SE from a N(0,1) distribution; in deterministic mode they remain 
at their initial value of 1.0. These variables are used later to derive the 
errors in the estimates of raid parameters when fighter interception courses 
are recalculated. This processing is carried out at event type 14; .to 
ensure that the same error estimates apply to all fighters IF which are 
currently attacking this raid, these random variables are stored :
PERR(1F)=PE
QERR(1F)=QE
RERR(1F)=RE
SERR(1F)=SE
(9.1)
(The serial IF of each fighter attacking the raid is recovered from the 
lATTACK array).
The event type 14 (interception course recalculation) for each fighter IF 
attacking the raid must be set up. If the fighter already has a missile 
in flight against the raid, this processing is ignored. (The variable 
L0CEVF3(1F), if non-zero, is a pointer to the next event for fighter IF 
of type 16,17 or 18, for these cannot be pending simultaneously. If it 
is of type 16, ie a missile-splash, then 1EVENT(2,L0CEVF3(IF))=16).
Subroutine RES'PACC determines the total delay TDELAY suffered by 
fighter IF before it can adopt a new interception course; this comprises a 
GC processing delay plus a fighter response delay. The expected interception 
of fighter IF (event type 12) is then cancelled by a call to subroutine 
DELETE with the control variable L0CEVF2(IF) as the parameter. The event 
type 14 for fighter IF is then generated, to occur a time TDELAY hence.
This processing is repeated for each fighter IF attacking the raid.
Finally, if the event type 4 for this raid has occured, so that 1EV4(1R)=1, 
then GC has track information on the raid and an event type 20 is generated 
to occur a time TRESPONSER(IR) hence, where TRESPONSER(IR) is the GC 
delay in processing track-change information on raid IR. This event 
determines if there is any shortfall in the number of fighters assigned to 
attack the raid and, if necessary, it selects and allocates extra 
fighters to intercept the raid. If the appropriate event type 4 has not 
occured (1EV4(IR)=0)GC does not yet have track information on the raid 
and the event type 20 is not generated.
Event Type 3 - Raid first detected by Ground Control
This event is generated for each raid at the beginning of each replication 
in subroutine REPINIT and corresponds to the crossing of warning line 1, 
ie the initial detection of the raid. (The times at which the three 
warning lines are crossed - if they are crossed - by each raid are cal­
culated in subroutine INPUT, since they are constant for all replications, 
and the corresponding events (types 3, 4 and 5) are set up in subroutine 
REPINIT).
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It is assumed that when the raid is first detected a specified number 
NF0 (NF0^O) of fighters is scrambled to fly to a CAP; the CAP allocated 
depends on the serial IR of the raid, and is specified in the raid input 
data. It is also assumed that the fighters at every base start decreasing 
their readiness levels towards the minimum readiness level when the first 
event type 3 occurs, ie when the first raid is detected. A variable TEV3 
(set equal to -1 in subroutine REPINIT) stores the time of the first 
event type 3. Under this assumption subroutine FCHOOSE selects and scrambles, 
from any base, the NF0 fighters which can most quickly reach the CAP.
After take-off these fighters search for enemy raids on their AI radars.
Event Type 4: Ground Control acquires raid track information
This event represents the Ground Control (GC) response to the acquisition 
of track information on raid IR.Track information on a raid can be generated 
in one of two ways, the first of which is more usual:
(i) The raid crosses warning line 2. The time at which this
occurs is calculated in subroutine INPUT and the corresponding event
type 4 generated at the beginning of each replication in subroutine 
REPINIT.
(ii) A fighter scrambled when a raid is first detected (event type 3) 
may acquire track information on a raid before it crosses warning
line 2. In this case an equivalent event, type 13, is generated.
Note that the raid track and warning lines may be defined in the input
data so that an event type 3 occurs but event types 4 and 5 do not, to
represent, for example, spoof raids.
The model represents errors in the estimates of raid position, speed and 
heading in the calculation of interception courses, and a delay in the 
GC response to a raid track-change. Subroutine UPDATEERROR is called to 
assign values to these estimates and this GC reaction delay. If the raid 
has already been detected and tracked by a fighter, the source - GC or 
fighter - providing the smallest such errors or shortest delay is 
assumed to be chosen. (If a conflict arises between the sources of 
information providing the smallest errors and the shortest reaction 
delay, a criterion must be specified in the model to determine which 
of these factors takes precedence).
Apart from the single call to subroutine UPDATERR0R(IR,0) if the raid 
crosses warning line 2,the same processing is carried out if the track- 
change information is generated by GC (event type 4) or by a fighter 
(event type 13). In particular, the variable IEV4(IR),initialised in 
subroutine REPINIT, is used to ensure that all the following processing 
for raid IR is carried out once only.
If the raid has been completely destroyed or has reached the end of its 
defined flight path, then LOCEVR(IR)=0 and no more processing is necessary. 
Otherwise, subroutine MOVER is called to update the raid's position. Each 
fighter already attacking the raid - if any - has its position and velocity 
updated in subroutine MOVEIF and a new interception course calculated in
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subroutine COLLISION (via subroutine INTCALCONTROL). If a fighter 
possesses a valid interception course this is assumed to be instantly 
adopted; the fighter's change of track is set up in subroutine EV12 
(via subroutine INTCALCONTROL). If a fighter cannot intercept the raid 
it is removed in subroutine lATTDEL from the list (IATTACK(IR, •)) of 
fighters attacking raid IR and provisionally sent to CAP in subroutine EV9. 
Subroutine ERRORS is first called before any of these fighter interception 
courses are calculated; this ensures that the same errors in the estimates 
of raid position, speed and heading apply to all the fighters.
The input data specifies a number, NFl, of fighters which should attack a 
raid once its track has been ascertained. If, after new interception 
courses have been calculated for all fighters currently attacking the 
raid there is any shortfall, subroutine FFIND finds those fighters cruising 
to or on CAP which can intercept the raid most quickly. Finally, if 
sufficient such fighters cannot be found, subroutine FCHOOSE attempts 
to meet the remaining shortfall by scrambling unallocated fighters from the 
fighter bases.
Event Type 5 - Raid Size Resolved
Event type 5 represents the Ground Control response to the acquisition of 
accurate information on the strength of a raid, ie the number of aircraft 
within it. As with event type 4, an event type 5 can be generated in one 
of two ways:
(i) The raid crosses warning line 3. The time at which this 
occurs is calculated just once in subroutine INPUT, and the event 
type 5 for each raid is then set up at the beginning of each 
replication in subroutine REPINIT.
(ii) A fighter scrambled at an earlier event type 3 or 4 could 
possibly resolve the raid on its AI radar before it crosses warning 
line 3.
It is assumed that the event type 4 (GC acquisition of track information) 
for a raid must occur before the corresponding event type 5. The 
input data could of course be such that the size of a raid is never 
established. As with event type 4 a variable, IEV5(IR), is used to 
ensure that the following processing is only carried out at most once 
for each raid. Again, it is possible that raid IR is completely des­
troyed before it reaches warning line 3 (in which case LOCEVR(IR) is 
set equal to zero in subroutine RAIDKILL).
The input data contains a parameter, FRATID, which represents the ratio 
of fighters: enemy aircraft which GC attempts to achieve when the 
strength of a raid is known. After updating the raid's position the 
number of fighters required to attack this raid is calculated. If there 
is a shortfall subroutine FFIND attempts to meet this with the fighters 
which can intercept the raid most quickly from those cruising to or on 
CAP. If insufficient such fighters are available subroutine FCHOOSE attempts 
to meet the remaining shortfall from the unallocated fighters on alert 
at the fighter bases.
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Event Type 6 - AI Radar Scan
This is the most complex event in the Fighter Model. Its frequence of 
occurrence is determined by a parameter DTR in the input data. The first 
event type 6 is generated at the beginning of each replication in sub­
routine REPINIT; each event type 6 then generates its successor, unless all 
raids have been completely destroyed.
Event type 6 corresponds to the updating, every DTR seconds, of the 
complete radar and ECM picture for each airborne fighter and each raid.
If there are no fighters remaining active - ie with sufficient fuel 
and missiles on-board to be capable of an interception - or none have yet 
taken off, no processing is carried out other than setting up the next radar 
scan. Otherwise the positions and velocities of all fighters and raids 
are updated in subroutines MOVE F and MOVER respectively. Subroutine RADAR 
then updates the radar and ECM picture for each fighter and raid pair.
In particular it determines, for each fighter and raid,the raid signal 
strength at the fighter, the total jamming experienced by the fighter 
when it is illuminating the raid and the fighter's background noise and 
clutter levels. Subroutine RADAR then calls subroutine RADEVENTS to det­
ermine what should be the fighter's response to this raid in the face of 
these values of target signal strength, jamming strength, noise and 
clutter levels.
Event Type 7 - Fighter take-off
This event, for fighter IF, is generated in subroutine FCHOOSE when a 
fighter is allocated either to fly to a CAP (at an event type 3) or to 
intercept a raid (at an event type 4 or S, or to replace a fighter whose 
planned interception is for some reason no longer possible). The current 
profile of fighter IF is recovered from the KPROF array, the fighter type 
from the KFTyPE array and the base from which this fighter is operating from 
the KBASE array. (A profile is a set of values of velocity and fuel- 
consumption rates at a series of time-points. The fighter profile is 
initially set in subroutine FCHOOSE, and is determined by its expected task. 
It is conceivable that this task could be changed in the interval between 
the fighter allocation and take-off;for example a raid could change track, 
rendering a planned interception impossible; conversely a raid could cross 
warning line 2 or 3 so that more fighters are allocated to attack it. At 
such occuirences the fighter profile is changed accordingly).
The variable NFIGHTCUM is updated; this is simply a count of the number of 
fighters which take-off. (It is initialised at the beginning of each 
replication in subroutine REPINIT). The fighter's fixed AI carrier frequency 
is then set. If the model is running in stochastic mode its value is 
chosen from a uniform distribution within the minimum and maximum carrier 
frequencies (specified in the input data). When in deterministic mode
the carrier frequency, F, of fighter n scrambled (n=l,2,3,......) is given
by
F(n) =
A+y B (n=2,4,6,.......)
A- (n=l,3,5,........ )
(9.2)
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Here A is the average carrier frequency for this fighter type and B is 
the maximum systematic frequency difference for this fighter type, 
calculated in subroutine INPUT by
A= Max.frequency+Min.frequency
^ (9.3)
B=Max. frequency-Min, frequency 
21
(The denominator 21 is the current maximum number of fighters expected 
to be airborne at any one time, and equals the dimension of all fighter 
arrays. This can easily be changed of course).
The value of the control variable MODER(IF) is next determined. The 
control variable MODEC(IF) will already have been set equal to 1,2 or 3 
depending on whether the fighter is to fly to a CAP, attack a raid 
under Broadcast Control (BC), or attack a raid under either Close Control 
(CC) or Data Link Control (DL) respectively. This is too ’coarse’ a 
variable for many purposes, taking only four possible values (M0DEC(IF)=4 
corresponds to fighter IF attacking a raid autonomously, after achieving 
a detection). MODER(IF) currently takes one of 14 values, with a 
correspondence with MODEC(IF) as illustrated in Figure 0.5. (MODER(IF)=G 
corresponds to a fighter between allocation and take-off, regardless of 
the value of MODEC(IF)).
The variable FT(IF) is updated, the queue for take-off at the fighter 
base decreased by one and the fighter's next profile-point change (event 
type 8) set up in subroutine PUTEVT.
Event Type 8 - Fighter reaches a profile point
The fighter position, velocity and fuel state are updated in subroutine 
MOVEIF, while the serial of the last profile point reached is retrieved 
from the variable JPPT(IF). The time until the next profile point is 
due is determined from the TPPT array and the next profile-point is set up 
in subroutine PUTEVT. The fighter acceleration components are then reset; 
FFX(IF) and FFY(IF) denote the current x- and y- components of fighter 
IP's acceleration. FPPT(JPROF,IFTY,M) stores the magnitude of the 
acceleration between profile points M and M+1 for fighter type IFTY under 
profile JPROF. If fighter IF has reached a constant speed FFX(IF) and 
FFY(IF) are unchanged - they are already zero - and no action need be 
taken. Otherwise, its new components are altered simply in proportion 
to the magnitude of the change in acceleration.
Finally the current fighter fuel consumption rate, FRATE(IF), and the 
serial of the last profile point reached,JPPT(IF), are updated.
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Event Type 9 - Fighter arrives on CAP and 
Event Type 10 - Fighter reaches a CAP point
Each CAP in the Fighter Model is defined by a series of points, the 
coordinates of which are specified in the input data. These points 
define the sequence of straight line segments which constitute the 
CAP. The processing carried out at event types 9 and 10 is identical.
A distinction is drawn only in order to make the arrival of a fighter 
on CAP distinct from its ensuing progression through the CAP points.
An event type 9 is generated either in subroutine FCHOOSE for a 
fighter scrambled to fly to a CAP, or in subroutine EV9 if a fighter's 
planned interception is rendered impossible and it is reallocated to 
a CAP. The fighter position and fuel state are first updated in subroutine 
MOVEIF. The fighter type, the serial of this CAP and the serial of the 
CAP point at which the fighter is arriving are retrieved from the 
KFTYPE,KCAP and NEXTCAPPT arrays respectively. NPOINTS(JCAP) denotes 
the number of points defining this CAP. The next CAP point is updated 
and the distance DS to this point found from the arrays XPT and YPT; 
the fighter velocity components are then reset to correspond to the 
fighter flying along the straight line segment towards the next CAP point.
It is expected that by the time a fighter reaches a CAP it will have 
finished accelerating and reached a constant speed and constant fuel 
consumption rate section of its flight profile. Nevertheless, to ensure 
that DT, the time taken to fly to the next CAP point, is always correctly 
evaluated, subroutine TFROMS is called; this takes into account any 
remaining acceleration between profile points. Finally subroutine 
PUTEVT sets up an event type 10, the next arrival at a CAP point, at 
time DT hence.
Event Type II - Fighter returns to Base
This event is generated in subroutine EV9 if fighter IF, unable to continue 
an interception, cannot reach any of the pre-defined CAP patterns. While 
flying back to base the fighter may detect and attack enemy raids on its 
AI radar. If no suitable targets present themselves to the fighter, 
on arrival back at base it is deleted from the list of active fighters 
(represented by a call to subroutine FDESTRl(IF)).
Event Type 12 - Fighter reaches its expected interception point
This event corresponds to fighter IF reaching its expected interception 
point and is generated in subroutine EV12.
The fighter and raid positions are updated by subroutines MOVEIF and MOVER 
respectively and the serial IR of the fighter's target raid recovered 
from the ITARGET array. Subroutine WRITERAD prints information on the 
fighter and raid positions and velocities and on the distance of the raid 
from its weapon-release point.
The remaining processing associated with this event depends on the value 
of the control variable I120R16, specified in the input data.
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(i) I120R16=0
In this case the fighter’s measure of effectiveness is event type 16- 
missile splash. The occurrence of this event type 12 means that fighter 
IF has reached its expected interception point before splashing a missile 
against raid IR. If the fighter has not even detected the raid (MODEC(IF)<4) 
the interception is abandoned and the fighter provisionally sent to CAP.
An attempt is made to replace fighter IF in the attack on raid IR, in sub­
routines FFIND and (if necessary) FCHOOSE. Otherwise, if the fighter has 
detected the raid and is in the process of attacking it, this event type 12 
is ignored: the fighter continues along its course, while event type 17's 
continue to be generated (in subroutine LAUNCHTEST) to test for missile- 
launch range.
(ii) I120R16=1
If required, the fighter measure of effectiveness may be taken to be event 
type 12, ie interception or collision. In this case, when the fighter has 
acquired range information on its target on its AI radar and set up its 
own interception course, no further radar or ECM processing of this 
fighter is carried out. (This is achieved by setting ICOLLIDE(IF)=1 in 
subroutine RADEVENTS when the fighter achieves burnthrough; see subroutine 
TESTFIGHTER). Similarly, no tests for missile launch-range are made, and 
all missile data is ignored. In this case subroutine STATS collects 
interception data; for completeness ICOLLIDE(IF) is reset to its initial value 
of -1 and, currently, subroutines lATTFIND,lATTDEL and FDESTRl eliminate 
fighter IF from the list of fighters attacking raid IR and the list of 
active fighters. Finally, it is possible that, with I120R16=1 specified in 
the input data, fighter IF has been assigned an interception course by 
Ground Control and has reached its expected interception point without 
even detecting the raid. In this case subroutine STATS does not collect 
interception data and there is no need to reset ICOLLIDE(IF), since it 
has not been altered from its initial value, set at the beginning of each 
replication in subroutine REPINIT. Subroutines lATTFIND,lATTDEL and FDESTRl 
still delete the fighter from the list of fighters attacking raid IR and 
the list of active fighters.
Event Type 13 - Ground Control acquires track information from a fighter
This event is generated in subroutine RADEVENTS when a fighter first 
achieves range and track information on raid IR. It is identical 
with event type 4 - track information on raid IR generated by GC when 
it crosses warning line 2 - except that subroutine UPDATEERROR(IR,0) is not 
called. (This subroutine call updates, as a result of the raid crossing 
warning line 2, the standard deviation of the errors in the estimates 
of raid position, speed and heading, and the reaction delay to any 
track-change by this raid).
Event Type 14 - Recalculate fighter interception course
This routine recalculates the interception course of fighter IF on raid 
IR, as a result of a track-change by raid IR. It is generated at the raid 
track-change event(type 2) to take into account the delay in the fighter's 
response to this information.
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If the fighter has a missile in flight, no action is taken. Similarly 
if the fighter has adopted a lead-pursuit course (M0DERCIF) = 6) and either 
GC has no track information (IEV4[IR)=0) or the fighter prefers its own LP 
course to a GC interception course [IGVSF=0 in the input data), no 
action is taken. Otherwise the raid and fighter positions and velocities 
are updated in subroutines MOVER and MOVEIF respectively and the raid 
serial IR recovered from the ITARGET array.
The random errors PE,QE,RE and SE to be applied to the estimates of raid 
position, speed and heading in the fighter course recalculation in sub­
routine INTCALCONTROL are retrieved:
PE=PERR(IF)
QE=QERR(IF)
RE=RERR(IF) ^
SE=SERR(IF)
The values PERR(IF),....,SERR(IF) are calculated at event type 2, the 
raid track-change event. This procedure ensures that the same errors in 
the estimates of the raid parameters apply to every fighter IF attacking 
raid IR when it changes track. Subroutine INTCALCONTROL calculates (via 
subroutine COLLISION) the fighter's new interception course; if the 
fighter has not yet taken-off the delay before take-off is taken into
account in this calculation. If the fighter can still intercept the raid
its new course is set up in subroutine EV12 from subroutine INTCALCONTROL 
and this concludes the processing. Otherwise, if as a result of the 
track-change the fighter can no longer intercept, it is removed from 
the list of fighters attacking raid IR by subroutines lATTFIND and lATTDEL 
and provisionally sent to a CAP in subroutine EV9. An attempt is made to 
replace fighter IF in the attack on raid IR, either from the fighters . 
cruising to or on CAP (in subroutine FFIND) or, if necessary, from the 
unallocated fighters on alert at the fighter bases (in subroutine 
FCHOOSE).
Event Type 15 - Spare
Event Type 16 - Missile Splash
This event corresponds to the splash of a missile fired by fighter IF 
and is set up in subroutine LAUNCHTEST. The fighter and raid positions 
are updated by subroutines MOVEIF and MOVER respectively and the serial 
IR of fighter IF's target raid recovered from the ITARGET array. Any 
possible pending interception event (type 12) is cancelled by a call to 
subroutine DELETE with parameter L0CEVF2(IK); this variable is a pointer 
to the appropriate event information for fighter IF in the event list.
The missile probability of kill, P, , is now calculated. This is a 
function of missile type (MTYPEF(IF), set up in subroutine LAUNCHTEST),
ECM conditions (clear, Home-on-Jam or Angle-on-Jam) and the hemisphere 
of the attack (set up in subroutine LAUNCHTEST;IHEM(IF)=1 or 2 if the 
attack is forward or rear hemisphere respectively). If the fighter has 
fired a radar missile (MISSMODE(MTYPEF(IF))=1) the ECM conditions at
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splash are assumed to apply, since the missile needs to be guided during 
its flight; the control variable m6deR(IF)=3,10 or 7 for clear conditions,
HOJ or AOJ respectively. If it is an infra-red missile (MISSMODE(MTYPEF(IF)) =2) 
the ECM conditions at launch are assumed to govern the missile P, ; this is 
represented by the variable IRLETH(IF), set up in subroutine LAUNCHTEST.
Thus IRLETH(IF)=0,1 or 2 if the ECM conditions when fighter IF launches its 
missile are AOJ,HOJ or clear, respectively. The missile P.,denoted by MPKl, 
may then be determined from the input array of kill probabilities, MPK.
Subroutine WRITERAD prints information on the fighter and raid positions 
and velocities. A random variable, Y, uniformly distributed between 
0 and 1, is then generated. The missile P^,MPK1, is compared with Y to 
determine, if the model is in stochastic mode, if a kill has been achieved.
(In deterministic mode fractional numbers of enemy aircraft are allowed 
and exactly MPKl aircraft will be eliminated from the raid). Subroutine 
STATS and RAIDKILL collect statistical data on the missile-splash and carry 
out the elimination of aircraft from the raid, unless no kill has been achieved 
in which case control jumps immediately to subroutine REATTACK. This 
subroutine chooses the next target, if any, for the fighter and sets up 
all the appropriate flight parameters. On return from subroutine RAIDKILL 
control again normally passes to subroutine REATTACK, unless this missile 
splash has finally annihilated raid IR (LOCEVR(IR)=0). In this case all 
fighters attacking the raid, including fighter IF, are provisionally 
sent to CAP in subroutine RAIDKILL. The further allocation (if any) of 
another target for this fighter is then carried out in subsequent calls to 
subroutine RADAR, rather than subroutine REATTACK, so that no further 
processing is required here.
Event Type 17 - Missile Launch check
This event tests at discrete intervals the range from fighter IF to its 
target, raid IR, to determine if it is within missile-launch range. If 
not the next event type 17 for this fighter is generated, while if it is 
within range a missile is launched and missile-splash event (type 16) is 
generated.
Subroutines MOVEIF and MOVER update the fighter and raid positions and 
velocities respectively, while subroutine LAUNCHTEST actually carries 
out all the processing associated with this event. Event types 17 and 
16 are only generated if the input variable I120R16=0, ie the fighter 
measure of effectiveness equals event type 16 or missile-splash, rather 
than simply event type 12 or interception/collision. In this case the 
first event type 17 is generated in subroutine RADEVENTS when the 
fighter first detects the raid; each event type 17 then generates its 
successor at intervals of DTLOOK (specified in the input data) in 
subroutine LAUNCHTEST.
Event Type 18 - Fighter released after a turn
It is currently assumed that the position of a fighter when turning 
between attacks on a raid remains constant. This event releases fighter 
IF at the end of such a turn, so that it may continue on its next straight- 
line interception course. The turn-time is calculated in subroutine 
COLLISION as part of the calculation of the time to the next interception.
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The fighter's position is frozen in subroutine REATTACK by setting 
ITURN(IF)=1. (This also prevents any radar and ECM processing of the 
fighter during its turn - see subroutine TESTFIGHTER). Event type 18 
is then generated in subroutine REATTACK, to correspond to the end of 
the turn.
The processing involved with this event is very straightforward.
The variable ITURN(IF) is reset to zero, while an event type 17 is 
generated so that the fighter can begin testing the range to its target 
for possible missile-launch.
Event Type 20 - Raid Track-Change (subsidiary)
This event is generated by a track-change of raid IR (event type 2). It 
calculates the number of fighters currently required to attack the raid 
and attempts to meet any shortfall, from fighters cruising to or on CAP 
if possible (in subroutine FFIND) or, if necessary, from unallocated 
fighters on alert at the fighter bases (in subroutine FCHOOSE).
10. SUBROUTINE EVPRINT
This routine is called from subroutine EVENTS to print information on the 
next event pending. This information may be suppressed by appropriate choices 
of input parameters: TPRINT is the time before which no event information 
is printed; NOEVPRINT(L)>0 if this information on event type L is not to 
be printed at any time.
11. SUBROUTINE EVRESET(IEV,IF)
This routine is called from subroutine EVENTS immediately after each 
event is retrieved from the event list and before the processing of the 
event. lEV is the event type and IF the serial of the entity to which 
the event refers. If this event refers to a fighter (determined by the 
type of the event,lEV), this routine initialises one of the control 
variables LOCEVFl(IF),L0CEVF2(IF) or L0CEVF3(IF).
A test is made on the event type serial, lEV. If IEV=2,3,4,5,13 or 20 
the event refers to raid IF and no action is taken. Similarly if IEV=1 or 
6 this is the end of replication or radar scan event respectively and 
again no action is taken.
When an event for fighter IF is first generated a pointer to the event 
data in the event list is stored in one of the variables LOCEVFl(IF), 
L0CEVF2(IF) or L0CEVF3(IF). This enables the event data to be easily 
accessed if it should later be necessary to cancel the event. When such an 
event is cancelled or, as now, when it actually occurs, the relevant 
pointer is reset to zero.
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Three variables suffice for this purpose because at most only three events 
can be simultaneously pending for a fighter. The set of fighter events is par­
titioned into the following three mutually exclusive sets, with the given 
one-one correspondence between sets and variables:
(i) If IEV=7 (fighter take-off) or 8 (profile-point change), 
exactly one of which must be pending, reset LOCEVFl(IF)=0.
(ii) If IEV=9 (arrival on CAP) or 10 (arrival at a subsequent CAP 
point) or 11 (arrival back at base) or 12 (arrival at expected 
interception point) or 14 (recalculate fighter interception course 
after a raid track-change), at most one of which may be pending 
(the fighter may be on a lead-pursuit course), reset L0CEVF2(IF)=0.
(iii) If IEV=16 (missile-splash) or 17 (test for missile-launch
range) or 18 (end of fighter turn after an attack), at most one
of which may be pending, reset LOCEVF3(IF)=0.
12. SUBROUTINE EV8(K,I)
This subroutine is called from subroutines FFIND and RADEVENTS (with 
K=2) and EV9 (with K=l) to set up the next event type 8 (change of 
profile-point) in profile K for fighter IF;I is the nearest profile-point 
in profile K with corresponding speed less than or equal to the current 
fighter speed. (I is evaluated in the calling subroutine). The time DT 
until the next profile-point is due is calculated by linear interpolation.
Note that profiles are assumed to be monotonically increasing, so that if 
a fighter reaches a constant speed on a profile it continues at that 
speed as long as it remains in the profile.
LOCEVFl(IF) contains a pointer to the next event type 8 and this is 
cancelled by a call to subroutine DELETE with parameter LOCEVFl (IF).
Subroutine PUTEVT then sets up the new event type 8 a time DT hence 
and stores the pointer to this event in LOCEVFl(IF).
13. SUBROUTINE EV9
This routine is called to provisionally send fighter IF to CAP if for
some reason it can no longer continue with an interception. It may be 
called from the following subroutines:
(i) from RADEVENTS, if after acquiring range and track information 
a fighter finds it cannot intercept its target;
(ii) from LAUNCHTEST, if the fighter is too close to fire or has 
run out of missiles;
(iii) from REATTACK, if after a first attack a fighter cannot 
make any subsequent attacks;
(iv) from EVENTS at an event type 4, if a fighter attacking a
raid under a lead-pursuit course is informed that it cannot intercept 
when Ground Control acquires track information;
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(v) from EVENTS at an event type 14, if after a raid track- 
change a fighter can no longer intercept its target;
(vi) from EVENTS at an event type 12, if the fighter's interception 
course is so much in error that it has reached the expected inter­
ception point without detecting its target raid.
(viii) from RAIDELIM, if a raid has either been completely destroyed
or has reached the end of its defined flight-path. All fighters attacking 
the raid are released for reallocation.
In all these cases, IF is deleted from the IATTACK array of the target 
raid (the list of fighters attacking it) in the calling routine.
The fighter control mode MODEC(IF) is set equal to 1, to correspond to a
fighter cruising to or on CAP, by a call to subroutine FCHMODE. Similarly, 
if the fighter has already taken-off (MODER(IF)>0), the control variable 
MODER(IF) is also set equal to 1. The interception event and any possible 
planned missile-launch event are cancelled by calls to subroutine DELETE 
with parameters L0CEVF2(IF) and L0CEVF3(IF) respectively. (These are the 
pointers to the relevant event data in the event list). The nearest CAP 
and nearest point of entry to that CAP are found for the fighters and 
their serials, ICAP and IPT, are stored in KCAP(IF) and NEXTCAPPT(IF) 
respectively. The fighter profile, KPROF(IF), is set to 1, the cruise 
profile.
The time to CAP, DT, is calculated, directly from the TF array if the 
fighter has not yet taken off, by a call to subroutine TFROMS if it has 
not reached the maximum cruise speed, or by assuming an instantaneous 
drop in speed to the maximum cruise speed if it has. The fuel used in 
cruising to CAP, FLT, is also calculated. Tlie serial JPPT(IF) of the 
last profile-point reached is altered to take into account the change from 
profile 2 to profile 1, and the next change of profile-point (an event 
type 8) in profile 1 is set up in subroutine EV8. The expected next 
profile-point in profile 2 is cancelled by a call to subroutine DELETE with 
parameter LOCEVFl(IF). The fighter change of course is represented by 
an appropriate change in the velocity and acceleration vectors, ie 
(FVX(IF),FVY(IF))and (FFX(IF),FFY(IF)) respectively. The fighter's fuel 
consumption rate, FRATE(IF), is altered to take into account the change 
of profile.
Finally, if the fighter has sufficient fuel to reach the CAP, the arrival 
on CAP a time DT hence (an event type 9) is set up in subroutine PUTEVT, 
which also stores a pointer to this event in L0CEVF2(IF). Otherwise a 
test is made that the fighter has sufficient fuel to return to a fighter 
base. If it can reach a base the variable KBASE(IF) is updated, the 
fighter immediately turns and flies towards the base and the corresponding 
event type 11 (fighter arrives back at base) is set up. On the flight to 
CAP or back to base the fighter's radar continues scanning and it is 
also available for reallocation, so it is possible that the fighter may 
detect or be allocated another raid to attack. If the fighter has 
insufficient fuel to fly to a CAP or to a base, subroutine FDESTRl is called 
to cancel any pending events for the fighter and eliminate it from the 
list of active fighters.
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14. SUBROUTINE EV12
This routine is called from subroutines INTCALCONTROL, FCHOOSE and FFIND 
to set up an interception event (event type 12) for fighter IF. Common 
Block INTERCEPT brings into this routine the coordinates (PX,PY) of the 
expected interception point relative to the fighter's current position; 
the expected time to interception, TINT, and the serial,INIT, of the last 
profile-point reached (in profile 2, the interception profile).
Subroutine RESPACC finds the fighter's heading error HEADERR and sub­
routine ROTATE then alters the values of PX and PY to take this heading 
error into account. The fighter change of track is represented simply by 
an appropriate change in the velocity and acceleration components,
(FVX(IF),FVY(IF)) and (FFX(IF),FFY(IF)) respectively. Any pending event of 
the type whose pointer is stored in L0CEVF2(IF) (ie type 9,10,11,12 or 14
- see subroutine EVRESET) is cancelled by subroutine DELETE with parameter 
L0CEVF2(IF). Finally, subroutine PUTEVT sets up the interception event a 
time TINT hence, and stores the pointer to this new event in L0CEVF2(IF).
15. SUBROUTINE FCHMODE(IF,MNEW)
This subroutine changes the control mode, MODEC(IF), of fighter IF to 
MNEW (MNEW=1,2,3 and 4). It simply calls subroutine FDESTR(IF) to 
eliminate fighter IF, in its current mode, and then calls subroutine 
FCREA(IF,MNEW) to recreate it with MODEC(IF)=MNEW. It is called from 
subroutines EV9,FFIND,RADAR and REATTACK.
16. SUBROUTINE FCHOOSE(ICAP,NFNEC)
This routine is called to select a specified number, NFNEC, of fighters 
from the unallocated fighters waiting at various readiness levels at 
the various fighter bases. The integer ICAP specifies the proposed role 
of the fighters:if ICAP>0 FCHOOSE is called to scramble fighters to fly 
to a holding CAP, the serial of which is ICAP; if ICAP=0 FCHOOSE scrambles 
fighters in order to intercept a particular raid with serial IR. In 
both cases, the NFNEC fighters are chosen which can complete their mission
- fly to CAP or intercept a raid - most quickly. The subroutine logic is 
illustrated in Figures 16.1 and 16.2; the following notes refer to 
details of this flowchart.
(0) If subroutine FCHOOSE has been called to scramble fighters to intercept 
a raid, so that ICAP=0, then subroutine ERRORS is first called. This 
ensures that in the subsequent calculation of interception courses (via 
subroutine INTCALCONTROL) the same errors in the estimates of raid 
position, speed and heading apply to all fighters.
(1) K is a count of the number of fighters required.
(2) TMINl will, eventually, equal the shortest time in which the 
specified mission can be accomplished (see(7)) so that it is initialised 
here as a very large number.
(3) Up to 3 fighter types may be specified. It is assumed here that they 
are input in the data file in a chosen order, for type 1 is selected in
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preference to type 2, which in turn is always preferred to type 3. Similarly 
the (maximum) of 4 readiness levels are assumed input in increasing order, 
so that leve] i represents a shorter delay than level j ( l ^ i < j ^ 4 ) .
The best fighter type available at the base, IFTY, at the lowest readiness 
level, ILEV is chosen and these values, appertaining to base XBASE, are 
noted:
IFREP(IBASE)=IFTY
(16.1)
ILREP(IBASE)=ILEV
(4) The time before take-off, TONBASE(XBASE), is the maximum of the 
following three times:
(a) Initial fighter readiness level less the time since warning 
first received, ie
RLEV(ILEV)-(TIME-TEV3)
TEV3 is the time at which the first raid is detected, ie the time 
at which the first event type 3 occured.
(b) The minimum readiness level, RLEV(l).
(c) Time until the previous fighter scrambled has taken-off, 
ie
TBGO(IBASE)-TIME
TBGO(XBASE) is set to zero at the beginning of each replication in 
subroutine REPINIT and updated later in this routine (see (14)') 
whenever a fighter is given the scramble order.
(5) This determines, via subroutine COLLISION, an estimated 
interception course; if there is such a course, it calculates the 
expected time to interception, TINT (excl. take-off delay), and the 
coordinates of the interception point (PX,PY) relative to the 
fighter base.
(6) This is calculated, for each fighter type, CAP and fighter 
base, just once during a model run, in subroutine INPUT. A test is 
also made that the fighter has sufficient fuel to fly to CAP, 
with a fuel reserve for combat.
(7) JBASE is the serial of the base providing the fighter which 
can carry out its mission in the shortest total time TMINl.
If the fighters are scrambled to intercept a raid then (XRELMIN, 
YRELMIN) denote the coordinates of the expected interception point 
relative to base JBASE.
(8) If TMINl still equals 10^ no suitable fighters are available 
at any of the fighter bases. The number of fighters allocated at 
this entry to subroutine FCHOOSE is calculated («K-1), this
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information is output and control returns to the calling subroutine.
(9) If the fighter is assigned to cruise to a CAP its serial IF 
is determined and its control mode MODEC(IF) set equal to 1 by 
calling subroutine FCREA(IF,1). Similarly, if it is to intercept
a raid and a Close Control (CC) facility is available (ICC=1), together
with an intercept controller (NGC>0), subroutine FCREA is called with 
parameter list (IF,3); this derives the fighter serial IF and sets the 
control variable M0DEC(IF)=3. Otherwise, if the fighter is to intercept 
a raid but CC is not available the fighter is assumed to adopt its 
course under Broadcast Control (BC), which corresponds to M0DEC=2, so 
that subroutine FCREA is called with parameter list (IF,2).
10. The parameters peculiar to a fighter flying to a CAP are as 
follows ;
(i) NEXTCAPPT(IF)= serial of the next CAP point towards which the 
fighter is flying.
(ii) KCAP(IF) stores the serial ICAP of the fighter CAP.
(iii) Profile 1 is currently the 'cruise' profile, so KPR0F(IF)=1.
(iv) The fighter's initial vector to the CAP must be set up; this
is represented by the x- and y- components of its velocity and 
acceleration, (FVX(IF),FVY(IF)) and (FFX(IF),FFY(IF)) respectively.
11. This sets up the arrival of the fighter on CAP, an event type 9,
in time TTOT from now. The address of the pointer to the event data in 
the event list is stored in the variable L0CEVF2(IF), in case the event 
must later be cancelled.
12. The parameters peculiar to a fighter scrambled to intercept raid IR 
are as follows:
(i) The number of fighters attacking the raid must be increased
by one.
(ii) IF must be inserted at the end of the list of fighters attacking
raid IR, ie the IATTACK array.
(iii) ITARGET(IF) stores the serial IR of the raid which fighter IF
is attacking.
(iv) Profile 2 is currently the interception profile, so
KPR0F(IF)=2.
13. This sets up the expected interception (event type 12) in time TINT= 
TTOT(JBASE) from now. It also sets up the fighter's initial vector,
ie (FVX(IF) ,FVY(IF)), (FFX(IF) ,FFY(IF)), for which it needs the coordinates 
(XRELMIN,YRELMIN) of the expected interception point relative to the 
base.
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(14) The parameters common to fighters assigned to CAP or to intercept 
a raid are as follows:
(i) Decrease the number of fighters available at the base 
(NRLEV,NFCUM).
(ii) Increase the queue for take-off at the base (NQ,TBGO).
(iii) Set MODER(IF)=0 to correspond to a fighter between 
allocation and take-off.
(iv) JPPT(IF) stores the serial of the last profile point 
reached and is here set equal to 1.
(v) Store the fighter type, its base and readiness level, its 
initial fuel load and consumption rate, its initial x- and y- 
coordinates (=coordinates of the base) and its initial missile fit.
(15) This sets up the fighter take-off (an event type 7) in time 
T2=T0NBASE(JBASE) from now (see (4)).
17. SUBROUTINE FCREA(IF,MODE)
This subroutine creates a fighter with control mode MODEC(IF) equal to 
MODE. The number of active fighters is increased by one and the serial 
JF of the first fighter with a control mode greater than MODE is deter­
mined. (IFM(I), if non-zero, is the serial of the first fighter in 
mode I, for 1=1,2,3,4). If there are no such fighters with a control 
mode MODEC greater than MODE, then IFM(I)=0,I=MODE+1,...,4. In this 
case (and in particular if M0DE=4) JF is set equal to IFM(5). This is 
the next fighter serial available for use and is never zero. (IFM(I), 
I=l,..,5,are initialised at the beginning of each replication in subroutine 
REPINIT).
IF is then set equal to the next available serial, IFM(S); this must then 
be updated so that it continues to store the next available serial by setting;
IFM(5)=IUP(IFM(5)) (17.1)
The required value of MODEC(IF) is then defined:
MODEC(IF)=MODE (17.2)
It is necessary to change the pointers of IF and JF, so that IF is 
positioned at the end of the list of fighters in mode MODE, and points 
to the first fighter with control mode greater than MODE (or the first 
available fighter serial, if there are no such fighters). This is 
achieved by a call to subroutine FSEQCH, with the parameter list (IF,JF). 
Finally, if IF is the only fighter in mode MODE (so that, currently, 
IFM(MODE)=0) then IFM(MODE) is reset:
IFM(MODE)=IF (17.3)
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18. SUBROUTINE FDESTR(IF)
This subroutine removes fighter IF from the list of active fighters and 
is called from subroutines FDESTRl and FCHMODE.
The number of fighters currently active, NF, is decreased by one and, if 
IF is currently under Close Control the number of available intercept con­
trollers is increased by one. The serial JF of the fighter immediately 
above IF in the list is obtained from JF=IUP(IF). IF is removed from its 
current position in the active fighter list and placed below IFM(S) (the 
first fighter serial available for allocation) by a call to subroutine 
FSEQCH with parameter list (IF,IFM(5)). The serial IF becomes available 
for re-use if another fighter is now allocated and scrambled-in fact it 
becomes the first available serial - by setting
IFM(5)=IF (18.1)
If IF was not the first fighter in mode MODE=MODEC(IF), so that IFM(MODE)^IF, 
then control returns to the calling subroutine at this point. Otherwise, 
IFM(MODE) must be reset; if IF was the only fighter in mode MODE, so that 
MODEC(JF)>MODE, then IFM(MODE) is set equal to zero, otherwise it is set 
equal to JF.
19. SUBROUTINE FDESTRl(IF)
This routine removes fighter IF from all processing when it can no longer 
contribute to the defence system. It may be called from subroutines REATTACK 
if the fighter has run out of missiles or EV9 if, after a cancelled inter­
ception, it has insufficient fuel to fly to a CAP or a base. It may also 
be called at an event type 12 if the measure of fighter effectiveness is 
defined to be simply interception or collision (event type 12) rather 
than missile-splash (event type 16).
Subroutine DELETE is called with parameters LOCEVFl(IF),L0CEVF2(IF) and 
L0CEVF3(IF) to eliminate all possible events pending for this fighter. 
Subroutine FDESTR(IF) then removes fighter IF from the list of active 
fighters; the serial IF then becomes available for reallocation.
20. SUBROUTINE FFIND(NFSH0RT,NFSH0RT1)
This subroutine is called to find a specified number NFSHORT of fighters 
which are already allocated, to intercept a specified raid IR. Only 
fighters with control modes M0DEC=1 or 2 are considered, ie fighters 
cruising to or on CAP, or under simple Broadcast Control. All necessary 
changes in fighter parameters are carried out for those fighters found by 
this subroutine and control returns to the calling routine with the variable 
NFSHORTl, the shortfall in the number of fighters required (NFSHORT1.^  0).
If necessary, subroutine FCHOOSE may then be called to attempt to meet this 
remaining shortfall from the unallocated fighters on alert at the fighter 
bases. Throughout, the emphasis is on least-time-to-intercept, so that 
those eligible fighters are chosen which it is believed can intercept 
the raid most quickly.
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Figures 20.1 and 20.2 illustrate the logic of this subroutine. Subroutine 
ERRORS is first called; this ensures that in the subsequent calculation of 
interception courses (via subroutine INTCALCONTROL) the same errors in the 
estimates of raid position, speed and heading apply to all fighters.
NREQ is the total number of fighters required to attack the raid, ie
NREQ=NATTACK(IR)+NFSHORT (20.1)
TINTl(I), 1=1,.., NFSHORT will contain, in order of increasing time, the 
interception times of the NFSHORT fighters which can intercept the raid most 
quickly; this array must first be initialised. Subroutine SETIF is called ' 
with parameter list (1,2), to correspond to a search through fighter control 
modesM0DEC=1 and 2 only. Each such fighter is then processed in turn.
The variable INIT is first calculated; this is the nearest point on profile 
2, the interception profile, with a corresponding speed less than or 
equal to the current fighter speed. Subroutine INTCALCONTROL then deter­
mines if an interception by this fighter is believed to be possible. If 
it is (so that IMP0SS=0), the number of fighters attacking the raid, 
NATTACK(IR), is increased (unless NATTACK(IR) already equals NREQ). Five 
arrays-TINTl, PXl,PY1,IFMIN,INITI - store the interception data for each 
fighter considered. This comprises, respectively, the time to intercept,
X- and y- coordinates of the expected interception point (relative to the 
current fighter position), fighter serial and the profile-point serial,
INIT. This is stored in order of increasing time to interception, ie
TINT1(I)^TINT1(L) , 1 ^ 1 ^  L:^ NFSHORT (20.2)
If
TINT<TINT1(NFSHORT) (20.3)
the interception information for this fighter is inserted into the approp­
riate place in the arrays. This procedure is repeated for each fighter with 
M0DEC=1 or 2.
As shown in Figure 20.2 the number of fighters found by this routine,
NFOUND, and the number still required (if any), NFSHORTl, are calculated 
and printed. If NFOUND>0, each fighter IF assigned to intercept the raid 
has the appropriate parameters altered. Thus subroutine FCHMODE sets 
MODEC(IF)=2 if the fighter adopts Broadcast Control and MODEC(IF)=3 if 
it is under either Close Control or Date Link Control. Similarly the 
other control variable MODER(IF) is set equal to 5,11 or 12 - see 
Figure 0.5. (If the fighter is not yet airborne, MODER(IF) is instead 
set at the fighter take-off - event type 7). The serial IR of IF's target 
raid is stored in ITARGET(IF) and correspondingly the serial IF is 
inserted into the list of fighters attacking raid IR, in the IATTACK
array. Finally, the interception data is retrieved from the arrays des­
cribed above in order to set up the interception event (event type 12) 
in subroutine EV12 and, if the fighter has taken-off (ie MODER(IF)>  0), the 
time of the next profile-point in profile 2 (event type 8) in subroutine EV8.
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'NFSHORT 1=NREQ- 
NATTACK(IR)
IFOUND=NFSHORT- I 
NFSHORTl /
YESNFOUND = 0? RETURN
NO
Do for each fighter 
found by this 
subroutine
Set fighter 
parameters
SUBROUTINE
EV12
YESFighter 
taken—off?
SUBROUTINE
EV8
NO
More
fighters?
NOYES
RETURN
FIGURE 20.2. PROGRAM LOGIC -  SUBROUTINE F F IN D  (PART (ii))
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21. SUBROUTINE FIGHTERTURN
This routine is called from subroutine MOVEIF to update fighter IF's position 
and velocity during a turn between attacks oh raid IR. It contains no
processing, since as a first approximation it is currently assumed that the
fighterb position is 'frozen' during such a turn, which is made with 
constant angular velocity. In any extension to the reattack sequence 
in the Fighter Model, it would be straightforward to incorporate in this 
routine the fighter!s spatial movement during a turn.
22. SUBROUTINE FSEQCH(IF,JF)
This subroutine moves fighter IF to the position immediately below fighter 
JF in the fighter list, and is called from subroutines FCREA and FDESTR. If
1 Ft=JF or IF=IDOWN(JF) no action is necessary, otherwise the lUP and I DOWN 
pointers are adjusted as shown in Figures 22.1 and 22.2. IF is removed from
its original position and the list closed around it, it is inserted
between the original IDOWN(JF) and JF and the pointers adjusted accordingly.
2 3. SUBROUTINE GAINREAD(GAIN,ICONV)
This subroutine reads, and stores in the appropriate array,data in the 
form of a polar diagram. It is called from subroutines INPUT and MISSREAD 
and currently is used to input the following information.
(i) Radar Data
GR1(46,3) AI Radar Antenna Gain Pattern (up to 3 AI radar types)
TXSEC(46,2)  Enemy Aircraft Radar Cross-Sections (2 types of enemy 
aircraft-bombers/SSJs and specialist jammers)
(ii) Jammer Data
GJR(46,2) Jammer Receiver polar Diagram (2 types-bomber/SSJ and 
specialist jammer )
G'JT(46,2) Jammer Transmitter Polar Diagram (2 types-bomber/SSJ 
and specialist jammer )
(iii) Missile Data
RMAX(46,2) Outer Boundary of Missile Launch Success Zone (2 types 
of missile)
RMIN(26,2) Inner Boundary of Missile Launch Success Zone (2 types 
of missile)
T0F(46,2) Time of Flight from launch at outer boundary to splash 
The parameter list of this subroutine is (GAIN,ICONV).
(i) GAIN denotes the array (ie one of those listed above) in which
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Part 2 - P.7M-.
Description of subroutine GAUSSRV(R) should read:
This routine is called from subroutines ERRORS and 
ROTATE to sample a random variable from a normal distribution 
with mean 0 and s.d. 1. It simply adds a number of 
i. i, d samples from a uniform distribution.
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the polar diagram data is to be stored. All polar diagram patterns 
are assumed to be symmetrical about a central axis, so that gain 
patterns, aircraft cross-sections, etc need only be determined as 
functions of angles from 0° to 180 . Currently, all polar diagram 
patterns are stored in arrays of dimension 46, so that this infor­
mation is determined at all multipes of 4 (=180/(46-1)) from 0
to 180°. If greater accuracy is required in the specification of 
gain patterns the dimensions of the arrays listed above may simply 
be increased accordingly.
(ii) ICONV is a conversion factor; if IC0NV=1 the polar data 
(normally AI radar antenna gain patterns and jammer receiver and 
transmitter polar diagrams) is converted from dB to absolute, while 
if IC0NV=2 it is multiplied by 1000 (the maximum and minimum 
missile launch ranges are currently input in km).
For any call to subroutine GAINREAD, the polar data, and the angles 
at which the polar data are specified, are read into the arrays 
GVALUE and GANGLE respectively. It is assumed that GANGLE(1)=0, 
and the final value of GANGLE is 180°, otherwise the angles at which 
GVALUE points are specified are quite arbitrary. There is no 
relationship assumed between the number of ingut values of GANGLE 
and the number of equally spaced angles (of 4 ) at which the polar 
diagrams are calculated. The GANGLE and GVALUE arrays are currently 
of dimension 20; if more points are required to be specified in a 
gain pattern, this dimension is simply increased accordingly. (Note 
the fairly rigid input format used for this data, namely 12F6.0).
The values of GAIN(K), K=l,...., 46, where the integer K corresponds 
to the angle 4(K-1) degrees, are then determined by linear inter­
polation of the values of GVALUE, specified at the angles GANGLE.
24 . SUBROUTINE GAUSSRV(R)
This routine is called from subroutines ERRORS and ROTATE to produce an 
approximately normal random variable, R, with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. It simple adds a sufficient number of identical random 
variables, each of which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
25. SUBROUTINE GETEVT(EVTIME,lEVTYP,lUNIT)
This is a standard event-processing subroutine, as described in,.Lambeth (1978). 
Briefly, it retrieves the contents of the next event (time=EVTIME, type=IEVTYl’, 
raid or fighter serial=IUNIT) from the EVENT and lEVENT arrays, via the pointer 
at the head of the event queue. The emptied cell is returned to the stack 
of free cells and the pointers NXTEVT to the next event to be processed an,' 
NXTFRE to the first cell of the linked list of free cells are updated.
26, FUNCTION lANG,(ANGLE)
This function is called from subroutines COLLISION, JPOWER,LAUNCHTEST,RADAR 
and SOJPOWER, with the angle ANGLE in radians specified in the parameter 
list. It determines the nearest integer angle to ANGLE at which polar diagrams 
are specified; these are currently defined over the range 0^-180° at 4° 
intervals (see subroutine GAINREAD). The integer lANG (1^IANG^46) is deter­
mined as follows; the required angle, in degrees, is then simply 4.(IANG-1).
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ANGLE is first converted to degrees;
ANGDEG=ANGLE.(180/PI) (26.1)
lANG is then found from:
ANGDEG=(IANG-1) .4 + REM ( 0 ^ R EM<4) (26.2)
(1^ IANG<"46)
IF REM>2, then
IANG=IANG+1 (1^ IANG:^46) (26.3)
27 . SUBROUTINE lATTDEL(I)
I denotes the position of fighter IF in the list of fighters attacking
raid IR, ie the array (IATTACK(IR,K), K=l, ,NATTACK(IR)), where
NATTACK(IR) is the total number of fighters attacking the raid. This 
routine deletes IF from this list as follows:
IATTACK(IR,K)=IATTACK(IR,K+1) (K=I, ,NATTACK(IR)-1) (27.1)
NATTACK(IR) = NATTACK(IR)-1 (27.2)
28. SUBROUTINE lATTFIND(I)
This subroutine is called, for a fighter IF attacking a raid IR, to find 
the position. I, of IF in the IATTACK array of IR. This array is the 
(ordered) list of all fighters which are attacking raid IR, so that IF 
and IR are related by
IF=IATTACK(IR,I) (28.1)
29. LOGICAL FUNCTION IDFUEL(XT,YT,V,FL,DT)
This logical function determines whether a fighter with initial speed 
V and fuel FL can reach the point (XT,YT) on an interception profile 
in flight time DT, with sufficient fuel to engage in combat and then 
return to a fighter base safely. If so, IDFUEL is set equal to TRUE, 
and if not it is set equal to FALSE.
Function IDFUEL is called only from subroutine INTCALCONTROL. (XT,YT) 
denotes the calculated interception point, while INIT+1 is the next 
point on profile 2 (the current interception profile) for the fighter. 
Subroutine SFROMT calculates the fuel FLT used in time DT, ie the fuel used 
by the fighter in flying (in profile 2) to the expected interception 
point (XT,YT). FAVAIL is then set equal to the expected fuel available 
after reaching (XT,YT) and allowing for a fuel reserve FRES for combat 
(FRES is a function only of the fighter type IFTY). Each fighter base is
then checked to determine whether the fighter can cruise from 
(XT,YT) to the base with fuel FAVAIL. (The fighter's cruise speed 
and cruise fuel consumption rate are taken to be those corresponding 
to the final points on profile 1).
30. SUBROUTINE INITVT
This is a standard event processing subroutine - See H a m b e b h  (lAjy), It 
is called from subroutine REPINIT at the beginning of each replication to
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initialise the event system. It sets up the stack of empty event cells 
(IEVENTC1> ’)) and gives initial values to the next-event (NXTEVT) and 
next-free-cell (NXTFRE) pointers.
31. SUBROUTINE INPUT
Subroutine INPUT is called just once, from the Master Segment 
MASTER DFX. It reads in all the program data, calling subroutine GAINREAD 
to read AI radar and jammer gain patterns and enemy aircraft cross-section 
data, and subroutine MISSREAD to read all missile data. Subroutines RREAD 
and IREAD are repeatedly called to read one-dimensional real and integer 
arrays respectively. The definition of all program arrays and variables, 
including input data arrays and variables, is given in the Glossary. Note 
that data items are input in the units most commonly used for those items, 
as shown in the illustrative data file (Annex B). All data items are then 
converted to the internal program units - radians, metres, seconds, pounds 
(fuel), watts (radar and jammer threshold detection levels, powers, , 
losses and gains) and MHz (radar and jammer carrier frequencies and 
bandwidths; the only exception is a linear ranging modulation of the AI 
carrier frequency, assumed expressed in units of Hz/sec). In particular 
powers, gains etc. are input in dB, and converted to absolute units 
(ie watts) by Function DBTOABS.
Subroutine INPUT also initialises all variables which are independent of 
the replication machinery. This includes all statistical variables, which 
are initialised in subroutine STATSINIT. Subroutine RTRACKS sets up the 
track parameters for each enemy raid. Logical Function INTERSECT calculates, 
if they exist, the points of intersection of the raid tracks with the three 
warning lines. The corresponding detection events (event types 3,4 and 5) 
for each raid are then set up at the beginning of each replication in 
subroutine REPINIT.
The following radar equation constants are calculated once only during 
a model run, for each fighter type:
CPATR (C^lutter £ower at Radar),RPATJ (Radar Power at Jammer),
PJATR (Power of Jammer a^  ^ adar), RPATR (^adar Power returned
at Radar).
Finally, the variables PE,QE,RE and SE are initially set equal to 1.0. In 
deterministic mode they remain equal to 1 .0 , while in stochastic mode 
they take values sampled fromaN(0,l) distribution, for use in calculating 
interception courses with errors in the estimates of raid position, speed 
or heading.
32. SUBROUTINE INTCALCONTROL(TDELAY,ICALL)
Subroutine INTCALCONTROL prepares data for the interception algorithm, 
subroutine COLLISION, in the calculation of interception courses. On 
returning to subroutine INTCALCONTROL from subroutine COLLISION details 
of the interception calculations are printed and, if an interception is 
possible, further tests on fighter fuel state and crossing of out-of- 
bounds regions are carried out. The parameter ICALL identifies the calling
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routine of subroutine INTCALCONTROL and TDELAY the delay before the 
fighter can adopt an interception course, as follows:
(i) ICALL=1 when this routine is called from subroutine EVENTS, 
at event type 4. This corresponds to the recalculation of inter­
ception courses for each fighter IF which has already detected and 
is attacking raid IR under autonomous control, when Ground Control 
first acquires track information on the raid. It is assumed that 
these fighters immediately adopt their new interception courses,
so that TDELAY=0.0.
(ii) ICALL=2 when called from subroutine EVENTS at event type 14, 
to recalculate fighter IF's interception course after a track- 
change by its target, raid IR. TDELAY=0.0 unless the fighter has not 
yet taken-off, in which case it is set equal to the delay before 
take-off.
(iii) ICALL=3 when this routine is called from subroutine FCHOOSE. 
This calculates whether an unallocated fighter of type IFTY at base 
IBASE can intercept raid IR. TDELAY is set equal to the delay be­
fore take-off, calculated as usual in the calling routine. This 
particular call merits attention because the necessary fighter 
variables - initial position, speed, fuel state, etc - do not refer 
to a fighter with a well-defined serial.
(iv) ICALL=4 when this routine is called from subroutine FFIND 
to determine whether fighter IF, currently allocated to cruise to 
or on CAP, can intercept raid IR. Again, TDELAY=0.0 unless the 
fighter has not yet taken-off.
(v) ICALL=5 when called from subroutine RADEVENTS to calculate 
an interception course for fighter IF when it first achieves 
burnthrough, on its AI radar, against raid IR. It is assumed 
that the fighter can adopt its new course immediately so that 
TDELAY=0.0.
(vi) ICALL=6 when this routine is called from the first section 
of subroutine REATTACK. This is a preliminary calculation, to 
find the most likely next target for fighter IF in the reattack 
sequence. It is assumed here that the fighter can instantly 
turn onto its new heading after its previous attack, so that 
TDELAY=0.0.
(vii) ICALL=7 when this routine is called from the second section 
of subroutine REATTACK. Having found the most likely next target 
for the fighter its interception course is calculated more precisely, 
taking into account an approximation to the fighter's turn-time, 
denoted by TTURNl; this is calculated at the previous entry to 
subroutines INTCALCONTROL and COLLISION, with ICALL=6 . Thus, in 
this subroutine call TDELAY=TTURN1.
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The first calculations performed in this routine simply set up the 
following variables:
(RXD,RYD): current raid position
(X,Y) : current fighter position
FUELORIG : current fighter fuel state
V0 : current fighter speed
INIT : the nearest point on profile 2, the interception profile,
with a corresponding speed less than or equal to the 
current fighter speed.
Note that, if ICALL/3, subroutine RELCOORDS calculates the raid coordinates 
(RXD,RYD) while subroutine MOVEIF updates the fighter position. If 
ICALL=3 then INIT=1, while if ICALL=4 INIT is calculated in the calling 
routine, FFIND. Otherwise the fighter has already adopted an interception 
profile, currently taken to be profile 2, so that INIT=JPPT(IF), the 
serial of the last profile-point reached.
The estimated raid coordinates, speed and heading are then derived from 
the actual values of these parameters and the (deterministic or stochastic) 
errors in the estimates of these parameters. The standard deviations of 
the errors in the estimates of the raid parameters, for fighter or GC 
information, are specified in the input data. If the model is in deter­
ministic mode (MODERUN=0) the variables PE,QE,RE and SE are all set 
equal to 1.0 in subroutine INPUT. In stochastic mode these variables all 
take values - set in the calling routine - sampled from a N(0,1) distribution 
(via subroutine ERRORS). The current standard deviations of the errors in 
the estimates of raid position, speed and heading are, respectively, 
RPOSERR(IR),RSPEEDERR(IR) and RDIRERR(IR). The magnitudes A,B,C,D of the 
errors in the estimates of the raids x- and y- coordinates, speed and 
heading are then given by:
A=RPOSERR(IR).PE
B=RP0SERR(IR).QE (32.1)
C=RSPEEDERR(IR).RE
D=RDIRERR(IR).SE
The estimated raid speed, RVT, is then
RVT=RV(IR)+C (32.2)
If 8  is the actual raid heading, the estimated raid heading is
(5p-=(9^+P (32.3)
The parameters actually used in later calculations are the estimated 
x- and y- components of the raid velocity, denoted by RAIDVX and RAIDVY
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respectively. These are given by
f(vtccsSf.
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Finally the estimated raid coordinates relative to the fighter after 
the delay TDELAY are:
RELX =(RXD+A)-X+(RAIDVX.TDELAY)
RELY = (RYD+B)-Y+(RAIDVY.TDELAY)
(32.6)
where (RXD,RYD) are the actual raid coordinates and (X,Y) are the fighter 
coordinates.
Subroutine COLLISION then determines if the fighter can intercept the raid 
on its estimated track. If not, on return from subroutine COLLISION the 
control parameter IMPOSS equals 1 and control returns immediately to the 
calling routine. Otherwise subroutine COLLISION sets IMP0SS=0 and 
returns the coordinates (PX,PY) of the expected interception point 
relative to the fighter and the time TINT to interception (excluding the 
specified delay TDELAY).
The time for the fighter to turn onto its interception course is only 
taken into consideration when the fighter is in the reattack sequence. 
Otherwise, the raid is assumed to be sufficiently far from the fighter 
for the fighter's turn-time to be neglected. Thus if ICALL^^S, so that 
the fighter under consideration is not in the reattack sequence, information 
on the interception course is printed, while subroutine OUTOFB checks that 
this proposed course does not take the fighter into one of the specified 
out-of-bounds regions. Subroutine IDFUEL then checks that after reaching 
the expected interception point and taking into account a combat fuel 
allowance (specified in the input data), the fighter will still possess 
sufficient fuel to return to one of the fighter bases. If the proposed 
interception course does not go out of bounds or consume excessive fuel 
and if ICALL=1,2 or 5, subroutine EV12 sets up the new course, after which 
control returns to the calling routine. If ICALL=3 or 4, so that this routine 
is called from subroutine FCHOOSE or subroutine FFIND, this may be just 
one of a number of fighters being tested, to determine which can intercept 
the raid most quickly. In these cases the interception data is returned 
to the calling routine which, after selecting the fighters to carry out 
the planned interception, calls EV12 directly to set up their new courses.
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If the fighter is in the reattack sequence, so that ICALL=6 or 7, the 
angle 0^ (degrees) between the fighter's current heading and its proposed 
heading is calculated in subroutine DOTPROD (see Figure 32.1). As a 
first approximation the fighter is assumed to be capable of making this 
turn in a time TTURN seconds at a turn rate of 3.0*TRNRATE degrees/second 
where TRNRATE is specified in the input data. Thus
TTURN= 1^1 (32.7)
3.0*TRNRATE
The turn-time TTURN is added onto the interception time TINT and the 
processing described above - the printing of interception information and 
the calls to subroutines OUTOFB and IDFUEL - continues. (Note that the 
fuel consumed during the turn by the fighter is neglected). If ICALL=6 , 
so that the most likely next flight for the fighter to attack within this 
raid is being chosen, control then returns immediately to subroutine 
REATTACK. If ICALL=7, so that the target flight has been chosen and a 
more accurate interception course is being calculated, and if this course 
does not go out-of-bounds or consume excessive fuel, subroutine EV12 
finally sets up this new course.
33. LOGICAL FUNCTION INTERSECT(R1X,R1Y,R2X,R2Y,SIX,S1Y,S2X,S2Y,A)
This function is called from subroutine INPUT for each raid and each 
warning line to determine if the raid track-leg from the point (R1X,R1V) 
to the point (R2X,R2Y) intersects the warning line segment from the point 
(S1X,S1Y) to the point (S2X,S2Y), using a simple application of Cromer's 
Rule. If there is no intersection control returns with INTERSECT=FALSE,
otherwise INTERSECT=TRUE and the variable A ( O ^ A ^ l ) ,  defined: in .
Figure 33.1,is returned to subroutine INPUT. Knowing the times at which 
the raid is at the points (R1X,R1Y) and(R2X,R2Y), the time at which it 
crosses the warning line may then be calculated.
34. SUBROUTINE IREAD(L,N)
This subroutine is called from subroutine INPUT to read an integer array,
L, of dimension N.
35. SUBROUTINE ITERATE(T,A,B,C,D,E,F,*,*,T1)
This routine is called from subroutine COLLISION to carry out a Newton- 
Raphson iteration to find a root of a quartic equation. In the notation 
of subroutine COLLISION, the elements in the parameter list are as follows:
C - ' V Z ^ h l ^  (35.1)
D^’Srçi^s.
81
Expected interception point 
(PX ,P Y )V =(FV X ,FVY )
Current fighter heading Proposed fighter heading
Fighter
►  X
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LOGICAL FUNCTION IN T E R S E C T
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(35.1)
Control returns to the second specified label if a root is found, 
otherwise it returns to label 1. The parameter T is the specified 
initial approximation to the root; each successive approximation is 
compared with the specified upper bound T1.
The equations in subroutine ITERATE give:
Pi'-8fc.r* f/y/V 
F 3 = V r n . T -
(35.2)
The quartic polynomial, denoted by FUNG, is then given by equation (3.7);
fuHc:flfF2.r-n.P5 (35.3)
*^k).vT Si, (35.4)
The slope of the quartic at the approximation T is denoted by 
SLOPE, so that successive approximations are given by
T = T - FUNG (35.5)
SLOPE
Convergence is assumed when
jpUNC/ ^ 6  , where currently 5 =100 (metre) (35.6)
The iteration is assumed to be diverging if T>T1, while from subroutine 
COLLISION it is necessary that SLOPE<0.
36. SUBROUTINE JDETLOGIC(JDET)
This routine is called from subroutine RADAR and determines the tyqie of 
jamming emitted by jammer type IJTYPE in raid IJ against fighter IF. This 
information is returned in the parameter list in the variable JDET, which 
may take the values 0,1 or 2 :
JDET=0 corresponds to the fighter's radar remaining undetected by
the jammer, and therefore unjammed (unless by accident).
JDET=1 corresponds to the fighter's radar continuously detected by
the jammer and continuously jammed. (It is assumed that the 
frequency range which the jammer can detect equals the frequency 
range which it can jam although the jammer receiver and trans­
mitter may have different gain patterns specified in the input 
data).
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JDET=2 corresponds to the jammer detecting and responding to
the fighter’s AI radar while it is still in surveillance 
mode, ie not locked-on. The radar is assumed to be jammed 
during its paint only.
The program logic is illustrated in Figure 36.1. A detection threshold 
PDETJ must be specified in the input data for each jammer type. If the 
sidelobe strength is greater than this threshold, the radar is 
continuously detected and therefore continuously jammed. The sidelobe 
strength is specified in the input data, for each A1 radar type, simply 
as a power (in dB) down on the mainbeam strength. If the mainbeam strength 
(which is calculated in the first section of subroutine RADAR and denoted 
by POWER) is beneath this threshold, the radar is undetected and, unless 
it picks up jamming directed at another fighter, it is unjammed by this 
jammer. If the mainbeam only is greater than this threshold, and the 
radar is in a locked-on mode the radar will be continuously detected and 
therefore continuously jammed. (The value of the control variable 
MODER(IF) indicates whether or not the fighter is in a locked-on mode - 
see Figure 0.5. MODER=3,10 or 7 if the fighter has fired a missile in 
clear conditions, Home-on-Jam mode or Angle-on-Jam mode respectively.
It is assumed that a fighter is always either locked-on or attempting to 
lock-on when it fires a missile. Also, if the fighter does not have 
Track While Scan (TWS) radar, it is assumed that its radar must lock-on 
to acquire range information (M0DER=2), and that it continues attempting 
to lock-on if forced into a reversionary HOJ mode (M0DER=4)). If this is 
not the case then the radar is still in a scanning mode. For each 
jammer type IJTYPE the input data specifies in the variable JMPX (IJTYPE) 
whether it can respond to scanning radars during their paint only. If 
the jammer has this capability, it jams the radar during its paint only; 
otherwise, this scanning radar remains unjammed by this jammer (unless 
by accident).
37. SUBROUTINE JPOWER(JDET)
This subroutine is called from subroutine RADAR to determine DPOWER, the 
effective jamming emitted in band IB by jammer type IJTYPE in raid IJ 
against fighter IF when its mainbeam is illuminating raid IR. (Stand-off 
jammers, which are assumed to transmit isotropically, are considered in sub­
routine SOJPOWER). This is then added to the total jamming power,
POWER, suffered by fighter IF when it is illuminating raid IR; this 
implicitly assumes that the jammers do not interfere with each other.
The subroutine is entered with the value of JDET(1F,IJ,IJTYPE); JDET=0 
if this fighter is not (intentionally) jammed; JDET=1 if it is jammed 
continuously, and JDET=2 if it is jammed during its paint only. The 
bandwidth, BW, of the jamming is first determined. The principle of the 
(escort or self-screening) jammer response is that a jammer concentrates 
its power into the minimum possible continuous frequency band. If just 
one radar is detected within this frequency band IB it is spot-jammed over 
a fairly narrow bandwidth, SPOTBW (an input quantity). If several 
radars are continuously detected within this band the model assumes that 
jamming power is transmitted continuously over a bandwidth just 
encompassing the highest and lowest detected frequencies. If jammer 
type IJTYPE in raid IJ detects any scanning radars and it can respond
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to these during their dwell-time, if necessary it increases the above 
bandwidth to jam these radars during this dwell-time only. Finally, 
it is assumed that the jamming bandwidth BW is at least as great as the 
AI radar bandwidth, RBW. Thus if IFR denotes the carrier frequency of 
fighter IF and IFRMIN,IFRMAX respectively denote the minimum and maximum 
continuously detected frequencies in this band by these jammers, then
BW=Max (SPOTBW,RBW,IFRMAX-IFRMIN,IFR-IFRMIN,IFRMAX-IFR) (37.1)
Note that if these jammers do not continuously detect any radars in this 
band, IFRMIN and IFRMAX are still at their initial values:
IFRMIN = 10^ MHz 
IFRMAX = 0
The jamming power, P, , at fighter IF is first calculated:
(37.2)
P, = PJ. ( L . l  6-^. C- (37.3)
' a w
where
PJ = total jamming power of jammers
and band IB
= 1-way AI reception loss
= Jammer polarisation loss
\ = AI radar wavelength
and
PJATR = ( Lf7 .i , A  j is calculated in subroutine INPUT.
I  j
also G = GRMAX(IFTY)= AI radar mainbeam gain 
= range from fighter IF to raid IJ
= GJT(INTPHI,IJTYPE) = Jammer transmitter gain at an angle y?'
(see Figure 50.3,subroutine RADAR)
The effective jamming power, DPOWER, from this source at fighter IF 
when it is looking at raid IR is then determined. If IJ 7^ IR the 
jamming emitted by raid IJ is assumed to be from a point source and:
DPOWER = ^ (37.4)
~cr
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Here (9 is the angle projected at the fighter by the raids IR and IJ 
(see Figure 37.1) and is calculated in subroutine DOTPROD. lANGLE, the 
angle nearest to (9 at which polar diagrams are specified, is then obtained 
from Function lANG. G^ = GRl(TANGLE,IFTY) is the AI radar gain of fighter 
IF in the direction 0 . If IJ=IR the resolution of the raid by the
fighter's radar is taken into consideration. RESFAC denotes the number 
of independent glimpses of the raid achieved by the fighter's radar 
during a single scan and is calculated in subroutine RADAR. In this case:
P.
RESFAC (37.5)DP01VER=
Target Raid IR
(R ELXR ,R ELYR )
Jamming Raid IJ
(RELXJ,R ELYJ)
FIGURE 37.1. FIGHTER, RAID AND JAMMER GEOMETRY -  SUBROUTINE J P O W E R
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38. SUBROUTINE LAUNCHTEST
This subroutine is called at each event type 17 to test whether fighter 
IF is in a position to launch a missile at its target, raid IR. If it is, 
the necessary processing is carried out and the appropriate splash event, 
an event type 16, is generated; otherwise another event type 17 is gener­
ated a time DTLOOK hence, where DTLOOK is specified in the input data.
The serial IR of the raid being attacked by fighter IF is first recovered 
from the ITARGET array. Subroutine RELCOORDS then determines the co­
ordinates (RELXR,RELYR) of raid IR relative to fighter IF, and the 
range RR from the fighter to the raid. Subroutine DOTPROD calculates 
the angle ^  illustrated in Figure 38.1, ie the angle between the raid’s 
velocity vector and its position vector relative to the fighter.LAUNCHANGLE, 
the angle nearest t o ^ a t  which missile-launch polar diagrams are specified, 
is then obtained from Function lANG.
The model represents both infra-red and radar missiles, and front and 
rear hemisphere attacks. Each missile type must have specified a maximum 
launch-range polar diagram and a corresponding time-of-flight polar 
diagram, and a minimum launch-range polar diagram. The maximum launch- 
range may be multiplied by the input variable SAFEFAC to reduce the 
launch-range (and therefore the corresponding time-of-flight) in 
order to investigate the effects of ’playing safe’. The missile flight- 
path is not represented in the model, so that for each of the two missile 
types the range RR is simply compared with the specified maximum and 
minimum launch ranges. The current fighter heading is neglected in these 
calculations.
If neither missile type is within the maximum launch envelope, the next 
event type 17 for this fighter is generated and control returns to 
subroutine EVENTS. If just one missile type is within the maximum and 
minimum launch envelopes it is assumed that à missile of this type is 
launched and the missile serial is stored in MTYPEF(IF). If both missile 
types are within the launch envelopes the type with the specified priority 
is chosen. This depends on the hemisphere of the attack, which is 
determined by comparing the angle ^ with the threshold angle ATTACKANGLE, 
specified in the input data:
If cP ^  ATTACKANGLE ^  IHEM(IF) = l,ie forward hemisphere attack
If y?> ATTACKANGLE^ IHEM(IF)=2,ie rear hemisphere attack
Finally, if both missile types are within their minimum launch envelopes 
the fighter is,currently, assumed to abandon its attack on this raid. 
Subroutines lATTFIND and lATTDEL remove it from the lATTACK array, ie the 
list of fighters attacking the raid, and subroutine EV9 provisionally sends 
it to an appropriate CAP.
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If a missile is launched at this entry to subroutine LAUNCHTEST, the time- 
of-flight is calculated and the missile-splash event, an event type 16, 
is generated. The number of missiles remaining of the type launched 
is reduced by one. The missile lethality, for each missile type
is at present a function of two factors:
(i) Whether the attack is forward hemisphere or rear hemisphere (see above)
(ii) The ECM conditions prevailing at the time of launch
for infra-red missiles and at missile splash for radar missiles.
(The difference is because radar missiles need to be guided 
during their flight). Three such conditions are represented 
in the model - clear, Home-on-Jam (HOJ) and Angle-on-Jam (AOJ).
The conditions prevailing for fighter IP are determined by the 
current value of the control variable MODER(IF). The mode of 
missile type MTYPE is defined by the variable MISSMODE(MTYPE), 
where MISSMODE (MTYPE) = 1 or 2 corresponds respectively to radar 
or infra-red missiles. If an infra-red missile is launched the 
variable IRLETH(IF) is set to 0,1 or 2, depending on the current 
ECM conditions - AOJ,HOJ or clear, respectively. If a radar 
missile is launched the control variable itself is changed;
MODER(IF) is set equal to 7,10 or 3 if current ECM conditions are 
AOJ,HOJ or clear respectively (see Figure 0.5).
Finally, note that the P^ of a missile will also depend on the 
altitude difference between the fighter and its target, ie on whether 
the attack is essentially in level flight, snap-up or snap-down. Until 
fighter altitude is represented in more detail in the model, this distinction 
cannot properly be made.
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V = CRVXa,R),RVY(IR))
Raid IR
(R ELXR ,R ELYR )
RR
Fighter IF
►  X
FIGURE 38.1. F IGHTER AND RAID GEOMETRY -  SUBROUTINE L A U N C H T E S T
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59. SUBROUTINE LEADPURSUITCI)
This routine is called from subroutines RADEVENTS (with 1=0) to initiate 
a lead-pursuit (LP) course for fighter IF against raid IR, and MOVEIF 
(with 1=1) to update this lead-pursuit course.
The fighter and raid geometry is as shown in Figure 39.1. Subroutine 
RELCOORDS finds the coordinates (RELX,RELY) of the raid relative to 
the fighter and the range RR from the fighter to the raid. If the LP 
course is iust being initiated (1=0) the fighter's current LP angle, 
ANGLP(IF), is set equal to the initial LP angle, ALPORIG, specified 
in the input data. Otherwise, subroutine DOTPROD is called to find the 
angleÿ between the raid's position vector relative to the fighter and its 
velocity vector, as illustrated in Figures 39.1 and 39.2 (0^ ^ fY ). If
r^ = (-RELX,-RELY) and v= (RVX,RVY), j) is derived from:
r  ^V = |r||v| cos ^  (39.1)
Note that this expression does not discriminate between positive and 
negative values of ^ , as illustrated in Figures 39.1 and 39.2
It is assumed in the following processing that the fighter has some 
means of measuring the angle . The variable THILP(IF) is set equal 
to the current value of <p and this is compared with the value of ^  on 
the last occasion when the fighters LP course was updated. If (p is 
increasing the LP course is lagging so that the LP angle c< =ANGLP(IF) 
ought to be increased; similarly, if it is decreasing the LP course is 
advancing and ^  should be decreased. Currently, if the increase or 
decrease in (f is greater than 2 then DC is respectively increased or 
decreased by 2°.
Having found the fighter's LP angle its course may now be calculated. In 
order to discriminate between the situations illustrated in Figures 39.1 
and 39.2 the dot product r.v is replaced by the cross-product 
rx^. This gives:
(-RELX.RYY)-(-RELY.RVX) = U l  U  I S M  (39.2)
If the L.H.S. of (39.2) is positive this corresponds to Figure 39.2 and 
the fighter's course is given by a clockwise rotation through an angle 
OC from the raid's position vector. Conversely, if it is negative, 
this corresponds to Figure 39.1 and the fighter's course is given by an 
anticlockwise rotation through an angle from the raid's position vector.
If Ç denotes the bearing of the raid from the fighter and #  
denotes the fighter heading (measured from the positive x-axis), the 
situations illustrated in Figures 39,1 and 39.2 give, respectively,
(9 = p  f  X
(39.3)
and
8 -
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The fighter's velocity and acceleration components, (FVX,FVY) and 
(FFX,FFY) may finally be obtained, knowing the current raid speed FV, 
and acceleration, FF:
FVX=FV. (9
FVY=FV.5m i 9 (39.4)
FFX=FF.cof(9
FFY=FF. s i a6' (39.5)
40. SUBROUTINE MEANTIMES
This is an elementary routine called from subroutine OUTPUT to calculate 
the mean values of random variables which are specified in the parameter 
list.
41. SUBROUTINE MISSREAD
This routine is called from subroutine INPUT and reads in all the missile 
data, the definitions of which are given in the Glossary. Subroutine 
GAINREAD is called to read the missile launch envelopes.
42 . SUBROUTINE MOVEF
This routine is called from subroutine EVENTS at each radar-scan event 
(event type 6) to update the position, velocity and fuel state of every 
fighter.
Subroutine SETIF is first called with parameter list (1,4). This 
subroutine defines the range of fighters under consideration, and in 
this case all allocated fighters are considered. Subroutine MOVEIF is 
then called in turn for each fighter to update its position, velocity and 
fuel state.
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y  = (RVX, RVY)
Raid IR 
(R E LX,R ELY )
(F V X ,F V Y )
Fighter IF
► X
FIGURE 39.1. SUBROUTINE L E A D P U R S U I T
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Raid IR 
(R E LX ,R E LY )
V = (RVX,RVY)
RR = iri
(FVX.F VY)
Fighter IF
►  X
FIGURE 39.2, SUBROUTINE L E A D P U R S U I T
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4.3, SUBROUTINE MOVEIF
This subroutine updates the position, velocity and fuel state of fighter 
IF,
If the fighter has not yet taken-off (MODER(IF)=0) control returns immediately 
to the calling subroutine. If the fighter is turning following an attack, 
subroutine FIGHTERTURN is called after which control again returns to the 
calling routine. Otherwise, the time DT since the fighter's track was 
last updated is calculated:
DT=TIME-FT(TF) (43.1)
If f denotes the fighter acceleration, its new speed V^^^ is given by
^^3.2)
Note that f is assumed constant, for subroutine MOVEIF is called at each 
event type 8, ie at each point at which the fighter's acceleration may 
change.
Similarly, if (VX,VY) and(fj^,fy) are the components of the fighter velocity 
and acceleration respectively, then the fighter's x- and y- coordinates are 
given by:
%new= (43.3)
also
™new-™old"fx-DT (43.4)
The updated fighter position and velocity is then printed, unless this 
information is suppressed (TIME<TPRINTor IDUMF=0), Finally, if the 
fighter is following a lead-pursuit course (M0DER(IF)=6 or M0DER(1F)= 7) 
subroutine OUTOFB checks that the fighter has not flown into one of 
the out-of-bounds areas specified in the input data, while subroutine 
LEADPURSUIT recalculates the fighter's course.
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44. SUBROUTINE MOVER
This subroutine updates the position of each raid. Each raid IR is 
considered in turn; if LOCEVR(IR)=0 the raid has either already been 
totally destroyed or has reached the end of its defined flight path and is 
not considered further. Otherwise the time DT since its position was last 
updated is calculated:
DT=TIME-RT(IR) (44.1)
The variable RT(I'R) is updated (RT(IR)=TIME) and the raid's x- and y- 
coordinates calculated:
^new *old*^x"^^ (44,2)
rnew-yold+Vy.DT
where (V%,Vy) are the current components of the fighter velocity. These 
may be assumed constant,for the raid position is also updated at each of its 
track-change points (event type 2). Raids are assumed to travel with 
constant speed (and height) between track-change points.
Finally, the updated raid positions are printed, unless this information is 
suppressed, (TIME<TPRINT,IDUMR=0, or too short an interval has elapsed 
since all the raid positions were last printed. Current minimum time 
between printings = 1 second).
45. SUBROUTINE NEWTRACK
This routine is called from subroutine EVENTS at a raid track change 
(event type 2) to reset the kinematic track parameters for raid IR, and 
to generate the next track-change for this raid. If it has reached the 
end of its defined flight-path, it isdcMctivated by a call to subroutine 
RAIDELIM, Any change in track or height at the end of a track-leg is 
assumed to take place instantaneously. The raid's weapon-release point must 
be specified as a track-change point, at which no actual change in raid 
height, speed or track need occur. To avoid unnecessary processing in 
the calling routine the variable INOCHANGE is set equal to 1 if there is 
no change in any of the raid parameters, otherwise it is set equal to 0,
46. LOGICAL FUNCTION 0UT0FB(XI,YI,X2,Y2)
This Function tests whether a fighter track starting at the point .
(XI,Yl) and ending at the point (X2,Y2) takes the fighter into one 
of the out-of-bounds regions specified in the input data. It is called 
from subroutine COLLISION when interception courses are calculated and 
from subroutine MOVEIF to check that lead-pursuit courses do not stray 
into prohibited areas. The Function simply calls Logical Function INTERSECT 
to test whether the line from (XI,Yl) to (X2,Y2) intersects any of the 
specified out-of-bounds lines.
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47. SUBROUTINE OUTPUT
This routine is called from the MASTER segment at the end of a run to
collect and print statistical information if there is more than one 
replication. For each random variable on which statistical data is required 
the following information is derived from the results for each replication:
mean value, standard deviation, standard deviation of the mean, minimum and
maximum values. Two types of results are produced:
(i) For each fighter IF the statistics described above are calculated 
for the following events: times of detection, bumthrough and missile- 
launch; time to missile-splash or collision (depending on whether
the fighter's measure of effectiveness is event type 12(collision) 
or type 16 (missile-splash); this is controlled by the input variable 
I120R16); distance of splash or collision from the raid's pre­
determined weapon-release point. The basic data from which this 
information is derived is collected during a model run in sub­
routine STATS,
(ii) The above results are further aggregated to give the 
corresponding statistics - times to detection,range and missile- 
launch; time to collision or missile-splash and corresponding 
distance of the raid from its weapon-release point - taken over 
all replications and over all fighters. Again, the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values of these random variables are 
calculated,
/This is essentially a 'stop-gap' routine, for it is envisaged that detailed 
output routines will be written as required during the course of studies.
The output routine as written is based on the fighter serials, which has 
two major implications:
(i) If fighter IF runs out of fuel or missiles during an interception 
it is eliminated from the H s t  of active fighters and its serial 
currently becomes available for reallocation. Hence, if in the model 
scenario raids attack over a long period of time - longer than the 
fighter sortie length - the serial IF may refer to more than
one fighter.
(ii) If there is a wide variation between replications due to the 
stochastic processes being modelled, the serial IF need not refer 
to the same fighter (ie the same fighter type from the same base) 
on different replications. This problem is structurally more 
fundamental than that of (i). . To eliminate it, statistics would 
have to be collected not on the basis of fighter serials but in 
terms of the corresponding invariants - the number of fighters
of each type initially available at each base.
48. FUNCTION PDET
This Function is called from subroutine RADEVENTS when the model is 
running in stochastic mode. It calculates the probability that fighter 
IF has detected raid IR in the previous time interval DTR. If the fighters 
signal-to-total noise ratio when its mainbbam is illuminating this raid
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is denoted by SNR, then the detection probability is given by:
(48.1)
where
G is Swerling's G-factor (input data)
RESFAC is the effective number of azimuth resolution cells 
enclosing the raid, and is a measure of the number 
of independent glimpses of the raid achieved per scan 
(see Figure 50.5 in subroutine RADAR)
TFRAME is the time taken for the fighter's AI radar to complete 
a single scan (input data).
49. SUBROUTINE PUTEVT(EVTIME,IEVTYP,IUNIT,NEW)
This Inserbs into the event queue a new event of type lEVTYP, due to occur 
to entity (ie fighter or raid) IUNIT at time EVTIME. Briefly, the next 
free cell, NEW, is acquired from the free-cells stack and the values of the 
new event inserted into the corresponding array elements; thus
EVENT(NEW)=EVTIME
lEVENT(2,NEW)=IEVTYP (49.1)
IEVENT(3,NEW)=IUNIT
The new event is then linked into the event queue, after finding the proper 
place for it# A minor variation in the application of this
event structure in the Fighter Model is that the pointer, NEW, to the 
event data is returned to the calling routine in the parameter list. If 
the entity lUNIT refers to a fighter rather than a raid (determined by the 
event type lEVTYP), this parameter is stored in a variable in the calling 
routine, namely LOCEVFl(IUNIT), L0CEVF2(lUNIT) or L0CEVF3(IUNIT). This 
event for fighter lUNIT may then be easily cancelled, if required (see 
subroutines EVRESET, DELETE and DELEVT).
50. SUBROUTINE RADAR
Subroutines RADAR and RADEVENTS are the most fundamental in the Fighter 
Model, Subroutine RADAR is called from event type 6, the 'radar scan' event, 
every DJ'R seconds. It updates the complete AI radar and ECM picture for 
all fighters and raids and then calls subroutine RADEVENTS to determine 
the fighters' responses,
A considerable degree of jammer responsiveness by self-screening and
escort jammers is allowed for in the model. To represent this, the subroutine
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is split into two distinct sections, illustrated in Figures 50.1 and 50,2. 
The first section determines the fighters' signal strengths at the 
jammers, so that the response of each jammer to each fighter can be cal­
culated, For each fighter AI radar and jammer pair, the jammer detection 
logic currently assumed is that:
(i) the radar is undetected and unjammed (unless by accident) or
(ii) the radar is continuously detected and continuously jammed 
(if its frequency is within the range of jamming frequencies) or
(iii) the radar is in scanning mode and is detected and jammed 
during its paint only (if its frequency is within the range of 
jamming frequencies).
The second section of the subroutine then determines the jammers* responses 
to the number and type of the perceived AI radar signals. The principle 
of the jammer response is that a jammer concentrates its power into the 
minimum possible continuous frequency band. Thus if several AI radars 
are continuously detected within the frequency band of one transmitter, 
the model assumes that jamming power is transmitted continuously over 
a bandwidth just encompassing the highest and lowest detected frequencies. 
The total jamming power experienced by each fighter when its mainbeam is 
illuminating its target is calculated, together with the (pulse doppler) 
clutter and the target signal return. In the case of a fighter not yet 
allocated a target this procedure is carried out for each raid, in the 
hope of achieving a detection. The signal-to-total noise ratio for each
fighter illuminating its target (or a potential target) is then calculated
and subroutine RADEVENTS determines the fighter's response, based on this
data on signal strength and jamming and clutter, powers.
First Section
Figure 50,1 is a flowchart illustrating the logic of the first section 
of subroutine RADAR, and the following notes refer to details of this flow­
chart,
(1) IFREQ1(IJ,IJTYPE,IB) and IFREQ2(IJ,IJTYPE,IB) denote respectively 
the minimum and maximum AI radar frequencies (in MHz) continuously 
jammed during this radar scan(ie during this call to subroutine RADAR) in 
jamming band IB, by jammer type IJTYPE in raid IJ. These are initialised 
at the beginning of each call to subroutine RADAR.
(2) This subroutine is used to define the range of fighters under 
consideration. In this case all allocated fighters (ie fighters which 
have been given an identifying serial) are considered,
(3) The variable IR is normally used when referring to specific raids.
In this section of the subroutine it is the effectiveness of the raids as 
sources of jamming which is being examined, so the variable IJ is used to 
distinguish raids when they are considered as (point) jammers.
(4) A test is made that raid IJ has not been completely destroyed, or 
reached the end of its pre-planned flight path (LOCEVR(IJ)^O).
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(5) Currently two responsive jammer types are considered, representing 
bombers/SSJ and specialist escort jammers. SOJ’s are not considered 
here, for they are assumed to emit continuous barrage jamming and their 
output is not dependent upon the number, type or frequency of incident 
AI radar signals.
(6) JDET(IF,IJ,IJTYPE) is a measure of the type of jamming emitted by 
jammers of type IJTYPE in raid IJ against fighter IF. It is initialised 
here and calculated later, in subroutine JDETLOGIC.
(7) Subroutine TESTFIGHTER determines if there are any special conditions 
appertaining to fighter IF (eg although it has been allocated, it might 
not yet have taken off) such that it is not necessary to continue the 
calculation of jammer responses to its AI radar signals.
(8) The AI carrier frequency (MHz) of fighter IF is denoted by IFREQF(IF) 
and is set at take-off. IFREQMIN is the minimum jamming frequency con­
sidered in the model and IBW the width of each jamming band (determined
in subroutine INPUT), The range of jamming frequencies is currently 
divided into two (equally spaced) such bands. The particular band 
IB into which fighter IF's carrier frequency falls is given by
IB= 1+ (IFREQF(IF)-IFREQMIN)/IBW (50.1)
Equation (50.1) in IB is calculated in integer variables, ie any fractional 
part of the answer is truncated to zero. Hence only if IB=1 or 2 does 
the fighter's carrier frequency lie within the upper and lower limits of 
the jamming frequencies.
(9) Subrouting RELCOORDS finds the coordinates (RELXJ,RELYJ) of the 
raid IJ relative to the fighter IF and the range RJ of the jammer from the 
fighter.
(10) Subroutine DOTPROD calculates the angle <P illustrated in Figure 50.3, 
This is stored in the array element PHI(IF,IJ).
(11) A test is made that the jamming band IB into which the fighter's 
radar frequency falls equals 1 or 2 (see (8)) and that the range RJ is less 
than the maximum for AI radar and jammer interactions specified in the 
input data (RANGEMAX).
(12) For each jammer type IJTYPE the variable POWER is determined. This 
is the effective power of fighter IF's radar at raid IJ when its mainbeam 
is illuminating the raid and is given by:
POWER= ( P p - L f  CrX^ j ,  Cr^
W .  A i  I ^  ‘ ’
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where
and
Pp = AI radar peak power
Lp = AI radar transmission loss
= Jammer polarisation loss 
G = AI radar mainbeam gain
X = AI radar wavelength
Rj = range from fighter to raid (=RJ)
RPATJ = — P°Ù.' ^ X—  is calculated in subroutine INPUT
Finally
= jammer receiver gain in the direction ^  (assuming that the 
mainbeam of the jammer is concurrent with its direction of 
travel). INTPHI, the angle nearest to at which polar 
diagrams are specified,is found from Function lANG, so that
INTPHI=IANG(PHI(IF,IJ)) (50.3)
Y
= GJRCINTPHI,IJTYPE) (50.4)
(13) Subroutine JDETLOGIC is called to determine the value of the 
variable KDET:
KDET=0 if the fighter is not detected by the jammer
KDET=1 if the fighter is detected and jammed continuously
KDET=2 if the fighter is detected and jammed during paint only
(14) If KDET=1 the upper and lower limits of the fighter frequencies
continuously jammed in band IB are adjusted, if necessary.
(15) Control passes from this section of subroutine RADAR when the 
following information has been derived for each fighter IF and each jammer 
type IJTYPE in raid IJ:
(i) PHI(IF,IJ)
(ii) IFREQ1(IJ,IJTYPE,IB) and IFREQ2(IJ,IJTYPE,IB)
(iii) JDET(IF,IJ,IJTYPE)
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FIGURE 50.3. F IGHTER AND JAMMER GEOMETRY -  SUBROUTINE RADAR
Raid
IR (R ELXR ,R ELYR ),y = (F V X (IF ),F V Y (IF ))
X
Fighter IF
FIGURE 50.4. ANGLE, a,  MADE BY THE RAID WITH THE FIGHTER HEADING -  SUBROUTINE RADAR
lOU
FIGURE 50.5. F IGHTER'S PERCEIVED WIDTH OF RAID IR -  SUBROUTINE RADAR
Note: If Wi denotes the width of the fighter’s radar when it illuminates the raid,
then the resolution factor RESFAC is defined by:
RESFAC = max j 1,^/Wj}.
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Second Section
Figure 50,2 illustrates the logic of the second section of subroutine RADAR 
and the following notes refer to details of this flowchart.
(16) Subroutine TESTFIGHTER determines if any special circumstances make 
further processing of this fighter unnecessary. The fighter's missile 
state is also checked and the jamming band IB into which the fighter's AI 
carrier frequency falls is determined.
(17) This determines the coordinates (RELXR,RELYR) of raid IR relative 
to fighter IF and the range RR from the fighter to the raid.
(18) Further processing of this raid is discontinued if it is not within 
the maximum range (RANGEMAX) for radar and jammer interactions. There are 
two additional important conditions under which processing is discontinued:
(a) If fighter IF is assigned to attack raid IR (so that IR= 
ITARGET(IF)) and is under Glose Control or Data Link Control 
(MODEC(IF)=3) or is acting autonomously (MODEC(IF)=4), the 
following processing for fighter IF is conducted only for the 
target raid IR.
(b) If fighter IF is not allocated to a particular raid (ie it is 
cruising to or on CAP with MODEC(IF)=1) or is only under Broadcast 
Control (MODEC(IF)=2) a check is made that the raid currently imder 
consideration as a potential target is not already being attacked by 
a sufficient number of fighters (NATTACK(IR) is compared with 
NMAXNO).
(19) Subroutine DOTPROD determines the angle between the fighter's 
velocity vector and the position vector of the raid relative to the 
fighter, as illustrated in Figure 50.4. This is then compared with the AI 
radar angle of scan, SCANW. If raid IR is outside the angle of scan of 
fighter IF's radar, normally this fighter and raid pair is not processed 
further during this call to subroutine RADAR, An exception is made if the 
fighter has already detected the raid and is attacking it under autonomous 
control (MODEC(IF)=4), In this case the raid is assumed to have temporarily 
wandered out of radar cover and the processing of the fighter and raid is
allowed to proceed. An appropriate fighter change of course under these
circumstances, to bring the raid back within the fighter's radar scan,
can easily be modelled if required.
(20) This is the first step in the calculation of the radar signal return,
PT, from raid IR to fighter IF. RESFAC is the effective number of 
azimuth resolution cells enclosing the raid, and is a measure of the 
number of independent glimpses of the raid achieved by the fighter's radar 
during a single scan. If W denotes the width of the raid as perceived by 
the fighter, then from Figure 50.5
W=RL(IR).J//îj^f RW(IR),/coi^/ ( O ^ ^ ^ / y )  (50.5)
Tlie width of the fighter's radar when it illuminates the raid is , where
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W,=RR, BEAMW (50.6)
and
RR = Range of the raid from the fighter 
BEAMW= 3-dB beamwidth of the fighter's radar 
The resolution factor, RESFAC, is then given by:
RESFAC=max (1, W/W, ) (50.7)
(21) This section determines the total jamming,denoted by POWER, suffered 
by fighter IF when its mainbeam is illuminating raid IR (assuming that the 
jammers do not mutually interfere with each other). Within each raid IJ 
(considered as a source of jamming) the contribution of each jammer type 
IJTYPE is assessed separately. In particular, a check is made that 
jammer type IJTYPE in raid IJ does possess jamming power in band IB, the 
jamming band corresponding to the fighter's AI frequency
(ie PJ(IJ,IJTYPE,IB)>0).
(22). Subroutine JPGWER calculates the power of jammer type IJTYPE in 
raid IJ at fighter IF when it is looking at raid IR, It makes use of 
the variable KDET, calculated in the previous section and stored in the 
JDET array, which describes the type of jamming emitted by jammer type 
IJTYPE in raid IJ against fighter IF.
(23) Subroutine SOJPOWER calculates the jamming contribution of each 
stand-off jammer,
(24) The radar cross-section of the raid, as perceived by the fighter, 
must first be calculated.
If Xj=radar cross-section of bomber/sSJ type (=TXSEC(INTPHI,1))
X2=radar cross-section of specialist jammer type (=TXSEC(INTPHI,2))
Ni=current number of bomber type aircraft in the raid (=TOTB(IR))
N2=current number of specialist jammer type aircraft in the raid (=TOTJ(IR))
the fighter's perceived radar cross-section of the raid, denoted by TXSECTION, 
is given by:
TXSECTION =
N 1 .X1+N2 .X2 (50.8)
RESFAC
The AI radar signal return to the fighter from the target (or potential 
target), raid IR, is then given by:
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PT=RPATR.TXSECTTON (50.9)
(Rl)4
Where RPATR is calculated in subroutine INPUT and is given by
RPATR= f e  ■ - fSO.lOl
and
Pj^  = radar mean power
Lp = radar transmission loss
Lp = radar reception loss
Lp = radar eclipsing loss
G = radar mainbeam gain
\  = radar wavelength
(25) This subroutine determines the clutter,PC, experienced by fighter IF 
when looking at raid IR. Currently it is assumed that the AI radar is 
operating in pulse doppler (PD) mode, so the PD clutter is calculated. 
(Pulse clutter routines are also incorporated in the model, though they 
are not yet used. Subroutine RADAR can easily be modified once a well-' 
defined procedure for the selection of AI radar pulse or PD modes of 
operation can be specified).
The pulse doppler clutter routine, subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC, calculates 
the solution PDCL to the integral shown in equation (73.1). The total 
clutter power, PC is then given by equations (72.15) and (72.17):
PC=CPATR. PDCL/(FV(IF).RH(IR).RH(IR))
where CPATR is calculated in subroutine INPUT and is given by:
CPATR= r/%? • ^ ^  ^
where
Pj^  = radar mean power
Lt  = radar transmission loss
Lj^  = radar reception loss 
RH(IR)= raid altitude
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Lg = radar eclipsing loss 
X = radar wavelength 
AP = radar bandwidth
(26) The signal-to-total noise ratio, SNR, for fighter IF illuminating 
raid IR, is given by:
SNR=PT/(PC+PN+POWERJ) (50.11)
where
FT = target signal return
PC = clutter
PN = internal radar noise (specified in the input data)
POWERJ = POWER = total jamming power
(27) Subroutine RADEVENTS is a major subroutine which derives fighter IF's 
response to raid IR, in view of its current state - defined primarily by 
the control variables MODEC(IF) and MODER(IF) - and the information just 
calculated on target signal strength and jamming, clutter and noise powers.
(28) Normally, in an entry to subroutine RADAR fighter IF is attacking
raid IR, either under Close Control (M0DEC(IF)=3) or, after a detection,
under autonomous control (M0DEC(IF)=4), A fighter only examines each raid 
as a possible target if it is not already attacking a raid (M0DEC(IF)=1
or equivalently M0DER(IF)=1) or if it is assigned to a raid but has not 
achieved a detection and is only under simple Broadcast Control (M0DEC(IF)=2 
or equivalently M0DER(IF)=5). If such a fighter does find a suitable target 
its control variable MODER is changed immediately, in subroutine RADEVENTS, 
while the variable MODEC is not altered until the end of subroutine RADAR; 
hence the test at this point is made on the value of the variable MODER, 
rather than MODEC.
(29) At the end of this subroutine the control mode MODEC of each 
fighter is altered if necessary. In the preceding analysis all fighters 
IF with MODEC(IF)=I are processed before those with MODEC(IF)=J
(1 ^  I < J ^ 4 ) ,  Complications would arise, in terms of fighters being 
processed twice, if MODEC(IF) of fighter IF was increased within the sub­
routine or within subroutine RADEVENTS, There is only one such increase 
which can occur, namely from M0DEC(IF)=1,2 or 3 to M0DEC(IF)=4.
51. SUBROUTINE RADEVENTS
This routine is called from subroutine RADAR for a particular fighter IF 
and raid IR. It determines the fighter response in view of the current 
value of the signal return from the raid, PT; the total jamming and clutter 
experienced by the fighter when its mainbeam is illuminating the raid,
POWERJ and PC respectively; the AI radar internal noise, PN and the 
signal-to-total noise ratio SNR= PT/(PC+POWERJ+PN), All these factors are
109
calculated in subroutine RADAR, Two important parameters used to describe 
the current state of fighter IF are the control variables MODER(IF) and 
MODEC(IF). MODER(IF) can take values from 0 to 13 while MODEC(IF) takes 
values from 1 to 4 *- MODEC (IF) is essentially a useful simplification of 
MODER(IF). The subroutine structure is based on the relationships 
between the various values of MODER, which are illustrated in Figure 0,5.
The subroutine logic is illustrated in Figures 51.1 and 51.2; the 
following notes refer to these flowcharts.
(1) This path is followed by a fighter until it achieves a detection.
(2) Thresholds for these tests are specified in the input data.
They comprise VISIDENT, the visual identification range; DETSNR, a 
threshold of the signal-to-total noise ratio for detection in the clear 
and PJMIN, a threshold of the jammerinoise ratio for detection as a 
jamming spoke. If the model is in stochastic mode and I120R16=0 (so 
that the measure of fighter effectiveness is event type 16 or missile- 
splash, rather than event type 12 or collision), the detection threshold 
DETSNR is not used and a probability of detection PDET is calculated 
instead (in Function PDET). This probability is compared with a random 
number from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 to determine if the 
raid is detected in the clear.
(3) After detection, if I120R16=0 subroutine PUTEVT sets up the first
event type 17 for this fighter; each event type 17 then generates its
successor. These events, via subroutine LAUNCHTEST, test the range from 
the fighter to the raid for possible missile-launch.
(4) It is possible that, if the fighter is under Broadcast Control, the 
raid which has been detected is not the raid to which the fighter was 
initially assigned. To change target subroutines lATTFIND and lATTDEL 
remove IF from the IATTACK array of the original raid (the list of 
fighters attacking it). IF is inserted into the lATTACK array of raid IR, 
NATTACK(IR) is increased by one and ITARCET(IF) is set equal to IR,
(5) If the fighter is under CC or Data Link Control and does not 
acquire range information, it may adopt a lead-pursuit course or continue 
on its current course (see (14)). In the latter case, to prevent 
continued testing for detection,MODER(IF) is reset from 11 or 12 to 13.
(6 ) This corresponds to a fighter cruising to or on CAP and detecting
the raid. The fighter changes from profile 1, the cruise profile, to profile 2
the interception profile. It is assumed that the fighter transfers to 
profile 2 at that point corresponding to its current speed, FV(IF) - see 
Figure 51.3, JPPT(IF), the serial of the last profile point reached by 
fighter IF, is updated to correspond to the new profile, and the time when 
the next change of profile-point (event type 8) is due is calculated in 
subroutine EV8 , The fighter's fuel consumption rate, FRATE, is also up­
dated to take into account the change of profile.
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l7) The test for range information is based oh a threshold of the signal- 
to-total noise ratio, SNR. Different such thresholds, TWSSNR and RSNR, 
may be specified in the input data according to whether the fighter has 
a TWS radar, or must lock-on to acquire range. If range information is 
acquired MODER(IF) is set equal to 8 or to 2, depending on whether it is 
attained via a TWS radar or by lock-on. This distinction is made because 
of the possibility, in subroutine JDETLOGIC, that a locked-on radar is more 
likely to generate responsive jamming from the target raid than one which 
is still in tracking-mode.
Presumably
TWSSNR^ RSNR (51.1)
if
TWSSNR>SNR>RSNR (51.2) '
then range information is denied the TWS radar although it would be available 
if the fighter attempted to lock-on. Nevertheless, it is currently
assumed that the fighter does not attempt to lock-on, preferring to wait
instead until (hopefully) burnthrough is achieved in TWS mode.
(8) As a result of the fighter's acquisition of range information on
the raid, subroutine UPDATEERROR updates the errors applicable to estimates 
of the raid parameters- position, speed and heading, together with the 
reaction delay to a raid track-change.
(9) If event type 4 for this raid has not yet occurred, so that GC does 
not have range and track information, this event is now generated. (In 
fact an almost identical event type 13 is used, because the information is 
derived from a fighter rather than from a raid crossing warning line 2 - see 
subroutine EVENTS).
(10) Subroutine INTCALCONTROL calculates and sets up an interception 
course for this fighter in subroutine COLLISION and EV12 respectively. 
Subroutine ERRORS first generates the random numbers used to calculate 
the errors in the estimates of the raid parameters which are imposed on 
the interception course calculation.
(11) If the input parameter I120R16 equals 1 no more radar processing 
of this fighter is required until it reaches the calculated interception 
point. The variable ICOLLIDE(IF) is reset from -1 to +1 so that, at 
each entry to subroutine RADAR, subroutine TESTFIGHTER prevents its 
continued processing.
(12) If GC has not already resolved the raid size this tests if the 
fighter is sufficiently close to do so. If it is, the corresponding event 
(type 5) is generated.
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(13) If it is believed that no interception course exists,
the fighter abandons its attack on this raid. Subroutines lATTFIND and 
lATTDEL remove IF from the IATTACK array of fighters attacking raid IR. 
Subroutine EV9 provisionally sends the fighter to a CAP; in particular, 
it sets M0DEC(IF)=1 and M0DER(IF)=1. Hence, on the next entry to 
subroutine RADAR, every raid will be examined as a potential target for this 
fighter.
(14) No more processing is carried out if the fighter is on a lead- 
pursuit (LP) course (M0DER=6), or on a CC or DL interception course which, 
in the absence of range information, it prefers to a LP course (M0DER=13 
and ICVSF=1). If the fighter was initially cruising to or on CAP 
(M0DER=1), or under BC (M0DER=5), or ICVSF=0 (Ground Control course vs 
Fighter course) then subroutine LEADPURSUIT sets up a lead-pursuit course 
for this fighter. MODER(IF) is reset to 6 and subroutine DELETE cancels 
any previously calculated interception event (type 12) or arrival at a 
CAP point (event type 9 or 10).
15. Tests on missile launch-range are carried out in subroutine LAUNCHTEST 
so that, from Figure 0.5, the possible changes of fighter state to be con­
sidered are as follows. The tests applied when M0DER(IF)=2,3,4,7 or 10 
on entry to subroutine RADEVENTS are based on R A £  (RTipq a n d
(i) M0DER=2 on entry. Jamming may have increased sufficiently 
since the last radar-scan event (type 6) to deny the fighter 
further range information, so that it must revert to Home-on-Jam (HOJ) 
mode. It is assumed to continue on its interception course, but there 
is possibly a degradation in missile effectiveness if it is launched 
in HOJ mode rather than in clear conditions. This is represented by 
setting M0DER=4. Two tests are carried out to determine
the fighter state: if the Jamming: Noise ratio, POWERJ:PN 
is less than a specified threshold, HOJSNR, or the 
Signal:Jamming ratio, PT:POWERJ is greater than a specified 
threshold, HOJSTARTS, then the jamming is insufficient to 
force the fighter into the reversionary HOJ mode and MODER 
remains equal to 2 .
(ii) M0DER=3 on entry. From Figure 0,5 this corresponds to a 
fighter, locked-on in clear conditions, with a radar missile in flight. 
Again, the only permitted change of fighter state is to the revers­
ionary HOJ mode, in this case MODER=10. Exactly the same tests as
in (i) above are applied to determine if this change of mode is 
necessary.
(iii) M0DER=4 on entry. This corresponds to a fighter in HOJ mode, 
attempting to lock-on. The only possible change is to M0DER=2 if
. bumthrough is achieved, either if the JammingiNoise ratio is 
less than the specified threshold value HOJEND, or if the Signal: 
Jamming ratio is greater than the threshold HOJENDS.
(iv) MODER=10 on entry. This corresponds to a fighter with a radar 
missile in flight in HOJ mode. The only permitted change is to 
M0DER=3 if bumthrough is achieved and the same tests as in (iii)
are applied.
(15) (see Figure S1.2)MODER (IF) = 2 ,3 ,4,7MODER(TF) = 1 ,5, 11 or 12
e n t e r
MODER(IF) = 6 or 13 
(7)
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(v) MQDER=8 on entry if the fighter has acquired range information 
without locking-on, with its radar in TWS mode. The current signal- 
to-total noise ratio, SNR, is compared with the threshold TWS signal- 
to-total noise ratio, TWSSNR, to determine if range is still avail­
able to the fighter in TWS mode; if not it reverts to HOJ mode with 
M0DER=9. (The representation of the fire control system is based
on the Phantom and Tornado; it is not yet clear whether this test 
or the test in (i) is most appropriate here).
(vi) M0DER=9 on entry if the fighter is in a reversionary HOJ 
mode with its radar in TWS mode, so that it has not locked-on. The 
current signal-to-total noise ratio, SNR, is compared with the track- 
while scan threshold value, TWSSNR, to determine if the fighter has 
achieved bumthough since the last radar scan; if so MODER is 
reset to 8 . Again, it is not clear whether this test or that of
(iii) is most appropriate.
(vii) M0DER=7 on entry . if the fighter has a radar missile in flight in 
AOJ mode. The only possible change of mode is to M0DER=3, if the 
fighter achieves bumthrough. It is currently assumed that the 
bumthrough criteria are the same for AOJ as for HOJ, so the same
tests as in (iii) and (iv) are applied.
52. SUBROUTINE RAIDELIM
This routine is called from subroutines NEWTRACK and RAIDKILL to eliminate 
raid IR, either because it has reached the end of its defined flight-path 
or because it has been totally destroyed. Any fighters attacking the 
raid are removed from the lATTACK array (ie the list of fighters attacking 
the raid) in subroutine lATTDEL and provisionally sent to CAP in sub­
routine EV9. While flying to CAP the fighters' radars continue scanning, 
so that they have the opportunity to detect and attack further raids.
53. SUBROUTINE RAIDKILL(MPKl)
This routine is called from subroutine EVENTS at an event type 16, ie a 
missile splash by fighter IF against raid IR, to reduce the number of 
aircraft remaining in the raid. In the stochastic mode of operation a random 
number, weighted by the current relative densities of bombers and jammers, 
is used to decide whether a bomber or a jammer has been killed. (In the 
stochastic mode the test to determine whether a kill has occurred is 
carried out in the event 16 processing; if there is no kill, the call of 
subroutine RAIDKILL is omitted). If MPKl denotes the missile kill 
probability (specified in the parameter list), in the deterministic mode 
a kill of size MPKl always occurs, so that flight and raid sizes and 
numbers of bombers and jammers may be fractional quantities. Again, the 
proportions of bombers and jammers killed depend on their current 
relative densities. Finally, with the elimination of (fractional or 
integer) bombers and jammers from the raid, the total jamming power of 
the raid must be reduced accordingly.
For most purposes the fighter model considers a raid to be a collection 
of enemy aircraft collected at a single point. However, when assessing 
the damage caused by a missile splash and choosing subsequent targets for 
the fighter in the REATTACK routine, greater detail is required. In these
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cases the raid is considered as a string of flights, each flight being 
a known mixture of bombers and jammers with its centre of gravity a known 
distance from the raid's centre of mass (see Figure 0.1) WTien a fighter 
makes a forward attack on a raid and a kill occurs, it is taken that an air­
craft from the leading flight is killed. Similarly a rear attack affects 
the trailing flight.
The subroutine logic is illustrated in Figure 53.1 and the following 
notes refer to details of this flowchart.
(1)(a) When a fighter makes its initial attack on a raid no specific 
flight has been assigned as its target, so that IFLIGHT(IF)=-1. The 
flight to attack is chosen as follows:
(i) Front hemisphere attack - the first non-empty flight from 
the front of the raid
(ii) Rear hemisphere attack - the first non-empty flight from 
the rear of the raid.
Note that a flights serial number remains the same as that defined on 
input, regardless of whether or not other flights have been destroyed.
(b) If the fighter is making a second or subsequent attack on the 
raid it will already have been assigned a flight as its target.
(2j In the stochastic mode the type of enemy aircraft killed depends 
upon their current relative densities. If there are Ng bombers and 
Nj specialist jammers in the flight being attacked, a random number 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 is found and compared with the 
quantity Nj . If the random number is less than this quantity a
N b+Nj
jammer is assumed killed, otherwise a bomber is assumed killed. Note that 
this method assumes that bombers and jammers are equally likely to be 
attacked, regardless of whether the attack is in clear conditions.
Home-on-Jam or Angle-on-Jam mode.
(3) If MPKl denotes the missile kill probability in deterministic mode 
a kill of size XPK is assumed to occur, where
XPK=min(MPKl, no,of surviving aircraft in the target flight) (53.1)
If there are Ng bombers and Nj jammers in the flight being attacked the 
bomber and jammer losses are assumed proportional to their relative densities
®loss =
Ng+Nj
(53.2)
Jioss " _ 2 2 _
Ng +Nj
H7
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This again assumes that bombers and jammers are equally likely targets 
for the missile.
(4) Although the jamming power of the raid is reduced as a result 
of aircraft being destroyed, the effect on the spatial distribution 
within the raid of the remaining jamming is not considered.
(5) If the raid is finally annihilated all fighters attacking it are 
provisionally sent to CAP in subroutine RAIDELIM, Their AI radars 
continue scanning, so they may detect and attack further raids via 
subroutine RADAR.
(6) More than one fighter attacking the raid may have been assigned 
to this particular flight. If the flight is now completely destroyed 
these fighters are assigned new flights within the raid to attack in 
subroutine REATTACK.
I
5 4. SUBROUTINE REATTACK
This routine is called from subroutine RAIDKILL and subroutine EVENTS at 
an event type 16[missile-splash) to set up a reattack for fighter IF on 
raid IR. In order to measure fighter effectiveness an appreciation is 
needed of the ability of a fighter to attack and kill enemy aircraft 
after its initial attack on a raid. The degree of sophistication used in 
the Fighter Model to represent a reattack sequence is felt to be suffic­
iently high to be consistent with the rest of the model, yet not so high 
that its computation and detail dominate the simulation. Thus targets 
are as usual chosen on the basis of least-time-to-intercept, within fuel 
limitations. The raid structure is represented in more detail, inasmuch 
as the individual flights of the raid currently being attacked are assessed 
as potential targets. Finally, the time taken for the fighter to turn 
from its current heading onto an interception course against any flight 
within the raid is taken into account. In the calculation of interception 
courses in the rest of the Fighter Model (in subroutines EVENTS,FCHOOSE, 
FFIND or RADEVENTS), each raid is regarded as concentrated at its centre 
of mass while the time for a fighter to turn onto an interception course 
is assumed to be negligible compared with the total flight time to 
interception.
In subroutine REATTACK each flight IFL is considered in turn as a potential 
target, initially assuming the fighter can turn instantly onto the approp­
riate attack heading. Subroutine INTCALCONTROL determines (via subroutine 
COLLISION) whether an interception course exists under this optimistic 
assumption. (Subroutine ERRORS first generates the random numbers used in 
subroutine INTCALCONTROL to derive the errors in the estimates of raid 
position, speed and heading). If so, it calculates the approximate time 
taken to turn onto this heading. The time to turn, time to intercept 
(excluding turn time) and flight serial are stored in the I-th position 
of the arrays TTURN0,TMIN0,IFLIGHT0 respectively, where the interception 
times are stored in ascending order:
TMIN0(J) ^ TMIN0(I) ^ TMIN0(K) , 1 ^  I <^K^ NFL0 (IR) (54.1)
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(NFL0(IR) is the number of flights in the raid at the start of each 
replication; currently NFL0(IR)^7).
If no interception course can be found against any flight within this 
raid,subroutine REATTACK does not carry out the processing to determine 
if the fighter can attack any other raid. Instead it is provisionally sent 
to CAP (in subroutine EV9) and its serial deleted from the list of 
fighters attacking this raid in subroutines lATTFIND and lATTDEL. Another 
target for the fighter to attack may then be found at subsequent radar-scan 
events, in subroutine RADAR.
Otherwise, suppose K flights are determined as potential targets by the 
above calculations (1;^ K^NFL0(IR) ^  7). Subroutine INTCALCONTROL then 
determines if an interception course exists against the apparent ’best' 
flight, IFLIGHT0(1), if the time taken to turn onto the first approx­
imation to an interception course,TTURN0(1), is taken into account. In 
the unlikely event that the turn time is sufficiently great as to
prevent the fighter making an attack, the next flight in the IFLIGHT0 array
is considered. In the extreme, if no suitable flight to attack can be 
found, the fighter is again provisionally sent to CAP in subroutine EV9.
Note that the movement of the fighter in space during its turn is 
currently neglected (see subroutine FIGHTERTURN), so that the fighter is 
assumed to spend its calculated turn-time in simply turning 'on the spot'. 
Subroutine COLLISION determines the angle through which the fighter turns 
and an approximate turn time is found by assuming a rate 'n' turn, where 
'n' is defined on input.
If the fighter can intercept flight IFL when the turn-time is taken into 
account the interception event (type 12) and change of fighter heading 
are set up in subroutine EV12 via subroutine INTCALCONTROL. The serial 
IFL is stored in the variable IFLIGHT(IF) and an event type 18 (end-of- 
t u m  event) is generated, to occur at the appropriate time hence.
During this turn the fighter's position is frozen, so that at the end of
the turn the fighter immediately continues on its calculated interception 
course and begins testing for a missile-launch opportunity. Finally, the 
next change of profile-point (event type 8) is delayed by the tum-time, while 
the control variable MODER(IF) is reset in accordance with Figure 0.5.
(The fighter is assumed to rely only on its own information during reattacks 
so that M0DER(IF)=13 is not allowed. If the previous attack was in AOJ 
mode without range information (M0DER(IF)=6,7 or 13) the fighter is 
assumed to provisionally adopt a lead-pursuit course (MODER(IF)=6) 
until it achieves burnthrough or again launches in AOJ mode. The planned 
interception event is cancelled in subroutine DELETE, so that in this 
case the foregoing analysis may be regarded simply as a means of choosing 
the next flight to attack).
55. ' SUBROUTINE RELCOORDS(I,RELX,RELY,RELD)
This subroutine calculates the coordinates (RELX,RELY) of a raid relative 
to some point and its distance RELD from that point. It is called under 
three circumstances, dependent upon the value of the control variable. I:
(i) 1=0 when called from subroutines INTCALCONTROL and WRITERAD
to find"the coordinates of raid IR relative to the origin of 
coordinates.
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(ii) 1=1 when called from subroutines LAUNCHTEST and RADAR 
to find the coordinates of raid IR relative to fighter IF and 
the distance from the fighter to the raid.
(iii) 1=2 when called from subroutine RADAR to find the coordinates 
of raid IJ relative to fighter IF and the distance from the fighter 
to the raid.
If fighter IF is attacking raid IR or IJ (so that ITARGET(IF)=IR or IJ) 
in the reattack sequence, it will be allocated to a specific flight 
(IFLIGHT(IF)). In that case the raid coordinates refer to the centre of 
mass of the particular flight being attacked, rather than the centre of 
mass of the raid (see Figure 0.1).
56. SUBROUTINE REPINIT
This routine is called from the MASTER segment at the beginning of each 
replication to initialise all the variables which may be altered during 
a model run: current time, size and jamming power of each raid, number of 
fighters attacking each raid, number of fighters available at each base, 
etc; all such variables are defined in the Glossary. Subroutine REPINIT
also sets up the initial events for each replication:
(i) the end-of-replication (event type I) at time TEND;
(ii) the start of each raid track, regarded as a track-change
point (event type 2) at time TR(IT-1,IR), where
TR(IT-I,IR)^ TSTART <  TR(IT,IR) (56.1)
The time TR(IT,IR) at which raid IR reaches track-change point IT 
is calculated in subroutine INPUT via subroutine RTRACKS;
(iii) the events 3,4 and 5 for each raid, corresponding to the 
times - EWT(IR,IEW), calculated in subroutine INPUT - at which raid 
IR crosses warning lines IEW=1,2 and 3 respectively;
(iv) finally, the first radar-scan event (type 6 ) is set up here 
to occur at time TSTART.
57. SUBROUTINE RESPACC(TDELAY,HEADERR)
This routine serves two distinct purposes:
(i) It may be called from subroutine EVENTS at an event type 2
to determine the delay TDELAY between a track-change of raid IR 
and the corresponding change of interception course by fighter IF, 
which is attacking the raid.
(ii) It may be called from subroutine EV12 to determine tlie
heading error HEADERR to be imposed on an interception course for
fighter IF.
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The fighter heading error and reaction delay to a raid track-change depend 
on the current control modes MODEC(IF) and MODER(IF) of the fighter. 
Subroutine RESPACC is only called for fighters either already on, or about 
to adopt, interception courses, so that MODEC(IF)^l; the four possible 
control modes are therefore as follows:
(i) Broadcast Control: ICTYPE=M0DEC(IF)=2
(ii) Close Control: ICTYPE=M0DEC(IF)=3
(iii) Autonomous control: ICTYPE=MODEC(IF)=4
(iv) Data Link Control: ICTYPE=1; M0DER(IF)=12
The heading error is simply set equal to the appropriate element in the
HERROR array, which is read in as input data:
HEADERR=HERROR(ICTYPE) (57,1)
The total reaction delay to the track-change of raid IR is the sum of two 
delays ;
(i) The Ground Control processing delay, TRESPONSER(IR)
(ii) The ensuing fighter reaction delay, CDELAY(ICTYPE)
Thus
TDELAY=TRESPONSER(IR)+CDELAY(ICTYPE) (57.2)
Equation (57.2) is modified under two circumstances: if the fighter has 
not yet taken off (MODER(IF)=0) it is assumed that only the GC processing 
delay applies, so that TDELAY=TRESPONSER(IR); if the fighter is under 
autonomous control, having detected the raid (MODEC(IF)=4), it is 
assumed that only the fighter reaction delay applies, so that 
TDELAY=CDELAY(ICTYPE)=CDELAY(4).
58. SUBROUTINE ROTATE(X,Y,ANG)
This routine is called from subroutine EV12 to impose a heading error 
of ANG (radians) on a fighter intercept course. (X,Y) are initially 
the coordinates of the calculated interception point, relative to 
the fighter's current position. They are then rotated to correspond 
to the fighter's actual heading when the heading error is taken into 
account. If the model is in stochastic mode the error is sampled 
from a normal distribution with standard deviation ANG, while in 
deterministic mode a systematic clockwise error of ANG radians is 
assumed. (see Figure 58.1)
122
Fighter
►  X
I f
FIGURE 58.1. SUBROUTINE R O T A T E
(X,Y) = calculated interception point
and
then
(X ,Y ) = point towards which the fighter is actually heading
(9 = heading error
X^ = LO^ ~ tc0\O-i-y > u O
X* = r  Zi/t Q) - y (P -'X S
(58.1)
59. SUBROUTINE RREAD(A,N)
This subroutine is called from subroutine INPUT to read a real array A, 
of dimension N.
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60. SUBROUTINE RTRACKS
This routine is called from subroutine INPUT to set up the track parameters 
for enemy raids. For each raid IR (IR=1,...,NR), the position and speed 
of the raid at each track-change point a re,specified in the input data, 
as is the number of raid track-change points NT(IR). (NT(IR) ^ 2  since 
the start position of the raid is classed as the first track-change point).
For each such point IT (IT=2, ,NT(IR)) this routine determines
TR(IT,IR), the time at which the raid is expected to reach the point IT, 
together with VXR(IT,IR) and VYR(IT,IR), the x- and y- components of the 
raid velocity on the track-1 eg from point IT-1 to point IT. The time 
TR(1,IR) is the time at which the raid reaches track-change point 1, 
ie the start time of the raid, and is specified separately in the input 
data.
61. SUBROUTINE SETIF(MGDEl,M0DE2)
This routine finds the range IFl to IF2 of fighters IF with control 
mode MODEC between MODEl and M0DE2 inclusive, ie fighters IF such that:
l^MODEl^ M0DEC(IF)^M0DE2<:4 (61.1)
It is called from subroutines FFIND, MOVEF and RADAR, A simple test is
made on IFM(I) for I=M0DE1, ,M0DE2 to determine IFl, the serial of
the first fighter in this range of control modes. If there is no such 
fighter then IF1=0. Otherwise a simple test is made on IFM(J),
J=M0DE2+1,.,.,5 to determine IF2, the serial of the first fighter with 
control mode greater than M0DE2. (Note that IFM(5), the first fighter 
serial available for future allocation, is never zero, so that IF2 is never 
zero). The last fighter in the required range then has serial ID0WN(IF2),
62. SUBROUTINE SFROMT (K,INIT,V,T,DIST,FLT)
This routine calculates the distance travelled, DIST and fuel consumed,
FLT by a fighter of type IFTY in time T, if it starts with initial speed 
V and INIT is the last profile point reached in profile K. It is called 
from Logical Function IDFUEL. Essentially, the distance covered on each 
leg of the profile is calculated until the fighter has flown for a time T. 
Allowances are made if the fighter starts between profile-points and if it 
is between profile-points after a time T. The logic of this subroutine 
is illustrated in Figure 62.1 and the following notes refer to details of 
this flowchart.
(1) The fighter speed and fuel consumption rates are assumed to be 
monotonically increasing so that once a fighter reaches a constant 
speed on a profile it remains at that speed while it remains on that 
profile.
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(2) This resets the point (T1,V1) at which calculation of DIST and 
FLT begins. VI is set equal to the current fighter speed V, while T1 is 
set equal to T* (see Figure 62.2), the time corresponding to speed V; 
this is calculated by linear interpolation.
(3) In this case the distance covered and fuel consumed while travelling 
from time T1 to time T2 must be included. Each section of the fighter 
profile is then considered in turn until a profile point T2 is reached 
which is greater than or equal to TSTOP.
(4) The terminal speed V* at time TSTOP is calculated by linear 
interpolation; for simplicity this also is illustrated in Figure 62.2.
V2 is then set equal to V* and T2 set equal to TSTOP,
63. SUBROUTINE SOJPOWER
This routine is called from subroutine RADAR to evaluate the jamming power 
received by fighter IF from stand-off jammer IJ, when its mainbeam is 
illuminating raid IR. A check is first made that the jammer is switched on 
(SOJT(IJ)^ TIME) and that it does have jamming power in band IB 
(PSOJ(IB,IJ)>  0). IB is the jamming band into which the fighter's AI 
frequency calls and is calculated in subroutine RADAR.
The coordinates (RELXR,RELYR) of the raid relative to the fighter are 
calculated in subroutine RADAR, while (DXJ,DYJ) denote the coordinates of 
the stand-off jammer relative to the fighter. From Figure 63.1, the angle 
Q subtended at the fighter by the raid and the stand-off jammer may then 
be calculated in subroutine DOTPROD from the expression
(63.1)
IANGLE, the angle nearest to Ô at which radar gain patterns are 
specified, is then obtained from Function lANG.
The power of the stand-off jammer at fighter IF, DPOWER, is calculated 
assuming the transmitter is isotropic:
DPOWER = ._T_ ) Cr. ^ F  (63.2)
where
Pj=PSOJ(IB,IJ) = SOJ power in AI frequency band IB
L|^  =l-way AI reception loss (a function of the fighter type, 
denoted by IFTY).
L = Jammer polarisation loss (affects reception and transmission 
by all jammers equally)
A  = AI radar wavelength
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and PJATR= A is calculated in subroutine INPUT.
also: G=GRMAX(IF'1T) =AI mainbeam gain
/{j. = R2S0J=squared range from SOJ to fighter
= RBW(IFTY)=AI received bandwidth
- IBW=width of each jamming band (determined in subroutine 
INPUT).
The effective jamming power, P, when the fighter is looking at raid IR is 
then determined:
P=DPOWER. G^ (63.3)
G
where
Gg^  = GRl (lANGLE, IFTY) is the AI radar gain of fighter IF 
in the direction <9
Assuming that the jammers do not interfere with each other, the total 
jamming power POWER suffered by fighter IF when looking at raid IR is 
finally increased by this component:
POWER = POWER+P (63.4)
126
f-,
- 5 : - :
5 : 5 & : : :
S k i l l :
s % a %
u a S 1
127
Speed
V2
terminal fighter speed 
at time TSTOP=V*
current fighter speed=V
V I
>  TimeTSTOP T2T1 Y*
FIGURE 62.2. POINTS T *  AND TSTOP AT WHICH CALCULATION BEGINS AND ENDS
SUBROUTINE SFROMT
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Raid
(R E LXR ,R ELYR )
Stand-off Jammet
U *  (DXJ.DYJ)
Fighter IF
►  X
FIGURE 63.1. FIGHTER, RAID AND STAND-OFF JAMMER GEOMETRY
SUBROUTINE SOJPOWER
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64. SUBROUTINE STATS
This routine is called from subroutines RADEVENTS,LAUNCHTEST AND EVENTS 
at event types 12 (collision) and 16 (missile-splash) to collect 
statistical data. For each fighter,data is aggregated on the times at 
which detection, bumthrough and missile-launch occur together with the 
time at which collision or missile-splash occurs and the distance at 
that point of the raid from its target. Aggregated values of the squares 
of these random variables are also calculated so that their standard 
deviations may be derived in subroutine OUTPUT, together with their mean, 
minimum and maximum values,
65. SUBROUTINE STATSINIT
This routine is called from subroutine INPUT at the beginning of a model 
run to initialise all the statistical variables used in subroutines STATS 
and OUTPUT,
6 6. SUBROUTINE TESTEVENTS
This routine is called from subroutine RADEVENTS if fighter IF has acquired 
range on its target, raid IR, It tests whether the fighter is sufficiently 
close to the raid to resolve the raid size (ie the approximate number of 
aircraft in the raid), if this has not already occurred as a result of the 
raid crossing warning line 3 (in which case the variable lEVS(IR) is set 
equal to 1). The test currently used is based only on the angular resolution 
of the raid, as illustrated in Figure 66.1, It may be worthwhile to 
eventually introduce tests based on range or velocity resolution.
The range RR from the fighter to the raid and the angle (f illustrated in 
Figure 66,1 are calculated in subroutine RADAR, where f is stored in the 
array element PH1(1F,IR). The width of the fighter's radar beam when it 
illuminates the raid is then
DRADAR=RR.BEAMW (66.1)
where BEAMW is the AI 3-dB beamwidth, specified in the input data. Only 
if this width, DRADAR, is less than the distance
DRMD=jyco£ tXsU f (66.2)
is the fighter deemed to have resolved the raid size (y is the inter­
aircraft spacing, x is the inter-flight spacing of the raid), in which case 
an event type 5 for this raid is generated a time TRESPONSEF hence. 
TRESPONSEF, specified in the input data for each fighter type, is the time
taken for Ground Control to absorb and process the fighter's information .
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Direction of travel
Typical Structure of an Enemy Raid 
---------------- Raid length ---------------
of the raid
" Raid width
FIGURE 66.1. RESOLUTION OF RAID SIZE -  SUBROUTINE T E S T E V E N T S
y = inter-aircraft spacing = SPLAT(IR) (specified in the input data)
X = inter-flight spacing = STRAIL(IR) ( ..   )
DRAID = jycos^l +x  sin cf>
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67. SUBROUTINE TESTFIGHTER
This routine is called from subroutine RADAR to determine if any further 
radar and ECM processing is required for fighter IF. Such processing is 
unnecessary in the following circumstances:
(i) The fighter has not yet taken off (MODER(1F)=0)
(ii) If event type 12 (collision) rather than type 16 (missile-splash) 
is the measure of fighter effectiveness, so that 1120R16=1, when the 
fighter acquires range on its target and adopts its own interception 
course the variable ICOLLIDE(IF) is set equal to 1 in subroutine 
RADEVENTS. No further radar processing of this fighter is carried 
out before its planned collision.
(iii) If the fighter has completed an attack and is turning to 
continue its reattack sequence, the variable ITURN(IF) is set equal 
to 1 in subroutine REATTACK. The radar processing of this fighter 
is suspended until it has completed its turn, represented by an 
event type 18.
6 8 . SUBROUTINE TFROMS(K,INIT,1FTY,V,T,D1ST,FLT)
This subroutine calculates the time taken, T, and the fuel consumed,FLT, 
by a fighter of type IFTY at profile point INlT on profile K in travelling a 
distance DIST, if it starts with initial speed V. It is called from 
subroutinesEV9,INPUT and EVENTS at event types 9 and 10. Basically, the 
time taken to cover each leg of the profile is calculated until the dis­
tance DIST has been covered. Adjustments are necessary since the fighter 
is normally between profile-points at entry to this routine and is between 
profile-points after a distance DIST has been covered. The subroutine logic 
is illustrated in Figure 68.1 and the following notes refer to details of 
this flowchart.
(1) The fighter speed and fuel consumption rates are assumed to be 
monotonically increasing, so that once a fighter reaches a constant 
speed on a profile it remains at that speed while it remains on that profile,
(2) This resets the point (T1,V1) on the fighter profile at which 
calculation of T and FLT begins. As in Figures 62.1 and 62.2 for 
subroutine SFR0MT,V1 is set equal to the initial fighter speed, V, while 
T1 is set equal to T*, the time corresponding to this speed; this is 
calculated by linear interpolation.
(3) STEM? denotes the distance travelled from time T1 to T2.
(4) In this case the fighter reaches at least profile point (T2,V2) 
before the distance DIST is covered, so that T is increased by (T2-T1), 
the variable S which denotes the total distance covered up to profile 
point (T2,V2) is increased, and the next leg of the fighter profile is 
considered.
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(5) The acceleration F from T1 to T2 is; 
F=(V2-V1)
(T2-T1) (68.1)
The fighter’s terminal speed V* when it has travelled the required 
distance, DIST, is given by
(V*)2 = (Vl)2 + 2.F.(D1ST-S) (68.2)
The time, TEXTRA, spent on this profile leg is then 
TEXTRA = 2.(D1ST-S)
(V1+V2)
(68.3)
Finally, the time TEXTRA is added to T to give the total time taken to 
cover the distance DIST and the fuel consumed while doing so, FLT, is 
also calculated.
69. SUBROUTINE TIMETOTS(TOTMEAN,mEAN,SDTOT,VAR,
TOTMIN,TMIN,TOTMAX,TMAX,N)
This subroutine is called for each fighter IF from subroutine OUTPUT. It 
increases the statistical variables TOTMEAN,SDTOT,TOTMIN and TOTMAX by 
addition of TMEAN, VAR,TMIN and TMAX respectively, while N is increased 
by 1 . It generates the totals from which can be calculated the mean, 
variance, minimum and maximum values summed over all fighters and over 
all replications of a number of random variables. N is a count of the 
number of times the subroutine is called for each random variable. After 
this subroutine has been called for every fighter, the final totals 
obtained are used as inputs to subroutine MEANTIMES.
70. SUBROUTINE UPDATEERR0R(1R,1)
The routine updates the standard deviations of the errors which are applied 
to estimates of the parameters of raid IR, together with the reaction delay 
appropriate to a track-change by this raid. Errors and reaction delay 
depend upon the source of information - Ground Control (GC) or fighter - 
and the source providing the smallest errors or shortest delays is assumed 
to be chosen. If a conflict arises between the sources of information 
providing the smallest errors and the shortest reaction delay, a criterion 
must be specified in the model to determine which of these factors takes 
precedence.
The variable 1 in the parameter list equals 0 if this routine is called 
when raid track information first becomes available from GC sources, ie 
when the raid crosses warning line 2, generating an event type 4. Sub­
routine UPDATERROR can also be called from subroutine RADEVENTS, if 
a fighter of type 1 achieves burnthrough against raid IR.
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TRESPONSER(IR) equals the current track-change reaction delay appertaining 
to raid lR;depending on the best available source of information, it 
either equals TRESPONSEF(1), the delay generated by fighter type 1, or 
GROUNDELAYl, the GC reaction delay if the raid has crossed warning line 2. 
RPOSERR(IR),RSPEEDERR(1R) and RDIRERR(IR) are, respectively, the standard 
deviations of the current errors in estimates of the raid position, speed 
and heading. Depending on the best available source of information, these 
correspond to fighter information - FPOSERR(l),FSPEEDERR(1) andFDlRERR(l) - 
or GC generated information, viz. GROUNDERROR, GSPEEDERROR and GDIRERROR 
respectively.
71. SUBROUTINE WRITERAD(1)
This subroutine is called from subroutine RADEVENTS to print information 
if a fighter detects a raid, either in the clear (1= 1) or as a jammer 
(1=2), or if a fighter acquires range information on a raid (1=3). It 
is also called from subroutine LAUNCHTEST with 1=4 to record fighter and 
raid positions and velocities at missile-launch. Finally, it is called from 
subroutine EVENTS, with 1=5, to record this information if an event type 
12 (a fighter reaches its expected interception point) or type 16 (missile- 
splash) occurs; in these cases the distance of the raid from its target is 
also calculated and printed.
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72. PULSE DOPPLER CLUTTER
A fairly general treatment of pulse doppler clutter is presented in this 
section, including the effects of non-level flight, a linear FM ranging 
modulation and a spherical earth. Any particular airborne radar may not 
exhibit all of these complications, but an appropriate modification of 
the general case can easily be obtained by setting various parameters to 
zero. Subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC, with subsidiary routines, contains the 
processing corresponding to this theory.
The choice of coordinate system considerably simplifies the analysis (see 
Figure 72.1). The radar is at the point R with coordinates (0,0,h), 
ie directly above the chosen origin of coordinates. The radar velocity 
is (Vjj ,0,Vj) , ie it moves in the x-z plane. P is the position of a 
general clutter point on the earth's surface.
Let 2  denote the vector from R to P, with
r-/i/ ' (72.1)
If Rg denotes the effective earth radius, then from triangle CPR in 
Figure 72.2 the cosine rule gives
(72.2)
The doppler frequency shift, f, of the signal returned from the target is 
known and is approximated by
(72.3)
X
where is the relative velocity of the target with respect to the radar 
and A is the radar carrier wavelength.
Pulse doppler clutter is returned from those points on the ground which 
return the radar signal from main beam and sidelobes with the same doppler 
frequency, f, as the target. The condition for the point P to produce a 
pulse doppler clutter return at the doppler frequency f is given by
^ + & &  (72.4)Xr c
(It is assumed in subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC that the radar has a triple linear 
ranging modulation, f - see Figure 74.1. The program calculates the clutter
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for each of the three regions of the carrier frequency modulation 
shown ie AB,BC and CA, and averages the three results obtained).
The clutter power dP received from a clutter patch of elemental area 
dA at the point P is then given by:
(72.5)
effective area of the radar antenna
le
P f r .  CrUf!
where
and
P = mean transmitter power (including the effects of all losses; 
to represent the effects of eclipsing by an average loss factor 
entails the assumption that r is much larger than the inter­
pulse distance, which is normally true for pulse-doppler radar).
^(x,y)= ground scattering cross-section /  sq.m. at the point r 
G(x,y) = radar antenna gain in the direction r 
From Figure 72.2 it can be seen that
id-. A A
CPS yP
(72.7)
From the cosine rule in triangle CPR we have
2
To integrate make the change of variables (x,y)--- > (r ,f), which has
the Jacobian
f  (72.9)
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where
w = / -
Zif^ c+P,)
(72.10)
Now, from the result:
f/ri
equations (72.6) and (72.9) give:
dP = FX^Cr^^ V  c / r V /
(72.11)
( 7 2 . 1 2 )
2 2 2 
The appropriate range of r in the integration is from r = h to
r^= , The range of integration is from r=h until the clutter patch
is exactly at the radar horizon; this occurs when the grazing angle &  
is zero. The cosine rule in Figure 72.2 gives
^  ' Zrl^.
so if fiy =0 then jf.+ii* .
e
I', a
Integrating over r* and omitting the differential factor df to leave 
power per unit bandwidth, denoted by P(f), equation (72.12) gives
F(P)^ I f  Jr^ (72.14)
/ ( r>c^s^lyl
v-r
The total clutter power, PC, is then simply taken to be
PC= P(f).Af (72.15)
where Ar is the effective bandwidth of the pulse doppler radar (assumed 
to be of the order of a few hundred Hz).
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The integrand of (72.14) is not straightforward. To evaluate it the 
integral and all parameters are first made dimensionless by expressing 
all lengths in terms of h, so that we write:
X = Z
and
z = 4 -
Equation (72.14) becomes: ^
1
where, from (72.10):
I V - / - ___
(’ ^ f )
and from (72.8):
The theoretical expression used for is:
^ v;JsiA
(72.16)
k
P(f) = £ 2 l _ _  . I y  J f  ^
4f4yyr/)^/r / F \ . s f l Y l  (72.17)
72.18)
(72. 19)
(72.20)
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where Og is the grazing angle and is the value of at normal incidence; 
the values of the constants and ^ , for each radar type, must be
specified in the program input data. From equation (72.13):
(72.2 0
A
2
Now, for a particular value of r the %-coordinate of any clutter point 
corresponding to this value is derived from (72.4), which may be written 
in the following expanded form:
\ h  - \ F r ’ i - fki -  ■ ) •
=  W  I T  I
(72.22)
Equivalently, for a particular value of R* the corresponding value of X is 
given by:
y .  A M -  Ù L É .  .A ~ !  
^ cl/; I
%
I/,
(72.23)
This may be written:
y  =/9i. R 7 flZ.R^+HH.B (72.24)
where
A1 = I L
^2 = ^  (72.25)
.y-
&
(A1,A2,HH and B are actual program variables).
2
Finally, the corresponding value of Y can be derived from equation (72.2):
2 2 2 2 
X +Y +(HH) =R
(72.26)
2 2 
If the resulting value of Y is negative, the corresponding value of R
does not represent a valid clutter return point, and does not therefore
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2
contribute to the integral. If on the other hand Y turns out to be 
positive, Y can be evaluated and the points corresponding to both +Y 
and -Y contribute to the integral. G is in fact the only part of the 
integral which is affected^by the sign of Y, and the two values are expressed 
most simply by rewriting G as
g 7(X,Y.Z)+g 7(X,-Y.Z)
(0,0,h)
Y= (v^, 0, v p
P(x, y, z)
FIGURE 72.1. CHOICE OF COORDINATE SYSTEM, PULSE DOPPLER CLUTTER
Depression Angle
« &g = Grazing Angl 
P(x, y, z)
FIGURE 72.2. GEOMETRY OF RADAR, R, AND PULSE DOPPLER CLU TTER  POINT, P
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73. SUBROUTINE ZCLUTTERCALC(PDGL)
This routine is called from subroutine RADAR to calculate the pulse 
doppler clutter of a fighter in the direction of a target, when its 
mainbeam is illuminating that target. The processing in this routine 
is based on the theory derived in the previous section, and the same 
notation is used here.
It is required to calculate the following integral;
PDCL = I ^ ^ 9  V  (73.1)
^jyj
The integration is performed numerically, where jyj is evaluated as 
provided is positive. Integration over the whole interval j[l, 1+%/?^]
2
may fail because of singularities at Y =0. Hence the integration range 
is first searched for roots of y 2=0, so that the integration may be 
performed only over those sub-intervals on which y 2 is positive. A final 
manipulation of the integral is necessary to eliminate singularities 
at the end-points of each such sub-interval.
Figure (73.1) illustrates the logic of this subroutine and the following 
notes refer to details of this flowchart.
(1) The clutter routines have been written independently of any particular 
application to the fighter model. Although it is not shown here,subroutine 
ZCLUTTERINIT is called immediately subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC is entered.
This routine assigns values to clutter parameters which are fighter or raid 
dependent - fighter velocity components, doppler frequency shift of the 
signal returned from the target, etc.
(2) The following variables are calculated:
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TY= 1-TX^ - TZ^
(the y-direction cosine of the target from the radar)
B = VZ _ Jfx.
vx ■ K.
Al =
ZV^
D = (73.2)
UPLiM = ;y-
ZH,
(the upper.limit of integration)
C =
POWER = 0 . 0
(the total clutter power; initially set equal to zero)
(3) The carrier frequency ranging modulation - if ^ y  - is assumed to be 
triangular, as shown in Figure 74.1. If the slope p is non-zero, the
clutter integral is calculated over each of the three,regions - zero modulation, 
modulation with slope +p and modulation with slope -f - and the average 
of the three results is taken.
(4) The following variables are calculated:
*
FDOTl = f.(J-2)
(73.3)
A2 = - \  ■ FDOTl
(see equation (72.25)
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2
NROOTS is a count of the number of roots of Y =0 found in the integration 
range, so it is initially set equal to zero. CLUTTER is a logical variable 
which is set to TRUE when a valid clutter return point is first found; 
it is initially set to FALSE.
(5) This section of the routine is described fully later - see Figure (73.2). 
If there are roots of y 2=o in the integration range these are stored in
the array ROOT, while the corresponding slope at these points is
stored in the array SLOPE.
2
(6) If there are roots of Y =0 in the integration range a simple check is 
carried out that a root has not been missed, viz that the slopes of successive
roots alternate in sign. Note that, when R^=l, Y^ is negative
or zero, since at that point from (72.25):
HH = 1 (73.4)
while from (72.26):
= 0 (73.5)
(7) Each root is now considered in turn to derive valid integration regions 
for R^. Each root, RVALUE, and its corresponding slope, GRAD, is in turn 
recovered from the ROOT and SLOPE arrays respectively :
RVALUE = ROOT (IROOT) )
) IR00T=1,___ , NROOTS (73.6)
GRAD = SLOPE(IROOT) )
(8) The procedure is to split up each valid integration region of R*
so that there is a singularity in the integrand at only one end - point; 
see Figure 73.3. Ih particular, on first entry through this loop GRAD 
should be positive.
(9) The lower limit of integration is X^, where
Xo = RVALUE (73.7)
The upper integration limit, X,, is provisionally set equal to UPLIM. If 
there are any further roots remaining, the required integration region 
is of type @  , as shown in Figure 73.3. The upper limit X,is then given 
by:
' - + I \
T j
This expression is used rather than simply because, in sub rout i
p* I
GINT the variable of integration is changed from A  to - f Is
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(10) In this case the integration region is of t y p e © ,  as shown in 
Figure 73.3. The lower integration limit, Xq, is set equal to the 
previous value of X^, while X, is set equal to RVALUE:
Xo — X^
(73.9)
X, = RVALUE
(11) This routine evaluates the following integral by a Gaussian algorithm:
X
DPOWER = I \  ivf (73.10)
n cos y I
X
(12) The total clutter power, POWER, is incremented by the contribution 
DPOWER from the sub-interval •
(13) If there are no roots of Y^=0 in the integration region /^ 1,UPLIm J 
and CLUTTER still equals FALSE, there is no clutter generated anywhere 
in the integration region.
(14) If CLUTTER=TRUE, clutter is generated over the whole region so that, 
in the call to subroutine ZGINT:
Xo = 1.0
(73.11)
X, = UPLIM
Also the variable RVALUE is set equal to -1. This enables subroutine 
ZGINT to avoid unnecessary manipulation of the integrand in (73.10), 
for there is no singularity at either end-point.
(15) Finally, the value of the integral in (73.1) is returned to 
subroutine RADAR in the variable PDCL. If f=0 then
PDCL=POWER
while if fj^ O then
PDCL=POWER
(see section (3)).
2
Calculation of Roots of Y =0
The integration range ^1,1+ of R^ is searched for roots of Y^=0,
2 2 
where Y is expressed as a function of R by equation (72.26):
2 2 2 2 
X + Y +(HH) = R
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The sign of Y is examined at the points
(4 = NSEARCH i =0,1 .NSEARCH (73.12)
where NSEARCH is specified in the BLOCK DATA segment and currently
NSEARCH=100
2
(The search for roots of Y is made at geometrically-spaced points rather 
than evenly-spaced points because initial roots tend to be closer together)
The search algorithm is illustrated in Figure 73.2. Some program 
variables are first initialised - the number of roots, NROOTS, is set 
to zero while the logical variable CLUTTER is set to FALSE; this is 
set to TRUE when a clutter point is found, ie a point R^ such that the 
corresponding Y^ is positive. The variable R2, which denotes the variable 
of integration, R*, is set equal to 1.0, the left-hand end of the 
integration range; subroutine EVALUATE calculates the corresponding value 
of Y*, denoted by Y2. Finally the logical variable CLUTTER is updated and 
the working variable YR is initialised:
YR=Y2 (73.13)
Each interval ,i=l,2...., NSEARCH is then considered in turn :
YL denotes the value of y* at and YR denotes the value of Y^ at
(R*)i. The variable CLUTTER is updated and the sign of YL.YR is examined. 
It is assumed that the parameter NSEARCH is sufficiently large such that, 
if YL.YR>0, there is no root of Y*=0 in the interval 
and the next interval is considered. Similarly, if YL.YR < 0, it is 
assumed that there is just one root of Y*=0 in this interval. (In fact 
a simple test is carried out later to check whether a root has been 
missed).
If in an interval YL.YR< 0, an initial approximation to the root is 
found by binary chop, to within a specified accuracy E (defined in the 
BLOCK DATA segment). This approximation is then carried into subroutine 
ITERATE, where a Newton-Raphson iteration refines it still further. 
Subroutine ITERATE also increases the count of the number of roots found, 
NROOTS, and stores in the arrays ROOT and SLOPE respectively the value 
of the root and the corresponding value of at this point. The
next interval is then considered and the process is repeated
until the whole integration range 1,1+i^J has been examined.
147
“S 1
1 1
3 ^
148
II
H
149
Y2
UPLIM
FIGURE 73.3. TWO TYPES OF INTEGRATION REGION -  SUBROUTINE ZCLUTTERCALC
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74. SUBROUTINE ZCLUTTERINIT
This routine is called from subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC,for fighter IF 
illuminating raid IR on its AI radar. It calculates some parameters 
used later in subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC to evaluate the fighter's clutter 
interference when looking at this raid. Currently the AI radar is 
assumed to operate in pulse doppler (PD) mode, although pulse clutter 
calculation routines are also incorporated in the model. The following 
are the parameters which are calculated:
(i) VX,VZ
These are the horizontal and vertical components respectively of 
the fighter's velocity. The fighter's movement in the vertical 
plane is currently not represented, so that
^ [74 1)
and VX=FV(IF)  ^ ^
' Note that, from Figure 72.1, VX is the x-component of the fighter's 
velocity, denoted by Vx. The coordinate system adopted for the pulse 
doppler clutter calculations is defined by the requirement that the 
fighter moves in the x-z plane, so that Vy=0 .
(ii) TX,TZ
These are the x- and z- direction cosines of the target,raid IR, with 
respect to the fighter. The y-direction cosine is then immediately 
available from
TX^+TY^+TZ^=1 (74.2)
Until the fighter's altitude is updated regularly in the model its 
attack is assumed to be at co-altitude with the raid, so that
TZ=0.0 ■ (74.3)
The coordinates (RELXR,RELYR) of the raid relative to the fighter 
are known, as is its range RR from the fighter, so that
TX (74.4)
(iii) F
This is the droppler frequency shift of the signel returned from the 
target, and is approximated by
where
V^=VC is the relative velocity of the target with respect to the
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fighter; if (RVX,RVY) and FVX,FVY) are the components of the target and 
fighter velocities respectively, then:
VC*= (RVX-FVX)^+(RVY-FVY)^ (74.6)
Also
(iv) H
X =  WLENGTH is the AI carrier wavelength
In subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC this denotes the AI radar altitude, currently 
assumed to be equal to the raid altitude:
H=RH(IR) (74.7)
(v) FOOT = f
This is the slope of the AI radar linear ranging modulation on
the carrier frequency in Hz/sec. If the fighter's PD radar does
not possess such a facility then FDOT=0.
It is assumed that the modulation of the carrier frequency, if any,
can be linearly approximated, as shown in Figure 74.1 .
(vi) SIG0,SIGEXP
The ground scattering cross-section/unit area at the clutter patch, 
denoted by , is assumed given by the theoretical expression:
(74.8)
where 6g is the grazing angle at the clutter patch (see Figure 72.2) 
and is the value of %  at normal incidence The
values of the constants = SIG0 and#=SIGEXP are specified in the
input data for each radar type.
(vii) GAIN
2
The GAIN array contains G , where G is the AI radar 1-way gain 
pattern; this is the function of G most commonly used in clutter 
calculations.
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FIGURE 74.1. SHAPE OF Al CARRIER FREQUENCY LINEAR RANGING MODULATION
SUBROUTINE Z C L U T T E R I N I T
Notes :
(i) The times spent on each of the three components of the carrier 
frequency modulation cycle are assumed equal, ie
AB = BC = CA
( i i )  I I fp ( ic i in lp ' i  I In* dtqip I r  r lr<M |iic iuy  •.ill I i  i l l  I | i r  ’. ip j i . i l  i r  I ii I i ir  d 
I'rum t i l e  ta r g e t :  on AB, th en  th e  d o p p le r  f re q u e n c y  s h i f t s  on BC and
CA are
and
c -  h ±
•n C
respectively, where c is the velocity of light and r is the range 
from the fighter to the target.
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75. SUBROUTINE ZEVALUATE(I)
This routine is called from subroutines ZCLUTTERCALC, ZGINT and ZITERATE, 
and from Function ZFUNC. If 1=1 then for a given value of R2 = R" the
corresponding X and values are found, while if 1=2 3/ and
are also calculated. àK*
The quantity HH, defined in (72.25) is first calculated:
From (73.2), in terms of program variables this becomes:
The value of X corresponding to this particular value of /? is then
given by equation (72.24):
(The variable A1,A2, B and C are all calculated at the beginning of 
subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC).
The corresponding value of XZ = is then obtained from equation (72.26)1 
If 1=2, then from (72.24):
le
M  =  PXDR2 -  O.S f fZ -^Q .C
A
Similarly, j y i s  also obtained from (72.24):
+  I X  y- 2//^. \ H M  = i
(75.2)
(75.3)
From (75.1) :
ViiL
(75.4)
Hence in terms of program variables:
^  3  n P ^ S H ^ I - Z C H H . C  D U R Z )  
3 A ’
(75.5)
I5A
76. FUNCTION ZF
This function is called from subroutine ZGINT to evaluate the expression:
(76.1)
where
and ,
tffi)- (76.3)
Hence the function ZF is given by:
^  ^  V , R
(76.4)
where, in terms of program variables:
(i) W is given by equations (72.18),' (72.25) and (73.2)
(ii) ^  is given by equations (72.20), (72.21) and (73.2)
2
(iii) The value of G is obtained from subroutine GAINEFF
(iv) . cos ^  is given by equations (72.19) and (73.2)
155
77. SUBROUTINE ZFUNC(XARG)
This routine is called from subroutine ZGINT as part of the calculation of 
the clutter integral. This is illustrated in equation (79.15) for the 
case of a singularity of )/^*0 at * Xp ; in this case the control variable 
RVALUE is set equal to Xo in subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC. If instead a 
singularity of occurs at X; , the upper end of the integration
range, then RVALUE= X/ » while if there is no singularity in the integrand 
of (79.15) in the range [X fX ] * then RVALUE = -/.O .
If RVALUE = -y.O , then:
ZFUNC =FUNC1 - 
while if RVALUE = X. or X, > then:
(77.1)
ZFUNC = FUNC1-FUNC2
^ x V / y )  _ C O aJ S T
j
J. L
X RVf)Lue
(77.2)
(77.3)
where
I
and
(77.4)
(77.5)
The expression CONST is calculated in subroutine ZGINT and is given by 
equations (79.19), (79.20) and (79.21).
The term FUNC2 is obtained immediately. The value of X  in FUNGI is obtained 
from (77.4) and subroutine ZEVALUATE is then called. This calculates the 
corresponding value of , together with some intermediate variables
necessary for the evaluation in Function ZF of f'(x) :
2f{x) - x^ p(x)
FUNCl is then given by:
r-uNci s
T r
(77.6)
156
78. SUBROUTINE ZGAINEFF(G2)
This routine is called from Function ZF to evaluate the radar gain Cr2^-&^ 
in the direction of the clutter patch, given that the mainbeam of the radar 
is pointing at the target. The direction cosines of the target relative 
to the radar are (TX,TY,TZ). From Figure (72.1) and equations (72.2),
(72.16) and (72.25), the coordinates of the clutter patch relative to the 
radar are
For a given value of , with the corresponding value of X positive, the 
points corresponding to both+X a n d-X contribute to the clutter integral. 
The two values are expressed most simply by rewriting as
(Note that unless the target is directly ahead of the fighter, will not 
be symmetric about )•
The angles A; and A^ subtended at the radar by the target and clutter 
patches are first calculated:
CQS = Çx, ^  -y. ^  HH.
(78.1)
Function lANG then claculates lAl and 1A2, the angles nearest to A| and A^ 
respectively at which gain patterns are specified. The radar gain, G Z  > 
is then given by:
G2=GA1N(IA1)+GAIN(IA2) (78.2)
(The GAIN array contains the square of the A1 radar receiver gain pattern, 
G, and is calculated in subroutine ZCLUTTERINIT).
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79. SUBROUTINE ZGINT(X0,X1,DPOWER)
This routine is called from subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC to evaluate the 
expression ^
X
The limits of integration =Xj^ and X/'Xi are calculated in subroutine 
ZCLUTTERCALC:
C79.2)
There may be a simple zero of i-0 at Xp or X/^and there are no other such
zeros in the range variable RVALUE is also set in the
calling routine. This equals -1 if there is no singularity of the integrand, 
otherwise it equals the point, X, X; > which /  has a simple zero.
The processing in this routine is expressed in terms of RVALUE and,
without loss of generality, we may suppose that a singularity occurs at
Theory
Two transformations of the integral in (79.1) are carried out. Firstly, 
the integrand varies more smoothly if the integration variable is taken as 
I , rather than fC . We write
(79.4)
' TP (79.5)
}yl = J y ^  (79.6)
and X
DPOWER = / f W  J x  (79.7)
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where ^Ix) has a simple zero at X=^Ap • Substituting (79.5) into (79.7):
'"‘ M L J u
V,
DPOWER = (79.8)
where
If we write
hlu) : ^(-h)
equation (79.8) becomes:
m i  d iDPOWER = I —
(79.9)
(79.10)
(79.11)
where /l[u) has a simple zero at U  - Up ,
To remove this singularity in the integrand, J \ ( u ) is expanded as a Taylor 
series for points sufficiently near to :
du
Now,
(79.12)
J k ( u )
du
U-Uo
= Â k l . M
Ux du
(79.13)
From Figure (73.3) is positive at )(,  ^ so that is negative
at Up . If /t denotes differentation with respect to ^  ^then (79.11) 
may be written:
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H i )  H à )  1 d u
(79.14)
where the last two terms are equal and opposite. The integrand in (79.14) 
is now non-infinite at its limits of integration. Finally, re-writing 
it in terms of X gives the expression actualIv evaluated in subroutine GINT:
DPOWER = _   Xp^P[)Q 1 A  -jT L (79.15)
W /xpg *^'J ■
Processing
The integral is evaluated from equation (79.15). The integration range 
r J_ / 1 is split into NINTP equal sub-intervals:
1 X, A. J r n
£ARG(I),ARGCI + 1)J, 1=1,.......NINTP (79.16)
where
ARG(1)= r 79 171
ARG(NINTP+i)= //Xp ’
and NINTP is specified in the Block Data segment.
The value of the integrand at each of the points ARC(I) is calculated 
in Function ZFUNC; a standard Gaussian integration procedure is then 
applied to give the value of the integral, denoted by RESULT. The final 
answer is then:
DPOWER = RESULT + X. CONST, (79.18)
The constant term CONST is zero if RVALUE = - A O  (no singularity at 
%p or X, ; otherwise it is given by:
co/v'Sr. 2F{t{Vflm£2 _  (79-19)
. I \V /)LU £
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where the function ZF ( %- ) is defined by:
^ x * k ( x )
(79.20)
(Subroutine ZEVALUATE must first be called in order for the function f 
to be evaluated). Finally, GRAD is calculated in subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC 
and is given by
GRAD = ^  (RVALUE) (79.21)
R =RVALUE
I6I
80. SUBROUTINE ZITERATE
This routine is called from subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC to find the value of 
corresponding to a root of = O  . This enables the range of 
integration of the pulse doppler clutter integral, which includes JYI 
in the denominator, to be subdivided so that singularities are avoided.
y is expressed as a function of by equation (72.26):
The initial estimate (f^)^ to the solution of H - 0  is calculated by 
binary chop in subroutine ZCLUTTERCALC. Subroutine ZEVALUATE calculates, 
for a given value of A* > the corresponding values of and
^ y . A Newton-Raphson iterative approximation is carried out, 
currently for four cycles:
[ m i ,
(80.2)
In terms of program variables, this becomes:
RZ ^ R Z - Y Z / V Z M S H
The number of roots found is increased by one:
/^RoorS
The final approximation to this root of the equation Ÿ ^ 0
is stored in an array, as is the corresponding value of .
'
ROOTS(NROOTS)=R2 (80.3)
SLOPE(NROOTS)=Y2DASH (80.4)
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81. CALCULATION OF PULSE RADAR CLUTTER FOR AN AI - RADAR
Pulse radar clutter occurs when radar returns are received from points on 
the ground (or sea) at the same distance from the radar as the target of 
interest. More precisely, if r is the range from the radar to the target, 
f is the radar pulse repetition frequency and c is the velocity of light, 
clutter is received from all points on the ground distant r^ . from the
radar, where r^ is given by
nc 
2ffc = r + (81.1)
n is an integer, the 'order' of the clutter patch, n = 0 produces the 
normal clutter return, while the other possible cases represent the 
reception of returns from preceding or succeeding pulses. In practice, 
if (81.1) can be satisfied for n <  0, clutter returns will be from so much 
nearer than the target that detection is impossible, while for n >  0 the 
opposite applies, and clutter returns are negligible. In this section, 
therefore, it will be assumed that r^ = r (though this actually depends on 
f being relatively low).
Any value of r^ . obtained from (81.1) must satisfy two other conditions 
if clutter is to occur. Firstly the clutter patch must be nearer than the 
radar horizon:
(81.2)
where R is the effective earth radius and h is the height of the radar 
above tHe ground.
Secondly the clutter patch must be at least as far away as the nearest 
ground surface:
. r ^ > h  (81.3)
The clutter power dC received from an area element dA of ground surface 
is given by the appropriate form of the radar equation:
Where P = Transmitter peak power (including the effect of
transmission and receiption losses)
\ - Wavelength of carrier
= Ground radar scattering cross-section/unit area 
at the clutter patch
G = Radar gain in the direction of the clutter patch
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To integrate (81.4) , G  and dA must be evaluated. The geometry of
the situation is shown in Figure (81.1). Bd is the depression angle 
from the radar to the clutter patch, is the grazing angle at the
clutter patch and is the effective earth radius .
Using the cosine rule, Q, and G  may be obtained in terms of h,r,
R (all known): ^
%  is only a function of , and may therefore be found immediately (it 
varies rapidly for small 6^ , which is why the earth's curvature must 
be taken into account). The theoretical expression used for is
^  ^  (81.7)
Here is the value of at normal incidence. The values of the constants
and X , for each radar type, must be specified in the input data.
To find dA, we must look at the clutter patch in more detail - see 
Figure (81.2)
If t is the pulse duration, the distance I is given by
t = c. (gt) = let (81.8)
Now cos Qj = ^  , from which the element of length, dx, is given by
dx = gctsec Og (81.9)
Note: This expression for the length of interception of the radar beam
with the ground is not valid for very large (9g. Then this distance is 
determined by the radar beamwidth , and the pulse-length t is irrelevant. 
More precisely, equation (81.9) holds as long as
5Ct. sec (9g < r, ^  (9 . cosec (9g
ie as long as jct. tan 9^ <  r. (81.10)
Hence the total clutter area is a circular annulus of radius Oj
and width gctsec6^ (see Figure 81.3). <j) is the azimuthal bearing from
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the radar, with in the direction of the target.
From Figure 81.3 we have:
dA= (rcos (9^  ). (gctsec ). c/^ (81.11)
If C denotes the total clutter power, then from equation (81.4):
rr
c : f  COS 6>/. Tecd>, f
U n - r ) ^  J (81.12)
Given the radar gain pattern, evaluation of the integral in (81.12) is 
straightforward.
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Radar
r cos Clutter Patch
FIGURE 81.1. GEOMETRY OF THE RADAR AND THE PULSE C LU TTER  PATCH
dx
FIGURE 81.2. PULSE C LU TTER  PATCH
r cos Oj
I  ic t .  sec (0g)
FIGURE 81.3. TO TAL PULSE C LU TTER  AREA
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82. SUBROUTINE ZPULSECL(RESULT)
This routine calculates the total pulse radar clutter experienced by a 
given fighter when its mainbeam illuminates a given target. It is not 
currently utilised in the fighter model . If the pulse clutter is 
denoted by RESULT, then from (81.12):
RESULT =
Subroutine ZPULSECLINIT is first called; this calculates those variables 
which are dependent on the current fighter and raid geometry. The dep­
ression angle from the radar to the clutter patch and the grazing 
angle at the clutter patch (Figure 81.1) may then be calculated from 
equations (81.5) and 81.6).
The integral in (81.12) is simplified by choosing a coordinate system 
for these calculations with the target in the (x,z)- plane (see 
Figure 82.1). Only one independent direction cosine, ,is then needed 
to specify its orientation relative to the A1 radar. The remaining 
direction cosine,!^ , is then given by:
If (x,y,z) are the coordinates of a clutter patch with respect to the 
origin at the radar, then in terms of program variables:
? = -HH (82.1)
where from Figure 81.1 :
(82.2)
(r denotes the range from the radar to the target).
The range of integration [o^TTJ is split up into NINTP equal subintervals, 
where NINTP is specified in the Block Data segment. The value of 0-^  
at each of the (NINTP +1) points ^ (1) is then calculated in subroutine 
ZPULSEF, where
(l-l). j7  r-l^ (82.3)
t^ lAlTP
Knowing these values a standard Gaussian integration procedure 
evaluates the integral /T
0^
The value of is calculated from equation (81.7) and the solution to
(81.12) is finally obtained.*
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P \
RESULT = PULSEPOWER.f^.<^P^ ^3 ) ) Cr J ^
ÎT
 ^ (82.4)
o
PULSEPOWER is calculated in subroutine INPUT for each radar type and is 
given by:
PULSEPOWER = Pp.L-r- t „ . A  , F  (82.5)
f
where:
- radar peak power 
Lf = radar transmission loss
= radar reception loss 
X  = radar carrier wavelength
Z' = radar carrier frequency
/- = radar pulse repetition frequency
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P(x,y,z)
typical clutter point
clutter region
FIGURE 82.1. COORDINATE SYSTEM FOR PULSE RADAR C LU T TE R  CALCULATIONS
SUBROUTINE Z P U L S E C L
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83. SUBROUTINE ZPULSECLINIT
This routine is called from subroutine ZPULSECL, which calculates the 
pulse clutter experienced by a given fighter when its mainbeam is illuminating 
a given target. It calculates the parameters which are dependent on the 
fighter type and the fighter and target geometry:
(i) r,the range from the fighter to the target
(ii) h, the fighter altitude, currently assumed to be equal to 
the raid altitude.
(iii) Tg , the z-direction cosine of the target with respect to 
the fighter. The coordinate system in subroutine ZPULSECL is such 
that the target is in the Cx,z)-plane, so that only one independent 
direction cosine need be specified. Until the fighter's altitude is 
updated regularly in the model its attack is assumed to be at co­
altitude with the raid, so that
T = 0.0 
z
(iv) The ground scattering cross-section/unit area at the 
clutter patch, denoted by ^  , is assumed given by equation (81.7)
The values of the constants = SIG0 and K= SIGEXP are specified
in the input data for each radar type.
(v) The GAIN array contains ,where G is the AI radar 1-way 
gain pattern.
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84. FUNCTION ZPULSEF(PHI)
2
This Function is called from subroutine ZPULSECL to evaluate G , the two- 
way radar gain at the clutter point P at an azimuth angle f =PHI, when
the mainbeam of the radar is illuminating the target (ÿ =0). This is
illustrated in Figure 82.1, while Figure 84.1 presents a plan view of
the geometry. The target, by definition of the coordinate system, is in
the (x,z)-plane.
A
If 7 denotes the unit position vector of the target relative to the 
radar, then:
T  = (7x,^.Ti) (84.1)
where T^ and T^ are known.
If ^  is the position vector of the clutter patch relative to the radar (at 
the origin of coordinates), then:
(84.2)
HH is given by equation (82.2), while x is calculated as follows.
In Figure 84.1, RP represents the projection onto the horizontal plane 
of the line from the radar to the clutter patch; from Figure 81.1 this is 
given by:
l f { P l  ^  K c o s ô j
Hence from Figure 84.1 the x-coordinate of the clutter patch is:
X -  p c . ù j . c c s f  (84.3)
From Figure 82.1 it is required to calculate the radar gain at an
angle , where o( is the angle subtended at the radar by the target and
clutter patches. This is given by:
A ^
5 - X  = l&l.l jl. CCS i{ (84.4)
ie
COSU = - - ^  HH.Tj (84.5)
The angle lA nearest to o( at which radar gain patterns are specified is then 
calculated in Function lANG. The required 2-way radar gain, , is then
given by:
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G = GAIN CIA) (84.6)
Target is in the (x,z) — plane
cos (f)r  cos
locus of clutter patch
typical clutter patch point
FIGURE 84.1. PLANE VIEW OF THE PULSE C L U TT E R  GEOMETRY -  SUBROUTINE Z P U L S E F
A N N E X  A
GLOSSARY OF V A R I A B L E  NAMES
A L P O R I G C I F T Y )
A N G L P ( I F )
A T T A C K A N G L E ( I F T Y )
A V F R E N ( I F T Y )
B A S E X ( I B A S E )
B A S E Y C I B A S E )
B E A M W U  RAO)
B X 1 ( I B )
B X 2 ( I B )
B Y 1 ( I B )
B Y 2 (  I Li)
C A P H T d  F T Y P E )
C B Y A P i
C D E L A Y ( I C T Y P E )
C P A T R ( I F T Y )
c v e l
DEGRAD
D £ L T F k E Q ( I F T Y )
D E T S n R(  I F T Y )
DS
DTLOOK.
DTR
E
E C L I P S ( I F T Y )
EVENT I N )
E W T ( i R f l E W )
E W X d O )
E W Y ( I V )
F
F D I R E R R ( I F T Y )
F O O T , F D O T P D ( I F T Y )  
F F X ( I F )
F F Y ( I F )
FH(  I F )
F L F ( I  L A P , I  B A S E , I F T Y )  
F L T OT
F N B d F L ,  I R )  
F N J ( I F L , I R )  
F P O S E R R ( I F T Y )
F P P T ( i P R O F , I F T Y , Ï P P T )  
F R A T E ( I F )
F R A T I U
F R E Q ( I F T Y )  
f r e s c I F T Y )
F S P E E D E R R d  F T Y )
F T ( I F )
F U E L ( I F )
F U E L I ( I P R 0 F , I F T Y )  
F U E L R A T E ( I P R O F , I F T Y ,  I )
I N I T I A L  F I G H T E R  L E A D - P U R S U I T  ANGLE
CURRENT LEAD ANGLE OF F I G H T E R  I F ' S  L E A D - P U R S U I T  COURSE 
T HRESHOLD ANGLE BETWEEN F I G H T E R  AND R A I D  V E L O C I T I E S  
WHI CH DE T E R M I N E S  I F  AN A T T A C K  I S  FORWARD/ REAR H E MI S P HER E
AVERAGE Ca r r i e r  f r e q u e n c y  f o r  f i g h t e r  t y p e  i f t y  
X - COORD o f  EACH F I G H T E R  BASE  
Y - COOK D o f  EACH F I G H T E R  BASE
RADAR BEAMWI DTH OF RADAR TYPE ( = F I G H T E R  T Y P E )  I RAD  
X - C O O R D .  OF ONE END OF O U T - O F - B O U N D S  L I N E  I B  
X - C O O R D .  OF OTHER END OF O U T - O F - B O U N D S  L I N E  I B  
Y - C O O R D .  UF ONE END OF O U T - O F - B O U N D S  L I N E  I B  
Y - C O O H D .  OF o t h e r  END OF O U T - O F - B O U N D S  L I N E  I B  
CAP H E I G H T  OF A F I G H T E R  TYPE  
V E L O C I T Y  OF L I G H T ,  C,  D I V I D E D  BY A P I
F I G H T E R  R E A C T I O N  DEL AY I N  CONTROL MODE I C T Y P E  ( = 1 , . . , 4 )  
TU A R A I D  T R A C K - C H A N G E  ( S E E  S U B R O U T I N E  RESPA CC)
P . D .  CL UT T E R CONSTANT ( S U B R O U T I N E  Z C L U T T E R C A L C )
SPEED OF l i g h t
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D I S T A N C E  OF A R A I D  FROM I T S  TARGET AT M I S S I L E  SPL ASH ■
( s u b r o u t i n e s  s t a t s  a n d  W R I T E R A D )
T I M E  I N T E R V A L  BETWEEN RANGE CHECKS WHEN 
a p p r o a c h i n g  LAUNCH SUCCESS ZONE 
T I M E  I N T E R V A L ( S E C ) B E T W E E N  RADAR R O U T I N E  CAL LS  
RE Q UI RE D ACCURACY I N  THE L O C A L I S A T I O N  OF S I N G U L A R I T I E S  
I N  A PULSE DOPPLER CL UT TER I N T E G R A L
E C L I P S I N G  RADAR LOSS ( A F F E C T S  TARGET AND CL UT TER ONLY)  
EVENT T I M E
T I M E  AT WHI CH R A I D  I R  CROSSES EW L I N E  l EW 
X- COORDS OF P O I N T S  ON EW L I N E  
Y- COORDS uF  P O I N T S  ON EW L I N E  
DOPPLER FREQUENCY S H I F T  OF TARGET
S . D .  OF ERROR I N F I G H T E R  E S T I M A T E  OF TARGET HE ADI NG  
SLOPE OF L I N E A R  RANGI NG MO DUL A T I O N OF CA R R I E R  FREQUENCY  
CURRENT X - COMP  OF A C C E L E R A T I O N  OF F I G H T E R  I F  
CURRENT Y - COMP  OF A C C E L E R A T I O N  OF F I G H T E R  I F  
L AT E S T  c a l c u l a t e d  A L T I T U D E  OF F I G H T E R  I F  
FUEL USED BY A F I G H T E R  I N  C R U I S I N G  TO A CAP FROM A BASE  
T OT AL  n u m b e r  UF A I R C R A F T  I N  F L I G H T  B E I N G  CONS I DERE D  
( S U B R O U T I N E  R A I D K I L L )
NUMBER OF BOMBERS I N  F L I G H T  I F L  OF R A I D  I R
NUMBER OF JAMMERS I N  F L I G H T  I F L  OF R A I D  I R
S . D  OF ERROR I N  F I G H T E R  E S T I M A T E  OF TARGET P O S I T I O N
A C C E L E R A T I O N  BETWEEN P R O F I L E  P O I N T S  ( I P P T , I  PPT + 1 )
CURRENT F UEL  CONSUMPTI ON RATE OF F I G H T E R  I F  
F I G H T E R / E N E M Y  A I R C R A F T  R A T I O  WHI CH THE A L L O C A T I O N  
PROCESS W I L L  A T TEMPT  TO A C H I E V E  WHEN THE STRENGTH OF 
THE R A I D  I S  KNOWN
NO M I N A L  C A R R I E R  FREQUENCY OF F I G H T E R  TYPE I F T Y  
FUEL  RESERVE NEEDED TO A T TE MP T  AN I N T E R C E P T I O N  
S . D .  OF ERROR I N  F I G H T E R  E S T I M A T E  OF TARGET SPEED 
T I M E  AT WHI CH P O S I T I O N  OF F I G H T E R  I F  LAST UPDATED 
CURRENT FUEL RESERVES OF F I G H T E R  I F  
FUEL LEF T  AFTER T A X I , R U N - U P  AND T A K E - O F F  
FUEL CONSUMPTI ON RATE AT P R O F I L E  P O I N T  I
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FV(  I F)  
F V X ( I F )  
F V Y ( I f )  
F X ( I F )  
F Y (  I f ; 
GAI N
GANGLE 
G D I R E K R
G F A C ( 1 FTY)  
G J R d A N G ,  I J T Y P E )  
G j T d A N G ,  I J T Y P E )  
6 R l  ( I A N G , I R A D )  
G R M A X C I F T Y )  
GROUNDELAY
GROUNOELAY1
GROUNDERROR
GSPEEDERR
GVALUL
H
H E R R O K d C T Y P E )
H O J E N p d  F TY)
H O J E N P S ( I F T Y )
H O J S N R d  F TY )  
H O J S T A R T S ( I F T Y )  
H R ( I T , I R )
I 1 2 Ü R 1 6
I ANG
I A T T A C K ( I R , 1)
I B
I B A S E  
I BW 
I C A L L
1 CAP 
I CC
I C O L L I D E ( I F )
I CT Y PE
I D L ( I F T Y )
I DOWN ( I F )  
i D U M C d B A S E )
IDUMF 
I DUMR 
l E V
I E V 4 ( I R )  
I E V 5 ( I R )  
l E V E N T d  , N)  
I E V E N T ( 2 , N )  
l E V E N T ( 3 , N )  
lEW 
I F 
I F1
CURRENT V E L O C I T Y  OF F I GHT E R I F
CURRENT X- COMP OF V E L O C I T Y  OF F I GHT E R I F
CURRENT Y- COMP OF V E L O C I T Y  OF F I GHT ER I F
LATEST CAL CUL ATED X- COORD OF F I GHT ER I F
LATEST c a l c u l a t e d  Y- CUORD OF F I GHTER I F
DUMMY ARRAY I N  SUBROUTI NE GAI NREAD I NTO WHI CH POLAR
DI AGRAMS ARE READ
( A L S O 2 - WAY A1 RADAR G A I N  P A T T E R N,  I N  CLUTTER 
C A L C U L A T I O N S )
ARRAY OF P O I N T S  AT WHI CH A POLAR DI AGRAM I S  S P E C I F I E D  
S . D .  OF ERROR I N GROUND CONTROL REPORTI NG OF TARGET 
HEADI NG
S W E R L I N G ' S  G- FACTOR FOR RADAR CA L C U L A T I O N S
1- WAY JAMMER R E C EI V E R G A I N  PATTERN
1- WAY JAMMER T R A NS MI T T E R GA I N  PATTERN
1- WAY RADAR GAI N  PATTERN OF RADAR I R A D ( A B S - N O T  DB)
MAX 1 - WAY RADAR GAI N  OF RADAR I F T Y ( A B S - N 0 t DB)
DELAY BEFORE W A R N I N G - L I N E  DATA FROM GROUND CONTROL I S  
MADE A V A I L A B L E
DELAY BEFORE I RA CK- C HA NGE  DATA FROM GROUND CONTROL I S  
MADE a v a i l a b l e
S . D .  OF ERROR I N G . C .  REPORTI NG OF TARGET P O S I T I O N  
S . D .  OF ERROR I N G . C .  REPORTI NG OF TARGET SPEED 
ARRAY OF VALUES OF A POLAR DI AGRAM CORRESPONDI NG TO THE 
ANGLES S P E C I F I E D  I N THE GAN6LE ARRAY 
F I GHT ER A L T I T U D E  ( C L U T T E R  C A L C U L A T I O N S )
HEADI NG ERROR A P P L I E D  TO I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSES OF F I GHTER 
CONTROL MuDE 1 C T Y P E ( = 1 , . . , 4 ) ; SEE SUBROUTI NE RESPACC 
JAMMI NG TO NOI SE R A T I O  FOR T E R M I N A T I O N  OF HOME - ON- J A M 
AND A N G L E - O N - J A M  MODES
S I GN A L  TO J AMMI NG R A T I O  FOR T E R M I N A T I O N  OF HOME- ON- J AM 
AND A N G L E - Ü N - J A M  MODES
JAMMI NG TO NOI S E  R A T I O  FOR HOME - ON- J AM I N I T I A T I O N
S I G N A L  TO JAMMI NG RA T I O  FOR HOME- ON- J A M I N I T I A T I O N
A L T I T U D E  a t  START OF TRACK I T  OF R A I D  I R
= 1 / 0  I F  EVENT TYPE 1 2 / 1 6  I S  THE MEASURE OF F I GHTER
SUCCESS
SEE FUNCTI ON l ANG
ARRAY OF s e r i a l s  OF A L L  F I GHT ERS A T T A C K I N G  RA I D  I R
( 1 . L E . I . L c . 2 1 )
r a d a r  BAND S E R I A L  ( =1  OR 2 )
S E R I A L  OF A F I GHT ER BASE ( . L E . 3 )
JAMMER BAND BANDWI DTH ( MHZ)
I D E N T I F I E S  THE ROUT I NE C A L L I N G  SUBROUTI NE I NT CA L C0 NTR0 L 
TO CALCULATE AN I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSE ( = 1 , . . . , 7 )
S E R I A L  OF A CAP
=0 I F  CLOSE c o n t r o l  NOT P O S S I B L E  
=1 I F  CLOSE CONTROL I S  P O S S I B L E
=1 I F  F I GHT E R I F  HAS A CH I EV E D BURNTHROUGH & ADOPTED AN 
I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSE, AND ALSO EVENT TYPE 12 I S  THE 
MEASURE OF F I GHTER SUCCESS;  = - 1  OTHERWI SE 
F I GHT ER CONTROL MODE;  SEE SUBROUTI NE RESPACC 
= 1 / 0  I F  F I GHT ER TYPE I F T Y  HAS/ DOES NOT HAVE A DATA L I N K  
ARRAY OF DOWNWARD P OI NTERS FOR F I GHT ER S E R I A L S  
ENSURES THAT I NF ORMA T I ON THAT BASE OUT OF F I GHT E RS  I S  
OUTPUT ONCE ONLY
= 1 / 0  I F  f i g h t e r  P O S I T I O N S  A RE / A RE  NOT P RI NT E D
= 1 / 0  I F  RA I D  P O S I T I O N S  A R E / A R E  NOT P RI NT ED
TYPE OF EVENT TO BE NEXT EXECUTED I N SUBROUTI NE EVENTS
= 0 / 1  I F  RA I D  TRACK I NF OR MAT I ON N O T / I S  A V A I L A B L E
= 0 / 1  I F  RA I D  S I Z E  I NF OR MA T I O N N O T / I S  A V A I L A B L E
POI NTER TO NEXT EVENT OR FREE CELL
EVENT TYPE NUMBER
E N T I T Y  TO WHI CH THE EVENT OCCURS
EARLY WARNI NG L I N E  S E R I A L  ( = 1 , 2  OR 3 )
S E R I A L  OF F I GHT ER ( . L E . 2 1 )
S E R I A L  OF 1ST ACCESSED F I G H T E R ;  SEE SUBROUTI NE S E T I F
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I  F2
I F I RE ( I )
I F I R E f T (  I R )
I F L
I F L I G H T  ( I F )
I F L N E X T O ( I )
I F M ( M O D E )
I F M ( 5 )
I F M I N C  I )
I F R E P  C I B A S E )
I FRÊQ1 ( I J , J J T Y P E , I 8 )
I F R E Ü 2 ( I J , I J T Y P E , I B )
I F R E Q F ( I F )
I F R E Q M I N  
I FREQMAX 
I F T Y  
I F T Y P E  
I GVSF
I H E M ( I F )  
I J
I J T Y P E
I L R E P ( I B A S E )
I MPUSS
I N I T
I N I T C A P ( I R )
I NOCHANGE 
I N T P H I
I PPT 
I PROF 
I R
I REP
I R L E T H ( I F )
I SEED 
I T
I T A R GE T  ( I F )
I T R ( I K )
I T U R N ( I F )
i T W S ( i F T Y )
l U P ( I F )
JC
J D E T ( I F , I J , I J T Y P E )
J M P X ( I J T Y P E )
J P P T ( I F )
K B A S E ( I F )
K C A P ( I F )
KDET
SEE S UBROUTI NE S E T I F
= I I F  A R A I D  I S  W I T H I N  THE LAUNCH ENVELOPES OF M I S S I L E  
TYPE l ;  =(J OR - I  OTHERWI SE ( S U B R O U T I N E  L AUNCHTEST )
WEAPON RELEASE P OI N T  OF R A I D  I R 
S E R I A L  OF ENEMY F L I G H T
S E R I A L  OF F L I U H T  BEI NG ATTCKED BY F I GHT E R I F  ( ONLY I F  I T
I S W I T H I N  THE REATTACK SEQUENCE;  - 1  OTHERWI SE)
ARRAY OF P O S S I B L E  NEXT TARGET F L I G H T S  ( REA T T A CK R O U T I N E )
S E R I A L  OF F I R S T  F I GHT E R A V A I L A B L E  I N CONTROL MODE 
M O D E C ( I F ) ,  i f  M0DE=M0 DEC(  I F ) = 1 , 2 , 3  OR 4 
F I R S T  A V A I L A B L E  F I GHT E R S E R I A L  FOR A L L O C A T I O N  
ARRAY OF F I GHT E RS  WHI CH MAY BE ALLOCATED TO I NT E RCEP T  
R A I D  IR ( S U B R O U T I N E  F F I N D )
F I GHT ER TYPE FROM BASE I B A S E  ( S U B R OU T I N E  FCHOOSE)
MI N I MUM FREQUENCY DETECTED BY JAMMER ( I J , I J T Y P E )
I N BAND I B
MAXI MUM FREQUENCY DETECTED BY JAMMER ( I J , I J T Y P E )
I N BAND I B
RADAR FREQUENCY OF F I GHT E R I F ( MHZ)
LOWEST RADAR FREQUENCY CONSI DERED 
H I GHES T  RADAR FREQUENCY CONSI DERED 
F I GHT E R TYPE ( . L E . 3 )
F I GHT E R TYPE ( . L E . 3 )
I NP UT  V A R I A B L E , T O  GOVERN RESPONSE OF A F I GHT E R ON A CC 
OR DL C O U R S E ; I G V S F = 1  I F  CONTI NUE ON O R I G I N A L  COURSE;  
I G V S F = 0  I F  ADOPT A L . P .  COURSE
= 1 / 2  I F  f i g h t e r  I F  HAS LAUNCHED A M I S S I L E  I N A
FORWARD/ REAR HEMI SPHERE ATTACK 
JAMMER S E R I A L  ( . L E . 2 0 )
JAMMER T Y P E , C U R R E N T L Y :  1 = S P E C I A L I S T  
2 = NON- SPEC I A L I S T (E.G. POD)
( S O J ' S  ARE N O N - R E S P O N S I V E  AND ARE PROCESSED SE P AR A T E L Y )  
READI NE S S LEVEL AT BASE I B A S E  ( S UB R OU T I NE  FCHOOSE)
= 0 / 1  I F  I N T E R C E P T I O N  I S / I S  NOT P O S S I B L E
NEAREST p r o f i l e  P O I N T  WI TH A CORRESPONDI NG SPEED . L E .
CURRENT f i g h t e r  SpEED
S E R I A L  OF CAP MOUNTED I N RESPONSE TO I N I T I A L  DET ECT I ON 
OF RA I D  I R
= 0 / 1  I F  CHANGE/ NOCHANGE I N TRACK PARAMETERS 
= I A N G ( P H I ( I F , I J ) ) = A N G L E  NEAREST TO PHI  AT WHI CH RADAR 
AND JAMMER G A I N  PATTERNS ARE S P E C I F I E D  
S E R I A L  OF A P R O F I L E  P O I N T  ■
S E R I A L  OF A F I G HT E R P R O F I L E  
R A I D  S E R I A L  ( .  L E . 2 0 )
S E R I A L  OF CURRENT R E P L I C A T I O N  
I N F R A - R E D  M I S S I L E  L E T H A L I T Y  
RANDOM NUMBER SEED
S E R I A L  OF ENEMY R A I D  TRACK; WORK V A R I A B L E  
S E R I A L  OF F I GHT E R I F ' S  TARGET RAI D
S E R I A L  OF P OI N T  3 END OF CURRENT TRACK OF RAI D  I R  
=1 I F  F I GHT E R I S  TURNI NG AFTER AN A T T A C K ;  =0 OTHERWI SE  
= 1 / 0  I F  TRACK w h i l e  SCAN I S / I S  NOT P O S S I B L E  
ARRAY OF UPWARD P OI N T E R S  FOR F I GHT ER S E R I A L S  
MEASURE OF CURRENT ECM C O N D I T I O N S  ( EVENT TYPE 1 6 ) ;
=1 ( CL EAR C O N D I T I O N S ) ; = 2  ( H O M E - O N - J A M  MODE ) ;
=3  ( A N G L E - O N - J A M  MODE)
i n d i c a t e s  w a y  i n  WHI CH RADAR OF I F  DETECTED BY 
JAMMER ( I J , I J T Y P E )  0=UNDETECTED  
1 = CONT I N UUU SL Y  DETECTED  
2 = DET ECT ED DURI NG D W E L L - T I M E  ONLY
= 1 / 0  I F  JAMMER A B L E / U N A B L E  TO DETECT AND RESPOND TO A
SCANNI NG RADAR DURI NG P A I N T  ONLY
LAST P R O F I L E  P OI N T  REACHED BY F I GHTER I F
BASE OF f i g h t e r  I F
CAP TO WHI CH F I GHT ER I F  I S  ASSI GNED 
WORK V A R I A B L E  HOLDI NG ONE ELEMENT OF J DET
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K F T Y P L ( I F )
K P R O F ( I F )  
L O C E V R ( I R )
L 0 C E V F 1  ( I F )  
LO CE V f  2 (  I F)  
L 0 C E V F 3 ( I F )  
M A X F R t Q ( I F T Y )  
M I N F R c Q ( I F T Y )
MI  SSMfJDE ( M T Y P t )  
MÜDE C( I F )
MÛD E R( I F )
MODERUN
M P K ( M T Y P E , J C , I  HEM)  
MP K l
M P R I O R d  , I F T Y )  
M P R I 0 K ( 2 , I F T Y )
MTYPE
M T Y P E F ( I F )
N
N A C C E S S ( I B A S E , I  CAP)  
N A T T A C K ( I R )
Nb O ( I F L , I R )
N B ( I F L , I R )
n b o u n d s
NCAPS
NCELL S
NEWMODE( I F )  
NEWP
N E X T C A P P T ( I F )
NFC
NF1
NF
NFBASES 
N F C U M ( I  B A SE )
TYPE OF F I G H T E R  I F
CURRENT F l i g h t  p r o f i l e  o f  f i g h t e r  i f
S E R I A L  OF NEXT EVENT DUE TO OCCUR TO R A I D  I R ( = 0  I F  R A I D
I S  A N N I H I L A T E D  OR HAS REACHED THE END OF I T S  M I S S I O N )
HOLDS S E R I A L  uF EVENT 7 OR 8
HOLDS S E R I A L  OF EVENT 9 , 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 2  OR 1 4
HOLDS S E R I A L  OF EVENT 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7  OR 18
MAXI MUM r a d a r  C A R R I E R  FREQUENCY F I G H T E R  TYPE I F T Y
M I N I M U M  RADAR C A R R I E R  FREQUENCY F I G H T E R  TYPE I F T Y
= 1 / 2  I F  M I S S I L E  TYPE MTYPE I S  S E M I - A C T I V E / I N F R A - R E D
CONTROL MODE OF F I G H T E R  I F
=1 I F  F I G H T E R  ON OR C R U I S I N G  TO CAP
= 2  I F  F I G H T E R  UNDER BROADCAST CONTROL
=3  I F  F I G H T E R  UNDER CLOSE CONTROL
= 4  I F  f i g h t e r  u n d e r  AUTONOMOUS CONTROL
D E T A I L E D  CONTROL MODE OF F I G H T E R  I F
=1 F I G H T E R  ON OR C R U I S I N G  TO CAP
=2  F U L L  I N F O R M A T I O N  I N T E R C E P T I O N ,  RANGE V I A  NON - T R A C K  
- W H I L E  SCAN r a d a r
= 3  UNJAMMED F I G H T E R  RADAR LOCKED ON TO TARGET DURI NG
M I S S I L E  F l i g h t  t i m e  ( r a d a r  m i s s i l e )
= 4  A T TACK  WI T H RADAR M I S S I L E ,  H O M E - O N - J A M  MODE 
( RANGE KNOWN)
=5  I N I T I A L  I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSE UNDER BROADCAST CONTROL 
= 6  LEAD P U R S U I T  COURSE,  TARGET DETECTED 
( RANGE UNKNOWN)
=7  RADAR LOCKED ON TO J A MMI NG TARGET I N  A N G L E - O N - J A M  
MODE,  ( RANGE UNKNOWN)
=8  I N T E R C E P T I O N  US I NG T R A C K - W H I L E - S C A N  RADAR 
=9  I N T E R C E P T I O N  I N  H O M E - O N - J A M  MODE ( RANGE KNOWN)
= 1 0  RADAR LOCKED ON TO J AMMI NG TARGET I N  H O M E - O N - J A M  
MODE
=11  F I G H T E R  ON A C L O S E - C O N T R O L L E D  I N T E R C E P T I O N  
= 1 2  F I G H T E R  ON A DATA L I N K  CONTROLLED I N T E R C E P T I O N  
= 1 3  CLOSE CONTROL OR DL C O N T R O L , W I T H  D E T E C T I O N  BUT NO 
RANGE ; SA ME  AS MODER( I F ) = 6 , BUT DO NOT WANT F I G H T E R  TO 
FOLLOW A l e a d  P U R S U I T  COURSE 
= 0 / 1  FOR D E T E R M I N I S T I C / S T O C H A S T I C  RUN 
P R O B A B I L I T Y  OF K I L L  OF M I S S I L E  TYPE MTYPE I N  ECM 
C O N D I T I O N S  JC AND A T TA CK I N  HE MI S P HE RE I HEM 
P R O B A B I L I T Y  OF K I L L  ( P E R C E N T A G E )
PREFERRED M I S S I L E  TYPE I N  FORWARD HE MI S P HE R E  AT TACK 
PREFERRED M I S S I L E  TYPE I N  REAR H E MI S P HER E  AT TA CK  
M I S S I L E  TYPE ( = 1 / 2  I F  RADAR M I S S I L E / I N F R A - R E D )
TYPE OF f i g h t e r  I F ' S  M I S S I L E  CURRENTLY I N  F L I G H T  
SEE NCELL S ( R E F .  TO ARRAYS l E V E N T  AND E V E NT )
P T . O F  ACCESS OF A BASE TO A CAP
NUMBER OF F I G H T E R S  A T T A C K I N G  R A I D  I R
I N I T I A L  NO.  OF B O M B E R S / S S J  I N  F L I G H T  I F L  OF R A I D  I R
NO.  OF B O M B E R S / S S J  I N  F L I G H T  I F L  OF R A I D  I R
n u m b e r  OF OUT OF BOUNDS L I N E S  L I M I T I N G  F I G H T E R  F L I G H T
NO.  OF F I G H T E R  C A P S ( . L E . 3 )
NO.  OF CEL LS A V A I L A B L E , I . E .  THE SAME AS THE SECOND 
D I M E N S I O N  OF ARRAYS EVENT AND I E V E N T : C U R R E N T L Y  
N C E L L S = 2 0 0
NEW VAL UE OF M O D E C ( I F )  I F  T H I S  I S  CHANGED I N 
SU B R OU T I N E  RADEVENTS
NO.  OF P O I N T S  S P E C I F Y I N G  AN EARLY WARNI NG SEGMENT 
NEXT CAP P O I N T  FOR F I G H T E R  I F
NO. OF  F I G H T E R S  SCRAMBLED TO A CAP AT F I R S T  D E T E C T I O N  
OF A R A I D
I N I T I A L  NO.  OF F I G H T E R S  COMMI TTED TO A R A I D  OF 
UNKNOWN STRENGTH WHEN THE R A I D  TRACK I S  KNOWN 
NO.  OF A C T I V E  F I G H T E R S  I N  MODEL 
NO.  OF F I G H T E R  B A S E S ( . L E . 3 )
NO.  OF F I G H T E R S  ON BASE I B A S E
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NF I GHTCUM
N F I G H T E R ( I B A S £ , I F T Y P E )  
NF I G H T E R O ( I  B A S E , I F T Y P E )  
N F L O ( I H )
N F L ( I K )
NFTYPhS
NGC
NGCO
N I N T P
N J R
NJ O(  1 H ,  I R )
N J ( I F L , I R )
N J T Y PL S
NLEVS
N M I S S ( 1 , 1 F)
N M I S S ( 2 , I F )
NMI SS V
NMTYPLS
N O E V P H I N T ( 5 0 )
NPOI N i S ( I CAP)
NPRÜF i  LES 
N P T S ( i P R O F , I F T Y >
N Q ( I  BASE)
NRO
NR
NRAD
NREP
N R L E V C I B A S E , I F T Y , I  LEV)  
N R L E V ü d B A S E ,  I F T Y ,  I LEV )  
NSEARCH
NSOJ
N T ( I R )
NXTEVT
NXTFRE
PC
P D E T J d J T Y P E )  ,
p e , p e r r ( i f ) ••
P HI  ( I F , I J )
P I
P I X 4
P J O d  J T Y P E ,  I B )  
P J d J ,  I J T Y P E ,  I B )  
P J A T R ( I F T Y )  
P J M I N d  F TY)
PN
POL
POWER
POWERJ 
P R F ( I F T Y )  
P S O J d B ,  I S O J )
PT
P U L S E P O W E R d  F TY )  
PX
TOTAL NO.  OF F I GHT ERS WHI CH HAVE T A K E N - O F F  
CURRENT NO. OF F I GHT E RS  OF EACH TYPE ON EACH BASE 
I N I T I A L  NO. OF  F I GHT ERS OF EACH TYPE ON EACH BASE 
I N I T I A L  NO.  OF F L I G H T S  I N R A I D  I R 
CURRENT NO.  OF F L I G H T S  I N R A I D  I R  
NO. OF F I GHT E R T Y P e S ( . L E . 3 )
CURRENT NUMBER OF GROUND CONTROLLERS A V A I L A B L E  
i n i t i a l  n u m b e r  o f  g r o u n d  CONTROLLERS A V A I L A B L E  
NO.  OF P O I N T S  AT WHI CH THE I NTEGRAND I S  S P E C I F I E D  I N 
THE GAUSS I AN I N T E G R A T I O N  FORMULA USED FOR CLUTTER CAL CS.  
NO.  OF JAMMER BANpS ( . L E . 2 )
I N I T I A L  NO. S P E C I A L I S T  JAMMERS I N  F L I G H T  I F L  OF RAI D  I R 
CURRENT NO. S P E C I A L I S T  JAMMERS I N F L I G H T  I F L  OF RAI D  I R 
NO.  OF D I F F E R E N T  JAMMER T Y P E S ( E X C L U D I N G  SOJ )  ( . L E . 2 )
NO.  OF r e a d i n e s s  LEVELS ( . L E . 4 )
NUMBER OF M I S S I L E S  OF TYPE 1 -  RADAR CONTROLLED
2 -  I N F R A - R E D
HELD BY f i g h t e r  I F
i n i t i a l  n u m b e r  of  m i s s i l e s  h e l d  BY A F I GHTER  
NUMBER OF A I R - T O - A I R  M I S S I L E  TYPES ( CURRENTL Y = 2 )
L I S T  OF EVENT TYPES NOT TO BE L I S T E D  I N D I A G N O S T I C  
P R I N T - O U T
NO. OF P O I N T S  D E F I N I N G  EACH C A P ( . L E . 6 )
NO.  OF F I GHT E R PROF I L E S ( . L E . 8 )
NO.  OF P O I N T S  S P E C I F Y I N G  EACH P R O F I L E  FOR EACH F I GHT ER 
TYPE ( . L E . f )
NO.  OF F I GHT ERS QUEUEI NG FOR T A K E - O F F  AT BASE I BA S E
I N I T I A L  NO.  OF ENEMY RA I DS
CURRENT NO.  OF ENEMY RA I DS
NUMBER OF D I F F E R E N T  RADAR TYPES
NO.  OF MONTE CARLO R E P L I C A T I O N S
CURRENT NO.  OF F I GHT E R TYPE I F T Y  AT BASE I B A S E  AND 
R EADI NESS l e v e l  I LEV
I N I T I A L  NO.  OF F I GHT E R TYPE I F T Y  AT BASE I ABASE AND 
READI NES S  I LEV
NO.  OF P O I N T S  AT WHI CH AN I NTEGRAND I S  CHECKED FOR 
s i n g u l a r i t i e s  I N  t h e  C A L C U L A T I O N  OF A P . D .  CLUTTER  
I NT E GRAL
NUMBER OF S T A ND- OF F  JAMMERS
NO. OF TRACK- CHANGE P OI N T S  I N  TRACK OF R A I D  I R 
POI NTER TU THE E A R L I E S T  E V E N T , T H E  NEXT TO BE PROCESSED 
POI NTER TO THE 1 S T . CELL  OF THE L I N K E D  L I S T  OF FREE CELLS 
RADAR CLUTTER
M I NI MUM PEAK RADAR POWER DETECTABLE BY JAMMER I J T Y P E  
( WATT S)
RANDOM V A R I A B L E  FOR R A I D  P O S I T I O N A L  ERROR C A L C U L A T I O N S  
ANGLE BETWEEN V E L O C I T Y  VECTOR OF R A I D  I J  & I T S  P O S I T I O N  
VECTOR R E L A T I V E  TO F I GHTER I F  
C O N S T A N T , P I
C O N S T A N T , 4 M U L T I P L I E D  BY PI
POWER ALLOCATED TO BAND I B  BY JAMMER TYPE I J T Y P E  
POWER( WATTS)  E M I T T E D  BY J AMME R( I J , I J T Y P E ) I N  BAND I B  
JAMMER POWER AT A RADAR( SEE SUBROUTI NE JPOWER)
THRESHOLD FOR DET ECT I ON OF J A M M I N G ( S U B R O U T I N E  RADEVENTS)  
I N T E R N A L  RADAR NOI SE 
P O L A R I Z A T I O N  LOSS FOR JAMMERS
TOTAL J AMMI NG POWER SUFFERED BY A GI VEN F I GHT E R  
WHEN I T  I S  i l l u m i n a t i n g  A G I V EN RAI D  
=POWER: SEE s u b r o u t i n e  RADAR 
RADAR P . R . F .  ( H Z )
T RANSMI T TE R POWER FOR S T AND- OF F  JAMMERS 
TARGET S I G N A L  STRENGTH
RADAR c o n s t a n t  ( D E F I N E D  I N SUBROUTI NE I N P U T )
X COORD.  OF i n t e r c e p t i o n  P O I N T  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R ' S  
I N I T I A L  P O S I T I O N
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P X1 ( I )
PY
PY1 ( I )
Q E , Q E K R ( I F )
R1
R2J
R2R
R A D M P U W E R ( I F T Y )  
RAOPPUWER( I F T Y )  
RADPRf  < I F T Y )
RA I UVX
R A I D V Y
RANGEt l AX
R B W ( I R A D )
R D I R H K R ( I R )
R E , R E R R ( I F )
RE
RELX
REL XJ
RELXR
RELY
RE L YJ
RELYR
REP
RE PM I N I
RESF AL
R H ( I R )
RJ
R L ( I R )
R L O ( I R )
RLEVC i  L E V )  
R L O S S K ( I F T Y )  
R L O S S K  I F T Y )  
R M A X C I A N G , M T Y P E )  
R M l N d A N G , M T Y P E )  
R N O I S L ( 1 F T Y )  
R P A T J ( I F T Y )  
R P A T R ( I F T Y )  
R P O S E R R d R )
RR
R S C A N R d  F T Y )
R S N R ( I F T Y )
R S P E E D E R R ( I R )  
R T ( I R )
R V d R )
RVT
R V X ( I R )
R V Y d H )
R W ( I R )
R X d R )
RX1
R Y ( I R )
ARRAY OF X - C O O R D S .  OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  P O I N T S  
( S U B R O U T I N E  F F I N D )
Y COORD.  uF i n t e r c e p t i o n  P O I N T  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R ' S  
I N I T I A L  P O S I T I O N
ARRAY OF Y - C O O R D S .  OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  P O I N T S  
( S U B R O U T I N E  F F I N D )
RANDOM V A R I A B L E  FOR R A I D  P O S I T I O N A L  ERROR C A L C U L A T I O N S  
RANGE TO R A I D
JAMMER 
R A I D
SQUARED r a n g e  TO 
SQUARED RANGE TO 
MEAN RADAR POWER 
RADAR PEAK POWER
RADAR PULSE R E P E T I T I O N  FREQUENCY
e s t i m a t e d  X COMPONENT OF R A I D  V E L O C I T Y  I N  I N T E R C E P T I O N  
COURSE C A L C U L A T I O N
E S T I M A T E D  Y COMPONENT OF R A I D  V E L O C I T Y  I N  I N T E R C E P T I O N  
COURSE C A L C U L A T I O N
RANGE ABOVE WHI CH R A D A R - R A I D - J A M M E R  
I N T E R A C T I O N S  I GNORED
R E C E I V E R  BANDWI DTH OF RADAR I R A D ( M H Z )
S . D .  OF e r r o r  i n  e s t i m a t i o n  OF HEADI NG OF R A I D  I R ;
SEE S U B R O U T I N E S  I N T C A L C O N T R O L  AND UPDATEERROR  
r a n d o m  V A R I A B L E  FOR R A I D  SPEED ERROR C A L C U L A T I O N S  
e f f e c t i v e  e a r t h  r a d i o s  ( C L u TTER C A L C U L A T I O N S )
E S T I M A T E D  X COORD OF R A I D  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R  
I N  I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSE C A L C U L A T I O N  
X - C O O R D .  OF R A I D  I J  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R  I F
X - C O O R D .  OF R A I D  I R  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R  I F
E S T I M A T E D  Y COORD OF R A I D  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R  
I N I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSE C A L C U L A T I O N  
Y - C O O R D .  OF R A I D  I J  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R  I F
Y - C O O R D .  OF r a i d  I R  R E L A T I V E  TO F I G H T E R  I F
NO.  OF r e p l i c a t i o n s  ( S U B R O U T I N E  O UT P UT )
( R E P - 1 )
R E S O L U T I O N  FACTOR FOR RADAR EQ UA T I O N 
LATEST CA L C U L A T E D  A L T I T U D E  FOR R A I D  I R 
D I S T A N C E  OF R A I D  I J  FROM F I G H T E R  I F
CURRENT LENGTH OF R A I D  I R  
I N I T I A L  R A I D  LENGTH
T I M E  BEFORE T A K E - O F F  I N  R E A D I N E S S  L E V E L  I LEV
RADAR R E C E P T I O N  LOSS
RADAR T R A N S M I S S I O N  LOSS
MAX m i s s i l e  l a u n c h  SUCCESS RANGE
MI N m i s s i l e  l a u n c h  SUCCESS RANGE
RADAR R E C E I V E R  N O I S E  POWER
RADAR POWER AT A JAMMER ( S E E  S U B R O U T I N E  RADAR)
RADAR POWER RETURNED TO THE R A D A R ( S U B R O U T I N E  RADAR)  
S . D .  OF ERROR I N E S T I M A T I O N  OF P O S I T I O N  OF R A I D  I R 
D I S T A N C E  OF R A I D  I R FROM F I G H T E R  I F  
RADAR SCANNI NG RATE
s i g n a l  TO N O I S E  R A T I O  FOR S A T I S F A C T O R Y  RANGE 
D E T E R M I N A T I O N
S . D .  OF ERROR I N E S T I M A T I O N  OF SPEED OF R A I D  I R 
T I M E  AT WHI CH P O S I T I O N  AND V E L O C I T Y  OF R A I D  I R  LAST 
UPDATED
CURRENT V E L O C I T Y  OF R A I D  I R
E S T I M A T E D  R A I D  SPEED I N  S UB R O U T I N E S  I N T C A L C O N T R O L  
AND C O L L I S I O N
CURRENT X- COMP OF VEL  OF R A I D  I R 
CURRENT Y- COMP OF V E L  OF R A I D  I R  
WI DTH OF R A I D  I R
L A T E ST  CA L C U L A T E D  X - COORD OF R A I D  I R 
X - C O O R D ,  OF A R A I D  AT A M I S S I L E  S P L A S H - P O I N T  
( S U B R O U T I N E S  ST A TS  AND W R I T E R A D )
L A T E ST  CA L C U L A T E D  Y- COORD OF R A I D  I R
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RY1
SAFEFAC
S C A N W ( I F T Y )
SE , S E K R ( I F )
S I G E X P , S I G F X P F N ( I F T Y )
S I 6 0 , S I G 0 F N ( I F T Y )
S L O B E ( I R A D )
SNR
S O J T ( I S O J )
S O J X ( I S O J )
S O J Y ( I S O J )
S P L A T ( I R )
S P O T B U ( I J T Y P E )
SQTREP 
S T R A I L (  I R)
T 1 ( I B A S E )
T B G O d  BASE)
T B L A U N C H ( I B A S E )
TDELAY
TEND
T E V i
T F ( I C A P , I B A S E , I F T Y )
T F R A M l ( I F T Y )
T H I L P ( I F )
T I ME
TI MÊM
T I N T
T I N T 1  ( I )
T M I N 0 ( I )
T O F ( I A N G , M T Y P E )  
T O N B A S E ( I B A S E )
T O T B ( I R)
T Û T J ( I R )
T P P T d P R O F ,  I F T Y ,  I PPT)
T P R I N T  
T R ( I T , I R )
TRACESTART 
TRACEEND
T R E S P O N S E F ( I F T Y )
T R N R A T E ( I F T Y )  
T R E S P U N S E R ( I R )
T S E C ( T )
TSTART 
T T O T ( I B A S E )
TTURN
T T U R N O ( I )
TWSSNR( I F T Y )
T X S E C ( I A N G , 1 )
T X S E C ( I A N G , 2 )
T X S E C Ï I O N
TX
TY
TZ
Y - C O O K D .  OF A RAI D  AT A M I S S I L E  S P L A S H - P O I N T  
( S U B R OU T I N E S  STATS AND WRI TERAD)
FACTOR BY WHI CH ACTUAL LAUNCH RANGE REDUCED FROM MAX 
M I S S I L E  L a u n c h  s u c c e s s  r a n g e  
RADAR A Z I MUTH SCAN H A L F - W I D T H
RANDOM V A R I A B L E  FOR RAI D  HEADI NG ERROR CA L CUL A T I O NS  
EXP OF S I N ( G R A Z I N G  ANGLE)  I N GROUND CR0 SS- S F CT I  0 N 
FORMULA ( SEE CLUTTER C A L C U L A T I O N S )
GROUND s c a t t e r i n g  CR0 SS- S E CT I  ON/ S Q . M.
AVERAGE S l D E L O B E  G A I N  OF RADAR I RAD
S I G N A L  TO TOTAL NOI S E  RA T I O  = P T / ( P N + P C + P O W E R J )
SWI TCH ON T I M E  FOR S T A N D - O F F  JAMMERS 
X COORD OF ST A ND- OF F  JAMMER
Y COORD OF S T A ND- OF F  JAMMER 
LAT ERA L  A I R C R A F T  SPACI NG I N R A I D  I R
MI NI MUM b a n d w i d t h  JAMMER I S CAPABLE OF J A M M I N G ( M H Z )  
SQUARE ROUT OF NO.  OF R E P L I C A T I O N S  ( S U B R O U T I N E  OUTPUT)  
I N T E R - F L I G H T  SPACI NG I N R A I D  I R
T I M E  TO Ca P or  TO I N T E R C E P T I O N ,  EX CL .  T A K E - O F F  DELAY  
( S U B R O U T I N E  FCHOOSE)
T I ME WHEN BASE I B A S E  I S  DUE TO BE FREE OF F I GHT ERS 
QUEUEI NG FOR T A K E - O F F
T I M E  BEFORE LAUNCH OF A F I GHTER FROM A BASE 
DELAY b e t w e e n  C A L C U L A T I O N  AND ADOPTI ON OF AN 
I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSE
T I M E  AT WHI CH EACH R E P L I C A T I O N  I S  T ERMI NAT ED
T I M E  AT WHI CH THE F I R S T  RA I D  I S  DETECTED
T I M E  f i g h t e r  t y p e  I F T Y  TAKES TO REACH CAP I CAP  FROM
BASE I B A S E
RADAR FRAME T I ME
SUBROUTI NE L E a DPUr S U I T :  CURRENT ANGLE BETWEEN A R A I D ' S  
P O S I T I O N  VECTOR R E L A T I V E  TO F I GHTER I F  & I T S  V E L O C I T Y  
VECTOR
CURRENT MODEL T I M E ( M E A S U R E D  I N F L O A T I N G - P O I N T  SECONDS)  
CURRENT MODEL T I ME  I N MI NUTES
T I ME  TO I N T E R C E P T I O N , C A L C U L A T E D  I N SUBROUTI NE C O L L I S I O N  
ARRAY OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  T I MES  ( S U B R OU T I N E  F F I N D )
ARRAY OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  T I ME S  ( S U B R OU T I N E  REAT T ACK)
T I ME OF F L I G H T  FOR M I S S I L E  TYPE MTYPE 
DELAY BEFORE T A K E - O F F  ( S U B R OU T I N E  FCHOOSE)
TOTAL NUMBER OF BOMBERS OF RA I D  I R
TOTAL n u m b e r  o f  J a MMERS OF R A I D  I R
T I ME  OF P R O F I L E  P OI N T  I P P T  ON P R O F I L E  I PROF
OF F I G HT E R TYPE I F T Y
T I M E  AT WHI CH EVENT L I S T I N G  STARTS
T I ME AT WHI CH TRACK I T  OF RA I D  I R STARTS
T I ME AT WHI CH FULL  TRACE STARTS
T I M E  AT WHICH FULL TRACE ENDS
DELAY BEFORE TARGET DATA FROM F I GHT ER I S  MADE A V A I L A B L E  
TO GROUND CONTROL
F I GHT E R T URN - RA T E  WHEN MAKI NG A REATTACK 
T OTAL  REACTI ON DELAY TO TRACK- CHANGE OF R A l D  I R, '
SEE SUBROUTI NE RESPACC
STATEMENT FUNCTI ON FOR CONVERTI NG M I N . S E C  TO SEC.
T I M E  AT WHI CH EACH R E P L I C A T I O N  STARTS
T I ME  TO Ca p  or  t o  I N T E R C E P T I O N ,  I N C L .  T A K E - O F F  DELAY
( S U B R O U T I N E  FCHOOSE)
T I ME  TAKEN FOR F I GHT ER TO TURN ONTO AN ATTACK HEADI NG 
ARRAY OF F I GHT ER TURN T I MES  ( S U B R OU T I N E  REATTACK)
S I G N A L  TO NOI SE R A T I O  FOR TRACK WHI LE SCAN I N I T I A T I O N  
RADAR C R O S S - S E C T I O N  FOR B O M B E R S / S E L F - S C R E E N I N G  JAMMERS 
RADAR CR O S S - S E C T I O N  FOR S P E C I A L I S T  ESCORT JAMMERS 
TOTAL RADAR C R OS S - S E C T I O N  OF RA I D  AS SEEN BY F I GHT E R
X D I R E C T I O N  COSI NE OF TARGET FROM RADAR
Y D I R E C T I O N  COSI NE OF TARGET FROM RADAR
Z D I R E C T I O N  COSI NE OF TARGET FROM RADAR
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VO
VC
V I S I D E N T ( I F T Y )  
V P P T C I P R O F , I F T Y P E , I P P T )  
VR ( I T , I R )
VX
VZ
V X R ( I T , I R )
V Y R (  I T ,  I R )
WLENGTH
W L B Y L P I
X
XBL OSS
X C O M P d B A S E ,  I C A P )
XJ LOSS 
XPK
X P T ( I C A P , I P T )
XR ( I T , I R )
X R E L M I N
Y COMP( I B A S E , I C A P )  
Y P T ( I C A P , I P T )  
Y R ( I T , I R )
Y R E L M I N
I N I T I A L  F I G H T E R  SPEED I N  S U B R O U T I N E S  I N T C A L C O N T R O L  
AND C O L L I S I O N
CL O S I N G  V E L O C I T Y  OF TARGET WI T H F I G H T E R  
D I S T A N C E  W I T H I N  WHI CH V I S U A L  I D E N T I F I C A T I O N  OCCURS 
V E L O C I T Y  OF A F I G H T E R  TYPE AT A P R O F I L E  PT 
V E L O C I T Y  OF TRACK I T  OF R A I D  I R
H O R I Z .  COMPONENT OF F I G H T E R  SPEED ( C L U T T E R  C A L C S . )  
V E R T I C A L  COMPONENT OF F I G H T E R  SPEED ( C L U T T E R  C A L C S . )  
X - COMP OF V E L  OF TRACK I T  OF R A I D  I R  
Y - COMP OF V E L  OF TRACK I T  OF R A I D  I R 
RADAR WAVE LENGTH
RADAR WAVELENGTH D I V I D E D  BY 4 P I .
F I G H T E R ' S  I N I T I A L  X - C O O R D .  AT START OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  
COURSE C A L C U L A T I O N
NUMBER OF BOMBERS LOST FROM A F L I G H T  
X D I F F E R E N C E  I N D I S T A N C E  BETWEEN CAP AND BASE 
NUMBER OF JAMMERS LOST FROM A F L I G H T
E F F E C T I V E  M I S S I L E  K I L L  P R O B A L I T Y  ( S U B R O U T I N E  R A I D K I L L )
X- COORDS OF THE P O I N T S  D E F I N I N G  EACH CAP
X - COORD OF START OF TRACK I T  OF R A I D  I R
X - C O O R D .  OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  P O I N T  CORR.  TO THE F I G H T E R
WHI CH CAN I N T E R C E P T  MOST Q U I C K L Y  ( S U B R O U T I N E  FCHOOSE)
F I G H T E R ' S  I N I T I A L  Y - C O O R D .  AT START OF I N T E R C E P T I O N
COURSE C A L C U L A T I O N
Y D I F F E R E N C E  I N  D I S T A N C E  BETWEEN CAP AND BASE
Y- COORDS OF t h e  P O I N T S  D E F I N I N G  EACH CAP
Y- COORD OF START OF TRACK I T  OF R A I D  I R
Y - C O O R D .  OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  P O I N T  CORR.  TO THE F I G H T E R
WHI CH CAN I N T E R C E P T  MOST Q U I C K L Y  ( S U B R O U T I N E  FCHOOSE)
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ANNEX B
I L L U S T R A T I V E  DATA F I L E
f i g u r e  B1 I L L U S T R A T E S  THE S I M P L E  TEST S C E N A R I O .  TWO RA I DS  ARE C O NS I DE R E D,  WI TH  
P R E - D E T E R M I N E D  TRACKS AS SHOWN. THE P O S I T I O N S  OF THE THREE WARNI NG L I N E S ,  THE 
TWO CAPS AND THE TWO F I GHT ER BASES I N THE SCENARI O ARE ALSO SHOWN.  THE MEANI NG  
OF MOST OF THL I TEMS I N THE DATA F I L E ,  CONSI DERED I N CONJ UNCTI ON WI TH F I GURE B 1 , 
SHOULD BE S E L F - E V I D E N T .
TEST DATA F I L E  FOR F I GHT E R MODEL
CONT AI NS 2 R A I D S , 2 BASES 
S E CT I ON 1 ;  HOUSEKEEPI NG DATA:
0 . 0  = T I M E  AT WHI CH EVENT L I S T I N G  S T A R T S ( S E C )
0 = 1 / 0  I F  RA I D  P O S I T I O N  DATA I S / I S  NOT TO BE OUTPUT
0 '  = 1 / 0  I F  F I GHT E R P O S I T I O N  DATA I S / I S  NOT TO BE OUTPUT
0 T H I S  I S  A L I S T  OF EVENT TYPES NOT TO BE L I S T E D
S ECT I ON 2 ;  RUN DATA
0.0 
2 5 .  Ü 
1 
10
9 8 7 6 5 4
1
10.U 
5 . 0  
0.0 
0.0
= START T I M E ( H I N . S E C )
=END T I M E ( M I N . S E C )
=M0DE OF RUN ( = 0 / 1  I F  D E T E R M I N I S T I C / S T O C H A S T I C )
= N 0 .  OF R E P L I C A T I O N S  TO HE CA RRI ED OUT 
= I N I T I A L  SEED V A l UE FOR RANDOM NUMBER STREAM
=1 I F  EVENT TYPE 12 I S  THE MEASURE OF F I GHT E R E F F E C T I V E N E S S  
=0  I F  EVENT TYPE 16  i S  THE MEASURE OF F I GHT ER E F F E C T I V E N E S S
= T l M h  I N T E R V A L ( S L C )  oETWEEN RADAR ROUTI NE CALLS
T I M E  BETWEEN RANGE CHECKS FOR M I S S I L E  LAUNCH RANGE AFTER DETECTI ON 
T I M E  AT WHI CH D E T A I L E D  TRACE S T A R T S , I F  REQUI RED ( M I N S )
T I M E  AT WHICH D E T A l L c D  TRACE E N D S , I F  REQUI RED ( M I N S )
S E CT I ON 3 : R A I D  DATA 
2 RA I DS
R A I D  1 :  
1
0.0
S E R I A L  OF CAP MOUNTED I N I N I T I A L  RESPONSE TO T H I S  RA I D  
T I ME  AT WHI CH RA I D  TRACK S T A R T S ( M l N . S E C )
181
.5 A
CN
r
CN <!
■ in
CNCO
O
CN
CO
5 ' F L I G H T S '
30Ü M i n t e r - a i r c r a f t  s p a c i n g
2 0 0 0  M I N T E R - ' F L I G H T '  SPACI NG
4 T RA CK - L E GS
COURSE:  - T R A C K - C H A N G E - P O I N T
182
FORMAT ION ; - ' F L I G H T ' -
1 2 .3 4 5
5 6 5 6 5 BOMBERS/ SSJ
1 0 1 0 1 S P E C I A L I S T  JAMMERS
0 1 2 3 4
2 2 0 1 3 5 40 80 2 50 X) COORDS OF
1 9 0 1 6 0 1 6 0 1 9 0 1 9 0 Y) T R A C K - C H A N G E - P T S ( N M )
9 0 9 9 15 R A I D  SPEED AT TRACK- CHANGE
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0  0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 a l t i t u d e  CM)
T RACK- Cr i ANGE POI NT  OF WE A P O N - R E L E A S E ( - 1  FOR SPOOF R A I D )
RA I D
2
10.0
2
5 0 0
2000
S E R I A L  OF CAP MOUNTED I N I N I T I A L  RESPONSE TO T H I S  RAI D  
T I M E  AT WHI CH R A I D  TRACK S T A R T S ( M I N . S E C )
' F L I G H T S '
M I N T E R - A I R C R A F T  SPACI NG 
M I N T E R - ' F L I G H T '  SPACI NG
FORMATI ON : - ' F L I G H T
1 2
1 0 1 0 BOMBERS/ SSJ
5 5 S P E C I A L I S T  JAMMERS
4 T R A C K - L E GS
COURSE:  - t r a c k - c h a n g e - p o i n t
0 1 2 3 4
2 5 0 1 2 5 80 80 2 5 0 X) COORDS OF
5 0 50 85 11 0 11 0 Y) T R A C K - C H A N G E - P T S ( N M )
9 9 9 9 1 5 R A I D  SPEED AT TRACK- CHANGE
9 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 A L T I T U D E ( M )
TRACK- CHANGE p o i n t  o f  WE A P ON - RE l E A S E ( - 1  f o r  SPOOF R A I D )  
S E CT I ON 4 :  EARLY WARNI NG DATA
EW L I N E  1 : I N I T I A L  D E T E C T I O N :
4 DATA POI NTS
1 7 0  2 1 0  2 1 0  1 7 0  
0 20  1 7 0  2 0 0
X)  COORDI NA T E S ( NM)  
Y)
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EW L I N E  2 ; T R A C K  DATA A V A I L A B L E :
3 DATA P O I N T S
1 1 0  1 5 0  1 1 0  X )  C U O R D I N A T E S ( N M )
2 0 0  1 0 0  0 Y)
EW L I N E  3 : R A I D  R E S O L V E D :
3 DATA P O I N T S
8 0 1 2 0  8 0 X )  C O O R D l N A T E S ( N M )
2 0 0  1 0 0  0 V)  
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > v > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >  
S E C T I O N  5 :  CAP AND F I G H T E R  A I R - B A S E  DATA
2 - N O . O F  CAPS CONS I DE R ED
NOTE THAT THE ORDER I N WHI CH THE CAP P O I N T S  ARE 
THE ORDER I N WHI CH THE P A T R O L L I N G  F I G H T E R S  PASS
I N P U T  D E F I N E S  
THROUGH THE P O I N T S
CAP 1 :
2 = N O . O F  P O I N T S  D E S C R I B I N G  THE CAP
P O I N T  NUMBER 
1 2
20
1 1 0
2 0  X) COORDS OF P O I N T S  D E S C R I B I N G  THE CAP 
1 9 0  Y)
CAP 2 :
3 = N O . O F  P O I N T S  D E S C R I B I N G  THE CAP
P O I N T  NUMBER 
1 2 3
30
10
3 0  3 0  X) COORDS OF P O I N T S  D E S C R I B I N G  THE 
50  1 0 0  Y)
CAP
2 = N O . O F  f i g h t e r  b a s e s  CONSI DERED
2 = N O . O F  F I G H T E R  TYPES CONSI DERED
3 = N O . O F  R E A D I N E S S  L EV EL S  CONSI DERED
LE V E L T I M E  B E F O R E ' F I G H T E R S  A V A I L A B L E  FOR T A K E - O F F
1
2
3
2 M I N S .  
5 M I N S .  
15  M I N S .
18^
BASE 1 ;
0 X) COORDS OF B A S E ( N M )
50 Y)
1 2 F I GHT E R TYPE
15 0 N O . I N I T I A L L Y  ON BASE
5 0 N O . A T  READI NESS l e v e l 1
10 0 N O. A T  READI NES S l e v e l 2
0 0 N O . A T  READI NESS l e v e l 3
CAP P OI NT Of  ACCESS
1 1 ) A CAP CAN BE J O I N E D ONLY AT ONE OF THE
2 2 ) WHI CH d e t e r m i n e THE CAP
0 . 3 0 ^ CONSTANT T I ME  BETWEEN F I GHT ER TAKE - O F F S ( M I N S . S E C S )
BASE 2 :
0 X) COORDS OF B A S E ( N M )
1 00 Y)
1 2 F I GHT ER TYPE
0 30 N O . i n i t i a l l y  on BASE
0 0 NO . A T  REA DI NES S l e v e l 1
0 1 5 N O. AT  READI NESS l e v e l 2
0 1 5 N O . A T  READI NESS l e v e l 3
CAP P OI N T OF ACCESS
1 1 ) A  CAP CAN BE J O I N E D  ONLY AT ONE OF THE P OI NTS
2 3 ) WHI CH DETERMI NE THE CAP
0 . 3 0  =CONSTANT T I ME  BETWEEN F I GHT E R T A K E - 0 F F S ( M I N S . SE CS >
S ECT I ON 6 ;  F I G HT E R DATA 
2 = NO. OF  P R O F I L E S  CONSI DERED
A I R C R A F T  TYPE 1
1 = F I G H T E R  TURN R A T E , R  ( = 3 * R  DEGREE S / S E C )
4 0 0 0  = FUEL  R E S E R V E ( L B S )  NEEDED TO ATTEMPT AN I N T E R C E P T I O N
3 5 0 0  =CAP H E I G H T ( M E T R E S )
P R O F I L E  1
2 2 0 0 0  = I N I T I A L  FUEL CA P A C I T Y  ON P R O F I L E  l ( L B S )
8 0 0  = FUEL  CONSUMED ON S T A R T , T A X I , R U N - U P  & ACCELERATE TO CL I MBSPEEO
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6 = N 0 . OF P O I N T S  AT WHI CH T H I S  P R O F I L E I S  S P E C I F I E D
P R O F I L E  P O I N T T I M E ( M I N . S E C )  V E L U C I T Y ( N M / M I N ) FUEL CONSUMPTI ON
1 0 0 3 5 0
2 2 3 2 5 0
4 5 1 5 0
4 5 6 1 50
5 6 6 . 5 1 2 5
t j 8 0  6 . 5 1 2 5
P R O F I L E  2
2 2 0 0 0  = I N I T I A L  FUEL C A P A C I T Y  ON P R O F I L E  2 ( L B S )
1 4 0 0  = F U E L  CONSUMED ON S T A R T , T A X I , E T C
5 = N 0 .  OF P O I N T S  AT WHI CH T H I S  P R O F I L E  I S  S P E C I F I E D
P R O F I L E  P O I N T T I M E  ( M I N . S E C )  V F . L O C I T Y ( N M / M I N )  FUEL CONSUMPTI ON RATE ( L B S / M I N )  
0 0 4 5 0
2 4 3 0 0
4 7 2 5 0
6 1 0  2 0 0
8 0  10  2 0 0
A I R C R A F T  TYPE 2 
1 . 5  
4 0 0 0  
5 0 0 0
P R O F I L E  1 
2 1 0 0 0  
9 0 0
6
= F I G H T E R  TURN R A T E , R  ( = 3 * R  D E G R E E S / S E C )
= F U E L  RESERVE ( L B S )  NEEDED TO ATTEMPT AN I N T E R C E P T I O N  
=CAP H E I G H T ( M E T R E S )
= I N I T I A L  FUEL C A P A C I T Y  ON P R O F I L E  1 ( L B S )
= F U L L  CONSUMED ON S T A R T , TAX I , E T C .
= N 0 .  OF P O I N T S  AT WHI CH T H I S  P R O F I L E  I S  S P E C I F I E D
P R O F I L E  P O I N T
'i
T I M E ( M I N S )  
0 
2
4
5
6 
8 0
V E L O C I T Y ( N M / M I N )
0
2 . 5
4 . 5  
6
7
7
FUEL CONSUMPTI ON R A T E ( L B S / M I N )  
3 7 5  
200 
1 50  
1 50 
1 2 5  
1 2 5
P R O F I L E  2
2 1 0 0 0  = I N I T I A L  FUEL  C A P A C I T Y  ON P R O F I L E  2 ( L B S )
1 4 0 0  = F U L L  CONSUMED ON S T A R T , T A X I , E T C
5 = N 0 .  OF P O I N T S  AT WHI CH T H I S  P R O F I L E  I S  S P E C I F I E D
P R O F I L E  P O I N T  T I M E ( M I N . S E C )  V E L O C I T Y ( N M / M I N > FUEL CONSUMPTI ON R A T E ( L B S / M I N )  
1 0 0 4 5 0
^ 2 4  3 0 0
3 4 7 2 5 0
4 6 8 . 5  2 0 0
5 8 0  8 . 5  2 0 0
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S E CT I ON 7 : COMMAND AND CONTROL DATA
2 = I N I T I A L  NO. OF F I GHT E RS  COMMI TTED TO A HOLDI NG CAP
2 = I N I T I A L  NO. OF F I GHT ERS COMMI TTED TO A RA I D  OF UNKNOWN STRENGTH
0 . 1  T H I S  I S  THE R A T I O  F I G H T E R S : E N E M Y  A I R C R A F T  I N  A R A I D  WHI CH
THE A L L O C A T I O N  PROCESS W I L L  ATTEMPT TO ACH I E V E  WHEN THE 
STRENGTH OF THE R A I D  I S  KNOWN.
1 CLOSE CONTROL P C S S I B LE ? ( 1 / 0  = Y ES / N0 )
1 1 OR 0 R E S P E C T I V E L Y  I F  A F I GHT ER UNDER CC CONTI NUES ON T H I S  COURSE
OR ADOPTS A L . P .  COURSE I F  I T  A C H I E V E S  DET ECT I ON BUT NOT BURNTHROUGH
2 0  I N I T I A L  NO.  OF I NT E RCE PT  CONTROLS A V A I L A B L E ( = 2 * N 0 .  OF I NT E RCEP T
CONTROLLERS A P P R O X I M A T E L Y )
F I GHT E R TARGET REPORTI NG PARAMETERS:
( I . E .  A I R - T O - G R O U N D  C O MMUN I C A T I O NS :  DEPENDENT ON THE F I GHT E R T YPE)
F I GHT E R T Y P E :
1 2
1 0 . 0  2 0 . 0  DELAY I N SEC BEFORE TARGET DATA FROM F I GHT E R MADE A V A I L A B L E
5 . 0  3 . 0  S . D .  OF ERROR I N  REPORTI NG TARGET P O S I T I O N  ( NM)
0 . 3  0 . 5  S . D .  OF ERROR I N REPORTI NG TARGET S P E E D ( N M / M I N )
3 . 0  5 . 0  S . D .  OF ERROR I N REPORTI NG TARGET HEADI NG ( DEG)
5 . 0  5 . 0  D I ST ANCE  W I T H I N  WHI CH V I S U A L  I D E N T I F I C A T I O N  OCCURS( NM)
GROUND TARGET REPORTI NG PARAMETERS:
5 . 0  DELAY I N SECS BEFORE TARGET DATA FROM GROUND MADE A V A I L A B L E
1 . 0  S . D .  OF ERROR I N REPORTI NG TARGET P O S I T I O N  ( NM)
0 . 1  S . D .  OF ERROR I N REPORTI NG TARGET S P E E D ( NM/ M I N )
2 . 0  S . D .  UF ERROR I N REPORTI NG TARGET HEADI NG ( DE G)
T I M E  DELAYS & A CCURACI ES OF I N T E R C E P T I O N  COURSES FOR VARI OUS CASES:
( I . E .  G R O U N D - A I R  C O MMUN I C A T I ONS :  DEPENDENT ON F I GHT ER CONTROL MODE)
CASE DELAY HEADI NG ERROR D E S C R I P T I O N  OF EACH CASE
( S E C ) ( S . D .  D E G . )
1 2 . 0 1 . 0 I N T E R C E P T I O N  USI NG DL+ONBOARD COMPUTER
2 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 BROADCAST CONTROLLED I N T E R C E P T I O N
3 1 . 0 1 . 0 NuRMAL CLOSE CONTROL FROM GROUND
4 2 . 0 2 . 0 I N T E R C E P T I O N  USI NG A I  RADAR
OUT OF BOUNDS L I N E S  L I M I T I N G  F I GHTER F L I G H T  ( M E Z ' S  FOR E X A M P L E ) :
1 NO.  OF L I N E S  ( EACH L I M I T E D BY 2 P O I N T S )
L I N E XI Y1 X2 Y2
1 2 0 0 0 2 0 0  2 0 0 NM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
187
S E C T I O N  8 : RADAR DATA 
GENERAL  :
2 5 0  NM RANGE ABOVE WHI CH R A D A R/ J A MME R I N T E R A C T I O N S  I GNORED
RADAR PERFORMANCE D A T A :
RADAR T Y P E d  TYPE PER F I G H T E R  T Y P E ) :
1
1 00  
1 000  
100000 
9 5 0 0  
1 0 0 0 0  
1 0 5 0 0
0
5 . 0
4 . 0  
0 
6 0
3 . 0  
8 0  
3 0
4
30
6 0
20
1
1
1
1
- 1 8 0  
1 OOO 
1 0 
5 
2 
2 
20 
10 
-1
1 0
2000 
5 0 0 0  
9 5 0 0  
1 00 00 
1 0 5 o 0
0
5 . 0
4 . 0  
0 
6 0
3 . 0  
8 0  
3 0
4
3 0
6 0
20
0
0
1
1
- 1 8 0  
1 00  
1 0 
5 
2 
2 
20 
1 0 
- 1
U N I T
W
W
HZ
MHZ
MHZ
MHZ
H Z / S
- D B
“ DB
- D 3
DB
S
D E G/ S
♦DB
DEG
“ DB
DEG
DEG
DB
HZ
DB
DB
DB
DB
DB
DB
DB
MEAN POWER 
PEAK POWER
PULSE R E P E T I T I O N  FREQUENCY  
M I N  C A R R I E R  FREQUENCY  
NO M I N A L  c a r r i e r  FREQUENCY  
MAX C A R R I E R  FREQUENCY
( EACH F I G H T E R  I S  A L L O C A T E D  A D I F F E R E N T  CA R RI E R 
FREQUENCY W I T H I N  THE RANGE S P E C I F I E D  FOR I T S  T Y P E )  
SLOPE OF L I N E A R  RANGI NG MODUL A T I ON
1 - WA Y  T R A N S M I S S I O N  L O S S ( A F F E C T S  A L L  T R A N S M I S S I O N S )
1 - W A Y  - RECEPTI ON L O S S ( A F F E C T S  A L L  R E C E I V E D  S I G N A L S )
PD E C L I P S I N G  L O S S ( A F F E C T S  TARGET & CL UT TER ONL Y )
T HRESHOLD FUR D E T E C T I O N  OF J AMMI NG
FRAME T I M E
SCA NNI NG RATE
MAX G A I N ( 1 - W A Y )
3 - D B  WEAMWI DTH
NO M I N A L  S I D E L O B E  G A I N ( D O WN  ON M A I N  BEAM)
A Z I M U T H  SCAN H A L F - W I D T H
i n i t i a l  l e a d  p u r s u i t  COURSE LEAD ANGLE
T W S ? ( 1 / 0 = Y E S / N 0 )
DL ? ( 1 / 0 = Y E S / N 0 )
GROUND s c a t t e r i n g  CR OS S - S E C T  I O N / S Q . M .
AT NORMAL I N C I D E N C E ( U S E D  I N  CL UT TER C A L C U L A T I O N S )
E X P O N E N T . U F  S I N ( G R A Z I N G  A N G L E )  I N  GROUND CROSS-
S E C T I O N  f o r m u l a  ( USED I N  CL UTTER C A L C U L A T I O N S )
SWERLI NG Ü - F A C T O R
r e c e i v e r  N O I S E  POWER
R E C E I V E R  BANDWI DTH
J : N  R A T I O  FOR HOJ I N I T I A T I O N
J : N  r a t i o  FOR T E R M I N A T I O N  OF HOJ
S : J  R A T I O  FOR HOJ I N I T I A T I O N
S : J r a t i o  FOR T E R M I N A T I O N  OF HOJ & AOJ
SNR FOR TWS I N I T I A T I O N
SNR FOR S A T I S F A C T O R Y  RANGE D E T E R M I N A T I O N  
SNR FOR i n i t i a l  D E T E C T I O N  OF TARGET
RADAR ANTENNA G A I N  P A T T E R N S : ( 1 - W A Y  G A I N  I N  DB I S  G I V E N  AS A F U NC T I O N OF ANGLE
O F F - A X I S  I N  DEGREES FROM 0 - 1 8 0 : ANGLES NEED NOT BE 
UN I F O R M L Y  SPACED AS PROGRAM L I N E A R L Y  I N T E R P O L A T E S )
RADAR 1 :
0.0 
3 0 .
RADAR 2 :
0.0 
3 0 .
2 . 5  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0  
2 7 .  1 5 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0
2 . 5  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0  
2 7 .  1 5 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0  0 . 0
ANGLE 
G A I N  DB
ANGLE 
G A I N  DB
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ENEMY RADAR CROSS- SECT I O N S : ( F O R M A T  AS FOR GAI N  PATTERNS)  
0 = 0 / 1  I F  DATA I N  SQ M/ DB REFERRED TO 1 SQ M
ENEMY A I R C R A F T  TYPE 1 : B O M B E R S / S S J :
0 . 0  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0
1 5 . 0  1 5 . 0  1 5 . 0  1 5 . 0  1 5 . 0
ENEMY A I R C R A F T  TYPE 2 : S P E C I A L I S T  JAMMERS:
0 . 0  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0
1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0  1 0 . 0
ANGLE
X SE CT I ON
AN G L E
X S ECT I ON
SECT I ON 9 : JAMMER DATA 
GENERAL :
9 0 0 0  MHZ LOWEST RADAR FREQUENCY CONSI DERED I N THE MODEL
1 0 5 0 0  MHZ H I GHES T  RADAR FREQUENCY CONSI DERED I N  THE MODEL
2 NO.  OF ( EQUAL ) SUBBANDS I NTO WHI CH ABOVE FREQUENCY RANGE
D I V I D E D  FOR JAMMI NG PURPOSES
2 NO.  OF TYPES OF ENEMY J A MM E R ( E X C L U D I N G  S0 J * S : CURRENTLY
COMPRI SES S S J ' S  AND S P E C I A L I S T  ESCORT JAMMERS)
3 . 0  - D B  P O L A R I S A T I O N  L O S S ( A F F E C T S  RECEPTI ON & T R A N S M I S S I O N  BY A L L  JAMMERS
E QUA L L Y )
S P E C I F I C  JAMMER C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S :
JAMMER TYPE 1 : NON- SPEC I A L I S T ( EG BOMBER WI TH ECM P O D ) :
50  MHZ : B A N D WI D T H  FOR S P O T - J A MMI NG
0
BA ND
1
2
= 1 / 0  I F  JAMMER A B L E / U N A B L E  TO DETECT & RESPOND TO SCANNI NG RADAR 
DURI NG P A I N T  ONLY
POWER ALL OCATED TO B A N D ( W ) :
1 0 0 0  
1 0 0 0
- 1 0 0  D B : T HRES H OL D POWER LEVEL FOR J a MMER TO DETECT RADARS
JAMMER r e c e i v e r  POLAR D I A G R A M : A B S O L U T E : ( F O R M A T  AS FOR RADAR GAI NS A B O V E ) :
0 . 0  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0
3 . 0  0 . 0  - 3 . 0  0 . 0  3 . 0
JAMMER T RA NS MI T T E R POLAR DI AGRAM
0 . 0  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0
3 . 0  0 . 0  - 3 . 0  0 . 0  3 . 0
ANGLE 
ga in DB
ANGLE 
GAI N DB
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JAMMER TYPE 2 %S P E C I A L I S T
5 0  M H Z : B A N D W I D T H  FOR S P O T - J A M M I N G
1 = 1 / 0  I F  JAMMER A B L E / U N A B L E  TO DETECT & RESPOND TO S CA NNI NG RADAR 
DURI NG P A I N T  ONLY
BAND POWER A L L O C A T E D  TO B A N D ( W ) :
1 2 0 0 0
2 2000
- 1 0 0  D B : T H R E S H O L D  POWER LE VE L  FOR JAMMER TO DETECT RADARS
JAMMER R E C E I V E R  POLAR D I A G R A M : A B S O L U T E : ( F O R M A T  AS FOR RADAR G A I N S  A B O V E ) :
0 . 0  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0  ANGLE
3 . 0  0 . 0  - 3 . 0  0 . 0  3 . 0  G A I N  DB
JAMMER t r a n s m i t t e r  POLAR DI AGRAM
0 . 0  4 5 . 0  9 0 . 0  1 3 5 . 0  1 8 0 . 0  ANGLE
3 . 0  0 . 0  - 5 . 0  0 . 0  3 . 0  G A I N  DB
S T A N D - O F F  J AMMERS:
2 S O J ' S
L O C A T I O N S ( A S S U M E D  S T A T I O N A R Y ) :
SOJ 1 S 0 J 2
2 0 0 . 1 0 0 . X NM
2 0 0 . 0 . Y NM
0 . 0 0 . 0 S W I T C H - O N  T I M E ( M I N . S E C )
T R A N S M I T T E R POWERS( ASSUMED I S O T R O P I C  FOR THE
s o j i S 0 J 2
5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 WATTS BAND 1 ( 9 0 0 0 - 9 7 5 0  MHZ)
1 0 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 0  WATTS BAND 2 ( 9 7 5 0 - 1 0 5 0 0  m HZ)
> > > > >
S E C T I O N  1 0 : M I S S I L E  D A T A :
2 A I R - T O - A I R  M I S S I L E  TYPES
M I S S I L E  MODES OF O P E R A T I 0 N ( 1 / 2 = R A D A R / I N F R A - R E D ) :
M I S S  I L E I  M I S S U E 2  
1 2
F I G H T E R  M I S S I L E  P A Y L O A D S :
F I G H T E R 1  F I G H T E R 2
4 1 MI  S S I  L E I
4 5 M I S S I L E 2
F I G H T E R  1ST  P R I O R I T Y  M I S S I L E  TYPE I N  D I F F E R E N T  S I T U A T I O N S :
F I G H T E R 1  F I G H T E R 2
1 1 FORWARD HE MI S P HE R E  AT TACK
2 1 REAR HE MI S P HE R E  AT TA CK
M I S S I L E  L E T H A L I T I E S ( X )  :
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M I S S I  LEI M I S S I  LE2
80 1 0 CLEAR
40 10 HOJ
20 10 AOJ
60 5 0 CLEAR
30 50 HOJ
15 50 AOJ
m i s s i l e LAUNCH SUCCESS
M I S S I  LEI : LAUNCH SUCCESS
FORWARD HEMI SPHERE ATTACK 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Overview
The work described here developed from DOAE Study 250 (DOAE Report 
R7707), which investigated the influence of sensors on fighter 
intercept capability as one aspect of air defence. In order to 
analyse the effect of the major sensor parameters certain simplifying 
assumptions were made in Study 250. In particular, it was assumed 
that:
(i) raids attack their targets along direct tracks
(ii) the information provided by the Ground Control sensors is 
accurate.
This part of the thesis investigates the problems raised by relaxing 
assumption (i), i.e. we examine the influence of bomber tactical 
routing on the intercept capability of fighters scrambled from ground 
alert. In considering raid indirect routing it will be assumed that 
the information provided to the fighters by the sensors through 
Ground Control (GC) is accurate. Two complementary approaches may be 
adopted. Mathematical analysis may be employed to give a basic 
understanding of the many elements involved, while a computer 
simulation - the fighter model - may be used to study the more 
complex operational aspects.
Scope
This study considers a single fighter base defending a single offset 
target against attack from a concentrated (point) raid. The analysis 
is primarily geometric in nature, and as such requires a pre-defined 
coordinate system. This could be derived, for example, as in Figure
1.1. We take the fighter base providing the fighter defences at the
origin of coordinates, while the y-axis represents a 'target axis.' 
Fighter interceptions are regarded as successful only if they are 
achieved before the raid penetrates the target axis,with attacks 
coming from the hemisphere x > 0. This introduces a form of 'area 
defence' and eliminates the need to define an expected target system, 
or to specify which fighter bases are likely to defend particular 
targets. With this convention we may take the raid target to be the
intersection of the raid track with the target axis. In the
numerical examples considered later we take this point to be half-way 
between the fighter base and its nearest neighbour along the target
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Last sentence, para, 2, should read:
The raid track-change point is assumed to be pre-planned 
by the attacker; thus evasive manoeuvre in response to 
fighter attack is not considered here, but can be investigated 
using the fighter model (after suitable modification).
axis (see Figure 1.1). The distance perpendicular to the target axis 
at which detection by GC sensors first occurs is called the 
warning distance. A number of the values of warning distance 
considered in the examples presented in Chapter 2 are sufficiently 
small so as to correspond to low-level attacks, at high subsonic 
speed. It can be seen from the assumptions described here, namely:
(i) single fighter base;
(ii) point raid;
(iii) 'area defence' of a target axis;
(iv) maximum target offset along this axis;
(v) low-level attacks;
that the scenarios considered in the numerical examples presented in 
Chapter 2 are in a number of respects pessimistic for the fighter 
defences. Favourable conclusions concerning the viability of the 
fighter defences which can be drawn under these circumstances are 
then likely to hold also under more favourable conditions for fighter 
operations.
The raid is assumed to fly one feint leg, at the end of which it 
heads directly for its target. While the analysis is in principle no 
more complicated by dropping this assumption, in the case of multiple 
raid feint tracks the complexity of fighter and raid interactions 
involved is such that the fighter model would be better suited to 
such a study. Interception is represented by 'collision', the 
coincidence of the fighter and the raid on their respective tracks, 
with no allowance made for offsets for forward or rear engagements, 
or for reattacks. Hence the planned point of intersection of the 
fighter and raid tracks is coincident with the expected raid position 
at that time and is not translated ahead of or behind the raid, 
although this could give the fighter a greater kill probability in a 
forward or rear hemisphere attack respectively. Further, no attempt 
is made to assess the likelihood for any given fighter and raid 
geometrical configuration of the fighter being able to carry out 
further attacks after its initial attempted interception. The 
position, speed and course of the raid at first detection, and at its 
track-change, are assumed correctly estimated by Ground Control. The 
raid track-change point is assumed to be pre-planned by the attacker; 
thus evasive manoeuvre in response to fighter attack is not 
considered here but can be investigated using the fighter model (Part 
2 of the thesis).
Following initial detection of the raid we assume a fixed delay for 
sensor and GC processing and transmission of the information, 
followed by a reaction delay representing the readiness level of the 
fighters. It is further assumed that, during these delays, the raid 
is identified as hostile and approaching (i.e., does not consist of 
stand-off jammers, patrolling outside defended airspace and emitting 
noise or deception jamming in support of the attacking raids - see 
Part 2) and is in sufficient strength to warrant fighter scramble.
We also impose a delay between each fighter scrambled for take-off. 
There is no limitation assumed in the analysis on the number of 
fighters at the base, although in the numerical examples presented 
there is taken to be at most twenty.
The details of the calculations are given in Appendices A and B, 
while Chapter 2 illustrates their application in a set of simple but 
significant examples.
Analytical Method
The mathematical approach is an extension of that used in DOAE Study 
250, The maximum allowable fighter take-off delay for successful 
interception is used as a measure of effectiveness of the fighter 
defences and most results are expressed in terms of this parameter.
In the numerical examples, we also present results in terms of the 
number of interceptions achieved before the raid reaches its target. 
We had originally hoped to obtain a full understanding of these 
aspects of fighter operations by running the fighter model but it 
soon became clear that its results could not easily be interpreted. 
The mathematical analysis presented here was therefore derived partly 
to explain the fighter model results.
We consider three categories of interception and four scramble 
policies (i.e. criteria under which fighters are scrambled for 
take-off); these may then be studied separately for different feint 
tracks and warning distances.
Categories of Interception
(i) Interception on the feint leg.
(ii) Interception on the second leg of the track by
fighters reallocated from expected interceptions on 
the feint leg.
(The penalty for premature fighter scramble may 
also be studied in this category. This corresponds 
to a fighter scrambled against the feint leg but 
unable to react to the track-change in time to 
intercept the raid on its second leg, whereas it 
could have intercepted had it not scrambled until 
after the track-change).
(iii) Interception on the second leg of the track by
fighters scrambled to intercept after detection of 
the track-change by the warning sensors.
Scramble Policies
I Scramble is continued as long as interception is
expected to occur before the target axis.
II Scramble is continued as long as fighters possess a
geometrically feasible interception course.
III The feint leg is ignored and fighters fly along the
target axis to a patrol position located directly 
over the target.
uIV Scramble is continued as long as fighters can
expect to intercept within a specified time (or 
distance) from the fighter base.
Because of the underlying assumption that the raid penetration is 
carried out at low-level, which places severe constraints on the 
upper speed limit of both the enemy raids and the fighters scrambled 
from Ground Alert, it is not unreasonable to approximate the fighter 
and raid flight profiles by constant speed. While the complete 
flight profile of a raid may involve a number of periods of flight at 
different heights and speeds, we consider here only that period 
during which it is vulnerable to attack by fighters scrambled from 
Ground Alert - say within 270 nm. of the target axis (Figure 1.1).
We assume that during this final phase the raid flies at its maximum 
subsonic speed at low-level. (Note that the warning distance 
achieved is dependent on raid height). Conversely, in general, 
fighters will have a sufficient distance to travel to their expected 
interception points such that they too can be assumed to have settled 
to a steady speed during the interception. (The slight delay between 
take-off and adoption of the planned interception course and speed 
can be subsumed into the reaction delay representing fighter 
readiness level). Finally, because of the assumed accuracy and 
timeliness of the GC information, we can ignore in this initial 
analysis the fighters' radar detection performance. Thus, it is 
assumed that, if an airborne fighter does not detect the raid 
track-change, it is nevertheless informed by Ground Control, after an 
appropriate processing delay, of its new interception course against 
the second track-leg. Further, it is assumed that the reaction delay 
by fighters which are operating on GC information is equal to the 
reaction delay to the track-change by fighters which have already 
detected the raid and are operating autonomously. In a more detailed 
analysis one could consider different reaction delays to the 
track-change for fighters operating under close control and fighters 
operating autonomously. This delay could also depend on the position 
and velocity of the fighter relative to the raid at the track-change 
point. We mention here that the fighter model has been used to 
investigate some of the more complex operational aspects of the 
problem. These include different capabilities for fighters operating 
under close control and fighters operating autonomously, and the 
assessment of fighter intercept effectiveness in the face of raid 
indirect routing, under both clear and Electronic Counter Measures 
(ECM) conditions. It can also be used to study realistic fighter 
velocity and fuel consumption-rate flight profiles, i.e., 
piecewise-linear graphs of speed, and fuel consumption rate, as a 
function of time.
Notation
The raid track geometry is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The 'target', 
i.e. the intersection of the second track-leg with the target axis, 
is at the point T with coordinates (0, y^), where we may take
y^ > 0 (1.1)
Each feint track has an associated feint angle i|<, the angle between 
the x-axis (i.e. the perpendicular to the target axis) and the feint 
track; with positive feint angles measured clockwise. We take
^  I • (1.2)
Given the feint angle , the feint track is fully defined by 
specifying its point of intersection F with the target axis. It is 
convenient to define this point in relation to the raid target T, as 
shown in Figure 1.2, so tht^Ve specify y^  ^ to be the position relative 
to T at which the feint line crosses the y-axis. In Chapter 2 we 
consider families of feint tracks passing through a fixed ’pivot 
point' at a distance x^ from the target, measured perpendicular to 
the target axis. From Figure 1.2, the quantities y_ and x„ are 
related by
Xrr = cot 1|J,
or ^ (1.3)
tan iji.
The track-change angle 0 is the angle between the feint track and the 
second track-leg, defined as shown in Figure 1.2.
There are six configurations of the raid feint track and direct 
track-leg to be considered, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Case (1). Raid feints north of the target, ^ > 0.
Case (2). Raid feints north of fighter base and south of target,
* > 0.
Case (3). Raid feints south of fighter base, ^ > 0.
Case (4). Raid feints north of target, ij; < 0.
Case (5). Raid feints north of fighter base and south of target,
4* < 0
Case (6). Raid feints south of fighter base, i|j < 0.
Case (1) represents the geography underlying the numerical examples 
of the next Chapter and is shown in more detail in Figure 1.2. The 
orientations of the feint angle ij; and the track-change angle 0 are 
defined by this case.
The raid travels at a constant speed U and is first detected at the 
point S, with coordinates (x ,y ), where x is the warning distance 
of the raid. Assuming that Ehe^feint is sEill in force when x = x^, 
then
Vo = Y t  + V m  ■ ^0 • (1-4)
The raid changes track (instantaneously) at the point C, which is 
defined either by the track-change angle 0 or the feint time t , 
where t is the time spent on the feint track after initial 
detection. Interceptions are defined to be successful only if they 
occur before the raid penetrates the target axis, so that we do not 
need to specify the raid track after it reaches the target.
Following initial detection of the raid there is taken to be a fixed 
delay D for Ground Control processing and transmission of the sensor 
information, followed by a further reaction delay D representing the 
readiness level of the fighters. There is also a delay D between 
each fighter take-off, after which fighters fly with constant speed 
V, If for simplicity we suppose that the first fighter scrambled 
also suffers the delay D , then the total delay before take-off, D , 
for the I-th fighter scrambled is given by
D = (Dp + D^) + I.Dg (I = 1,2,3,..... ). (1.5)
As the fighter takes off the raid, having travelled a distance UD, is 
then at the point R with coordinates (x^,y^), where
X, = X -UD cosijj ,
1 o ^ ’
y^ = y^ +UD sini}) . (1.6)
The fighter heading is the angle (}) made by its track with the 
positive x-axis, as shown. It is assumed that whether or not a 
fighter is capable of detecting the raid track-change on its own 
radar, it adopts if practicable its new interception course against 
the second track-leg after a delay D with respect to the time of the 
track-change; during this period it continues on its original 
course.
Note: we will find it convenient in the Appendices to use the
parameters p and q, defined by
and
P = (y^ + y-p) = x^ sin^ + y^ cosij) (1.7)
q =/y% cosij)/ , (1.8)
where /p/ and q are the shortest distances from the origin and the 
target respectively to the feint track (see Figure 1.2).
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2. EXAMPLE
Introduction
To provide a simple application of the analysis of raid indirect 
routing, we study a special case which, nevertheless, is of 
considerable interest and practical significance. A scenario is 
chosen which corresponds geographically to case (1). Furthermore, 
fighters are assumed to fly at the same speed as the raid and are 
assumed able to respond immediately to the track-change, which is 
taken to be at right angles to the feint track (Figure 2.1). It is 
easily seen from what follows that equation (1.4) relates the maximum 
allowable take-off delay for possible interception to the 
corresponding number of interceptions, so that the measure of 
effectiveness can be taken as the number of interceptions achieved 
before the raid reaches the target. This is shown as a function of 
the feint angle, i|i, for a range of realistic warning distances. Each 
raid track is assumed to pass through a fixed point at a distance x^
= 270 nm. from the target, measured perpendicular to the target axis. 
As mentioned earlier, the fighter model was also used in this study 
and generally gave very good agreement with the analytical approach; 
for simplicity the results of the fighter model runs are presented 
for one particular case only, in Figure 2.15.
Note that a feint away from the fighter base under consideration (at 
the origin of coordinates) implies a feint towards its nearest 
neighbour, but a pessimistic case is taken in which no fighters are 
available from this base to attack the raid. The other simplifying
assumptions of this example may be summarised as follows.
(i) Case (1). We consider only feint angles such that
0 < 4< < ^ . (2.1)
(ii) Track-change angle. For a given feint angle the raid is
assumed to abandon its feint when it is closest to the 
target, i.e.,
0 = ^ . (2.2)
(iii) Fighter reaction delay. It is assumed that whether or not a
fighter is capable of detecting the raid track-change on its
own radar, it is informed of its new intercept course by
Ground Control and adjusts its own track immediately, so 
that
D = 0 . (2.3)
c
II
(iv) Equal-speed. We take the fighter speed equal to the raid 
speed, viz.
V = U . (2.4)
Under these assumptions, the results of the general analysis in 
Appendices A and B reduce to the following simple form. Only 
scramble policies I-III are considered; for realistic values of the 
fighter endurance, policy IV does not restrict the number of possible 
interceptions in the numerical examples presented.
Scramble Policies (Appendix A)
Here D denotes the maximum acceptable delay between initial GC 
detection and take-off such that a fighter will scramble under each 
of the four scramble policies considered in Appendix A.
Policy 1 (Equation (A12))
D = ^ (%Q secili - (y^ + y^)) . (2.5)
Policy 11 (Equation (A16))
Ü (=0 sec* - v'T - 'MD = (x^ seciji - (y + y ) siniji) . (2.6)
Policy 111
If detection takes place on the feint leg, then from (A22)
D = ^ (x^ secijj - y? + (cos^ - sinij))). (2.7)
Now, the condition that detection occurs on the feint leg is given by
^o ^ %  cos^ siniji . (2.8)
If (2.8) does not hold then the raid is first detected by GC after 
its track-change, in which case, from (A24), D is given by
D = ^ (x^ coseciji - y^) . (2.9)
Categories of Interception (Appendix B)
Categories (i) and (ii) - Interception by fighters scrambled against 
the feint leg
Given that a fighter has scrambled onto an accurate interception 
course against the feint leg, it may then be unable to intercept 
because of the. raid track change. From Figure 1.2, it can be seen 
that those airborne fighters planning to intercept the raid beyond 
the track-change point, N, can do so only if they are within a
distance /NT/ = y_ cosijj of the target when the raid changes track.
The maximum take-off delay D for a successl^ui interception is such 
that scramble occurs when the raid reaches a point at a distance from 
F equal to
l/rt sin if- -f-( Hr -  • (2.10)
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Hence the required expression for D is
^  I  -  s . H  f .  I * '  —  I  —  l / f . . .  f  r > V  LL> I  ^
Equation (2.11) holds as long as the scramble limitation under policy 
11 does not come into effect, i.e. as long as
y„ < • (2.12)
In the Figures presented later, for completeness the graph of 
equation (2.11) is shown extended beyond its intersection with that 
of scramble policy 11 at the point y^ = y^, until it meets the graph 
of scramble policy 111, at the point y.^  = y^ cos ij).
Category (iii) ~ Interception by fighters scrambled against the 
second track-leg
All interceptions carried out under scramble policy 111 may be 
regarded as in this category, with the maximum allowable take-off 
delay D given by (2.7) and (2.9). Under the other scramble policies 
it is assumed that, if the information processing delay D has 
elapsed between first detection of the raid by GC and its^ 
track-change, then there is no further such delay imposed on fighters 
scrambled after the track-change - merely the delay D representing 
their readiness level. In this case, from (B38) the maximum take-off 
delay D for interception (relative to the time of the track-change) 
is given by
D = ^ (y% cosij) - y^ + U. Dp) . (2.13)
The relationship between take-off delay and corresponding number of 
interceptions is not given by (1.5) but by
D = D^ + 1. Dg (1 = 1, 2, 3, --- ). (2.14)
If the raid changes track before the information processing delay D 
is complete (or of course if it is not detected until after the ^ 
track-change), then the maximum allowable take-off delay is again 
given by equations (2.7) and (2.9).
Numerical Inputs
The numerical inputs used in the specific examples presented are 
summarised in Table 2.1. The fighter base is at the point shown in 
Figure 1.1, with the target (i.e. the point of intersection of the 
second track-leg with the target axis) halfway between this and the 
nearest fighter base along the target axis. All feint tracks pass 
through a fixed point at a distance x.^  = 270nm. from the target, 
measured perpendicular to the target axis. The analysis first 
assumes that there are no limitations on the number of fighters 
available at the base; these results are presented in Figures 
2.2-2.12. A cut-off is then applied, for a maximum availability of 
20 fighters; the corresponding results are presented in Figures 
2.13-2.16. (The maximum number of fighters available for scramble 
from a single fighter base is not a crucial factor in this analysis).
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Results - no limitations on the number of fighters available 
(Figures 2.2-2.12)
Four warning distances are considered, ranging from a minimum of 
198nm (at which no interceptions are possible, in these examples, 
against a direct (perpendicular) raid track) to an assumed maximum 
value of 360nm. For each warning distance the graphs show the number 
of interceptions possible as a function of the feint angle, for each 
of the three scramble policies. Table 2.2 gives a key to the 
notation of Figures 2.2-2.12. The number of interceptions achieved 
under policies I and II by fighters scrambled to intercept the feint 
leg are shown separately from those achieved by fighters scrambled to 
intercept the second leg. Under policy III fighters are always 
scrambled to intercept the second track-leg.
Discussion
Under scramble policy I all fighters scrambled to intercept the feint 
leg achieve successful interceptions. No interceptions on the feint 
leg are possible with a warning distance of only 198nm( i.e. curve 
does not exist). If the warning distance is increased to 270nm, 16 
interceptions are achieved against a direct attack, perpendicular to 
the target axis; this falls sharply to zero interceptions at a feint 
angle of 17 . Figure 2.5 shows the enormous improvement if the 
warning distance is increased still further to 360nm.
As the angle of feint increases the time spent by the raid on the 
second, direct track-leg increases. For feint angles larger than 
35 , interceptions by fighters scrambled after the track-change 
become possible. As can be seen from Table 2.2, the graph of the 
number of such interceptions, as a function of the feint angle, is 
composed of three parts. For raids detected at least 5 minutes 
before the track-change the processing delay at the track-change is 
ignored and curve C applies. Otherwise, the situation is identical 
with that described by scramble policy III, so that curves and
B ’jjj apply.
From Figure 2.2, no interceptions are possible against a direct track 
so that a feint can only be positively disadvantageous to the raid. 
Figures 2.3-2.5 show that under the 'conservative' scramble policy, 
with a reasonably large warning distance there is a range of feint 
angles which give considerable advantage to the raid over a direct 
track (i.e., a feint angle of 0 ). Note that in Figure 2.5 the two 
curves Ay and C overlap. Thus there is a range of feint angles in 
which interceptions are possible both by fighters scrambled to 
intercept the feint leg and by fighters scrambled to intercept the 
second track-leg.
Figures 2.6-2.9 show the corresponding results for scramble policy
II. The curves giving the number of interceptions achieved by 
fighters scrambled after the track-change are unaltered. The 
difference between the two policies lies in the number and success of 
fighters scrambled to intercept the feint leg. The number of 
interceptions achieved increases rapidly as the feint angle 
increases, until the scramble limitation is reached. For example.
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with 198am warning distance the number of interceptions increases 
from zero to nine at a feint angle of 22 , then decreases to zero 
again at 32 , The complete scramble limitation curves are shown, 
together with the extension of curve to meet B^^j, the inter­
ception limitation under scramble policy III,
These show, where appropriate, the number of fighters scrambled under 
this policy which fail to intercept, and the number of extra 
interceptions which could be achieved by a suitable switch to policy
III. Again, for larger warning distances there is a range of feint 
angles in which interceptions are possible both by fighters scrambled 
to intercept the feint leg and by fighters scrambled after the raid 
track-change. Finally, Figures 2.10-2.12 give the results achieved 
under scramble policy III. These are effectively the best possible, 
corresponding to fighters scrambled to a holding Combat Air Patrol 
position (CAP), regardless of the direction of the feint track. The 
CAP is ideally situated, being directly over the target.
Results - maximum availability of 20 fighters (Figures 2.13-2.16)
These results are derived by adding the various components of the 
fighter intercept capability in Figures 2.2-2.12, and then imposing a 
cut-off corresponding to a maximum availability of 20 fighters. For 
each of the four warning distances considered the graphs show the 
number of interceptions possible, as a function of the feint angle, 
for each of the three scramble policies, with a limit of 20 fighters 
available on the base.
The corresponding fighter model results for one of the examples, 
namely a warning distance of 234 nm, are presented in Figure 2.14 
and shown by open circles. As can be seen, the fighter model 
generally gives excellent agreement with the mathematical analysis. 
The only anomalous model result, for a feint angle of 30 under 
scramble policy II, is itself interesting:- it is due to the 
numerical technique used in the fighter model to calculate the 
expected interception points being too coarse to generate all the 
scrambled fighters; this has since been corrected.
Discussion
If the warning distance is only 200nm indirect routing is a positive 
disadvantage to the raid, since no interceptions are achieved against 
a direct track (a feint angle of 0 ). Under the conservative 
scramble policy I no fighters are scrambled against the feint leg, 
while with a feint angle of more than 35 some interceptions are 
achieved by fighters scrambled after the raid track-change. These 
rise to a maximum of 13 interceptions with a feint angle of 53 .
Under scramble policy II a maximum of 9 interceptions is achieved 
against the feint leg, at a feint angle of 22 ; for larger feint 
angles the number of fighters scrambled then limits the number of 
interceptions. Finally, under scramble policy III the number of 
interceptions rises to 20 as the feint angle increases to 35 , then 
decreases gradually to zero again.
15
If the warning distance is increased to 234 nm 8 interceptions are 
possible against a direct track. Under scramble policy I this number 
rapidly decreases to zero interceptions on the feint leg as the feint 
angle rises, while under policy II it increases to 18 interceptions 
at a feint angle of 22 . At larger feint angles the scramble 
limitation comes into effect. The maximum number of interceptions 
achieved by fighters scrambled after the track-change is 19, against 
a feint angle of 63 . With this warning distance, if Ground Control 
(GC) adopts scramble policy I there is a wide range of feint angles - 
between 0 and 45 - which are advantageous to the raid. For angles
between 8 and 35 , no interceptions at all are possible. Under 
policy II a feint is only slightly advantageous to the raid, for a 
narrow band of feint angles between 33 and 44 . If GC adopts 
scramble policy 111 there is a range of feint angles of almost 40 in 
which all 20 fighters scrambled can intercept. In general, under 
policies II and III more interceptions are possible if the raid takes 
an indirect route than if it flies direct to the target. With a 
warning distance of 270 nm, similar conclusions can be drawn. Under 
scramble policy 1 any feint angle between 0 and 57 is advantageous 
to the raid, while for angles between 17 and 35 no interceptions 
are achieved. Under scramble policy II a feint is only slightly 
advantageous to the raid, for a band of feint angles between 35 and 
55 , while at angles only slightly outside this band all 20 fighters 
can intercept. Finally, under scramble policy III, all 20 fighters 
achieve interceptions against most feint angles.
If the sensors can achieve a warning distance of 360 nm against the 
raid, only if the fighters adopt scramble policy I is a feint 
advantageous to the raid. The number of interceptions can be 
decreased from 20 to a minimum of 12, at a feint angle of 35 . Under 
scramble policies II and III all 20 fighters intercept, regardless of 
the feint angle.
Conclusions
Ample warning distance tends to negate any possible advantage to the 
raid of indirect routing. For a target offset by about 100 nm from 
the fighter base, and for warning distances between 200 nm and 300nm, 
the fighter intercept capability depends quite strongly on the 
scramble policy. There exists a range of raid feint angles
which can drastically reduce the number of possible interceptions if 
a conservative scramble policy is adopted. By being prepared to 
scramble against an identified raid without close regard to the 
estimated position of interception the defence can nullify the 
possible deleterious effects of well-planned indirect routing. Note 
that we have not investigated the 'campaign' aspects of such a 
policy. In particular, we assume that abortive fighter sorties do 
not degrade defences against later raids.
The results presented go some way towards a clarification of the more 
effective procedures which the defence might adopt in the face of 
deceptive raid tactics. They indicate the value of ample warning 
distance to the fighter defences, together with early resolution of 
raid size in order that sufficient fighters may be scrambled quickly, 
albeit not necessarily with well-defined interception courses.
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Table 2.1
Numerical Inputs to the Study of Raid Indirect Routing
RAID PARAMETERS 
(A) Target lOSnm along the target axis
(B) Distance of the feint track from
the target, measured perpendicular 
to the target axis.
270nm
(C) Angle of Feint arbitrary
(D) Track-change point at the perpendicular to the 
target
(E) Raid Speed (constant) 9nm/min
(F) Raid length - concentrated (point) 
raid
zero
GC AND FIGHTER PARAMETERS 
(A) Warning Distance (1) 198nm
(2) 234nm
(3) 270nm
(4) 360nm
(B) Sensor and GC processing and 
transmission delay at first 
detection of the raid
5 minutes
(C) Fighter readiness level 5 minutes
(D) Scramble Policy:
I : scramble if expect to
intercept before the target 
axis
II : scramble unless interception
of feint track appears 
impossible
III : scramble 20 fighters
regardless of their expected 
interception prospects
Table 2.1 (Coat'd)
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(E) Delay between take-offs 30 secs (i.e., scramble rate 
of two per minute)
(F) Number of fighters available (1) unlimited
at the base (2) twenty
(G) Fighter speed (constant) 9nm/min
(H) Delay before fighters, under 
Close Control (CC) or acting 
autonomously, react to the raid 
track-change
zero
Table 2.2
Key to Figures 2.2-2.12
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Serial Definition Equation
Scramble Limitations against the feint leg
Policy I (2.5)
M l
Policy II 
Interception Limitations
(2.6)
(i) Fighters scrambled to intercept the
feint leg
M
Policy I (all fighters scrambled achieve 
interceptions)
(2.5)
M i
(ii)
Policy II
Fighters scrambled to intercept the
(2.11)
second track-leg
(a) Policies I and II
c Raid detected at least 5 minutes 
before it changes track
(2.13)
^III
Raid detected between 0 and 5 
minutes before it changes track
(2.7)
® ’lll
(b)
Raid detected after it changes 
track
Policy III
(2.9)
®III
Raid detected before it changes 
track
(2.7)
Raid detected after it changes 
track
(2.9)
Notes
(1) Raid track-change at the perpendicular to 
the target.
(2) Equations (1.5) and (2.14) are used to convert 
expressions for the maximum acceptable 
take-off delay into the corresponding 
expressions giving the number of possible 
interceptions.
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T A R GE T  AXI S
T R A C K - C H A N G E  POINT
FEINT LEG
FEINT ANGLE
TARGET
POINT AT WHICH  
FIRSTTHE RAID
D E T E C T E DW A R N I N G  D I S T A N C E
FI GHTER BASE
FI GURE ZJ: I N D I R E C T  R O U T I N G  -  R A I D T R A C K  P A R A M E T E R S
Note
Xf denotes the distance from the feint track to the target, measured perpendicular to the 
target axis. The distance Xj- and the feint angle \p together define the feint track.
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FIGURE CL.3
Warning D is ta n c e = 270 nm
SCRAMBLE P O L IC Y I
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SCRAMBLE POLICY I
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SCRAMBLE POLICY II
Number of interceptions
4 0  -
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Warning D is ta n c e = 270 nm
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SCRAMBLE POLIC Y I I I
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Warning D is ta n c e  * 198 nm
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APPENDIX A
FIGHTER SCRAMBLE POLICIES
Introduction
To begin the analysis of fighter interception capability it is 
necessary to specify the conditions under which fighters are 
scrambled. Four scramble policies with associated control procedures 
are considered.
I Scramble is continued as long as interception is expected to
occur before or over the target axis; the initial fighter 
track is directed towards the estimated interception point.
II Scramble is continued until fighters cease to have the
potential to intercept the raid if it continues along its 
estimated track, i.e., as long as fighters possess a 
geometrically feasible interception course. In practice, 
the implementation of such a policy must sometimes imply a
degree of doubt by the fighter controller that the target
lies along the feint track, since fuel limitations are not 
taken into account when the fighter is scrambled against the 
feint track. Again, the initial fighter track is directed 
towards the expected interception point.
III Under policy III the feint leg is ignored and fighters fly
along the target axis to an ideally suited combat air patrol 
position, directly over the target. This policy is included 
as an analytical control to illustrate the best that can be 
achieved by the fighter defences; it differs from the 
others in that it presupposes Ground Control has some 
knowledge of the raid target.
IV Policy IV is a standard fuel-limitation policy, in which 
interception must be expected within a specified time or 
distance after take-off for scramble to proceed.
Although Figure 1.2 only is used to illustrate the raid and fighter
track geometry, the results in this Appendix apply to all of the
configurations given by cases (l)-(6). Throughout, D denotes the 
maximum acceptable take-off delay under each scramble policy. Before 
we derive D for policies I-IV it is convenient to calculate the 
expected time to interception after scramble and the heading, ({>, 
which defines the initial fighter interception course.
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Time to Interception
From Figure A 1 , the raid is at the point R , with coordinates 
(x ,y^) given by (1.6), at the moment the fighter begins its 
interception course. Its corresponding polar coordinates 
are r^ and 0^. If P denotes the expected interception point 
with coordinates (X,Y) we have
X = X- - UTcosiji = VTcos(j) 
and (Al)
Y = y^ + UTsiniji = VTsin(j) ,
where T is the expected time to interception and ({) denotes the 
fighter heading. Equation (Al) gives
T^ (U^-V^) - 2r^cosuJ.UT + r^^ = 0 , (A2)
where, from Figure Al,
UÜ = 0^ + iji (A 3)
0^ = tan ^(y^/x^) . (A4)
If U=V then equation (A2) has solution
T = ’^1 , (U=V) (A5)
2UC0SUÜ
while, if U^V, taking the minimum time interception we have
T = ^1 (Ucosuj - (V^-U^sin^w)^) . (UfV) (A6)
U^-V^
(To be more exact, if V > U  there is Just one valid solution 
to (A2) , given by (A6). If V < U ,  there are two real positive 
roots of (A2), provided that V % U s i n & ; , and the smaller value 
is given by (A6).)
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Fighter Heading
Given the expected time to interception, T, from equation (A5) or 
(A6) , the fighter heading (j) is immediately available from equation 
(Al)
cos 4, = %o-U(D+T)cos4 _
VT
sin = yo+U(D+T)sin*
VT
A useful alternative expression for ^ may be found as follows.
From Figure Al we may write
4) = Y + 0^ , (A8)
where
siny = p. . U
r^ V (A9)
and p is given by equation (1.7). Substituting into (A8) gives
,2 , _ (AlO)
U A  f = l x , . p . u ^ ^ , ( r 2 - p \
V  / V
with a similar expression for cos^.
The above expressions hold for each of the configurations (l)-(6) 
shown in Figure 1.3, provided that the angles y, (j) and 0^ are inter­
preted in the following sense:
y is the angle from OR^ to OP, measured anticlockwise;
(}) is the angle from the positive x-axis to OP, measured anti­
clockwise;
0 is the angle from the positive x-axis to OR , measured such 
that
-71 < < 7T .
3 8
Scramble Policy I
From Figure 1.2 the maximum take-off delay D for scramble under 
this policy, is such that
/OF/ _ / W  (All)
V U
This gives
/^T * y»/ =
V u '
so that
D = g (x^ secili - ^ C/y^ + Y^/)) • (A12)
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Scramble Policy II
From equation (A9) and Figure A 1 , the limiting case for interception 
under this policy is given by
/p/. ^ = r^ . (A13)
Substituting for p and r. from (A4) and (1.7) into (A13) leads 
to
= p(sinijj ± k.cosij/) 
and (A14)
y^ = p(cos^ + k.sinijj) ,
where
4 - 1 -
Hence from (1.6) D is given by
D  = (^0 - P(sini|i ± k.cosiji)) . (A16)
It may be seen that in the above equations the top sign is taken 
except in cases (3) and (6). Note that from (A15), if V>U 
there is no limiting point for fighter scramble under this policy.
Finally, from Figure 1.3 it is possible in cases (1), (5) and (6) 
that the maximum take-off delay D for scramble under this policy 
is such that the limiting interception occurs before the raid 
reaches the target axis. It follows easily from the above 
analysis that the coordinates (X ,Y ) of the limiting 
interception point P under scramble policy II are given by
X  = - '
e k cases (1), (2), (4), (5) (A17)
4  -  t  ^
and
y  _
€ '  ^ cases (3), (6) (A18)
4  ■
By substituting the appropriate expression for y_ from equation 
(A14) into the above expressions for X we find that, in cases 
(1),(5) and (6), we do not need to consider scramble policy I 
when
U > V
and . (A19)
/tanijj/ > ^ .
4.0
Scramble Policy III
From Figure 1.2, under this policy the maximum delay D before 
take-off for successful interception is found from
/RC/ + /CT/ , (fiiO)
V - u /
where C is the point at which the raid abandons its feint track 
and heads directly for the target. We note the following 
expressions for /RC/ and /CT/ , which hold for cases 
(l)-(6):
/CT/ = q/cosec0/ ,
/RC/ = X seci|) - UD - /CF/ , (A21)
and ^
/CF/ = q/cotO + tanijj/ ,
where q is given by (1.8). Substituting these into equation (A20) 
gives
D = ^ (x^sec^ + q(/cosec0/ - /cot0 + taniji/)- ÿ.y^). (A22)
Equation (A22) does not hold if the raid is not detected by Ground 
Control sensors until after its track-change. In this case, from 
Figure 1.2, D is given for all six cases by
y^ x^ cosec(/^/-/6/) -UD
_  _  _
j. • 0 •
D = ^ (XgCOsec( /ijj/ - /0/ ) - ^.y^). (A24)
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Scramble Policy IV
Under this policy fighters are not scrambled if they do not have 
sufficient fuel to carry out the expected interception; this is 
therefore the most immediately practical of the four scramble policies 
considered here. It may be regarded as a policy under which a fighter 
is only scrambled if it expects to intercept within a specified time, 
say T, after take-off. Hence if T is the expected time to interception, 
given by (A5) and (A6), this policy may be expressed simply as
T C T . (A25)
In the limiting case when the fighter achieves an interception just 
as it reaches the limit of its endurance, so that T = T, then 
by rearranging equation (A2) we have
(r^cosiu)^ - 2UT (r cosw) + ( T^(U^-V^)+p^) = 0 . (A26)
This gives
r^cos u) = UT - ((VT)2-p2)% . (A27)
Now from Figure A1 we may write
r cos uj = r cos w - UD , 
where ° ^ (A28)
r cos UÜ = X secib - p.tanijj .
O 0 0 ^
Substituting into (A27) gives
D = g (x sec^ - p.taniji - UT + ((VT)^ - p^)^) . (A29)
(To be more exact, taking the limiting case T = T as in __
(A26) - (A29) is only meaningful if r,{Ucoz J > T  
(see (A6)),for otherwise scramble always occurs.)
F4-2
.\
.E
- c
' L
V a
<V
<
3
^CH
(C
43
APPENDIX B
CATEGORIES OF INTERCEPTION
Introduction
The analysis is considerably more tractable if interceptions are 
categorised into the following three distinct types, illustrated 
in Figure Bl:
(i) interceptions on the feint leg;
(ii) interceptions on the second track-Ieg track by
fighters reallocated from expected interceptions on 
the feint leg;
(iii) interceptions on the second track-leg by fighters 
scrambled to intercept the second track-leg. This 
comprises all interceptions under scramble policy 111, 
while under the other policies it corresponds to fighters 
scrambled to intercept after detection of the track-change 
by the warning sensors.
We consider each of the interception categories (i)-(iii) in turn.
The maximum allowable take-off delay for interception in categories
(i) and (iii) is easily found. The criteria for interceptions
under category (ii) are more involved and correspondingly more
interesting. It is instructive to specify the track-change point
C not only by the track-change angle 0 (see Figure 1.2) but also
by the time t at which the track-change occurs after the raid
is first detected at the point S. For practical considerations
we may assume that the track-change occurs before the raid
reaches the target axis, so that from Figure 1.2 the parameters 0
and t are related by 
s ^
/SC/ = Ut^ = /SF/ - /CF/ .
Substituting from equation (A21) we find
Ut^ = x^seci|i-q/cot 0 + tantji/ . (Bl)
The maximum value of t^ is given by
Ut = X secijj . (B2)
s o
u
Category (i) - Interceptions on the feint leg
The maximum allowable take off delay, D, for interception in this 
category corresponds to interception at the point C in Figure 1.2, so 
that
/QC/_ /RC/.
V U
Hence, in terms of t^, D is given by
n = t _ A Ç /  , (B3)
s V
where /OC/ may be expressed as
/OC/^ = (y^ + x^tanij))^ + (x^ seciji - Ut^)^ (B4)
- 2(y^+x^tani|i) . (x^secijj - Ut^).sin^ .
Category (ii) - Interceptions by fighters reallocated from the
feint leg to the second track-leg
In order to calculate where a fighter reallocated from a planned 
interception on the feint leg achieves, if practicable, an
interception on the second track leg, the raid and fighter positions
at the track-change point must first be calculated. Assuming a fixed 
fighter response time to the track-change information, criteria under 
which the fighter can intercept the raid before it reaches the target 
may then be determined. For simplicity, we shall use the variable t 
rather than 0. At the track-change point, from Figure B2 the raid is 
at the point C with coordinates (^gjYg)» where
X = X - Ut cosijj 
and s o s
ys = + “’'s •
Consider a fighter scrambled to intercept the raid on its feint leg, 
with a take-off delay D after initial GC detection of the raid; if we 
write
A/
t = t - D , (B6)
s s
then the fighter is at the point F with coordinates (x^,y^) when the 
raid changes track, where
X r = Vt cosd)
, f s ^
and
%
Yf = Vtg sin^ .
Here ({) is the initial fighter heading to intercept the feint track.
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Suppose that the fighter suffers a fixed reaction delay D to the 
track-change, where D may be zero. During this time the fighter is 
assumed to continue aîong its original course at its constant speed 
V; it then instantly adopts a new course to intercept the raid on 
its second track-leg, if practicable. At time (t-t ) after the 
track-change the raid is at the point with coordinates (x ,y ), 
where ^ ^
= Xg + A(t-t^)(0-Xg) = x^(l-A(t-tg)) ,
Yr = Ys A(t-t^)(y^-yp ,
(B7)
and
+ (Yt -y P ^ ) ^
U________ (B8)
0 C t-t < i . (B9)
Hence if C (x ,y ) is the raid position at the moment the fighter
responds to t§e track-change, then
\  = X (1-ad ),
and (BIO)
Ys = Y, + AOc(YT-Ys) , 
provided that D^ < The corresponding fighter position is 
F(Xf,yf), where
x^ = Vt cos(j) ,
® (Ell)
y^ = Vt sin(b 
and f =
t = t + D  = t + D - D . (B12)
s s c s c
If we write
t* = t + D , (B13)
s s c
then the raid is at the point C* with coordinates (x* , y* ) at
time (t-t*) after the fighter has adopted its new interception
course, wRere
X* = (l-p (t-t* )) , (B14)
y* = Ÿ, + (J(t-t* ) (Yf- ÿ p  ,
u  = ____________________________ u_________  .
(^3^+ (y?- (B15)
and
0 < t-t* <
s fJ
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Assuming that after the delay D the fighter immediately adopts its 
new interception course, if practicable, then the corresponding 
fighter position is at the point F* with coordinates (x* , y* ), 
where
X* = -I-VC t-t/) C0S<P, ,
(B16)
y/ = +  v  C t- 1 * ) St/) (ji, ,
and (j)^ is the interception heading adopted by the fighter against 
the second track-leg (see Figure B2).
We now consider the conditions under which the fighter can intercept 
the raid before it reaches the target, restricting attention 
to the existence of geometrically feasible interception courses.
In a more detailed analysis - involving the fighter model 
for example - the consequences of imposing fuel limitations 
on the adoption of interception courses could also be examined.
If Z denotes the distance travelled by the fighter at time t-t* 
after adopting its new course, then
(B17)
-h lys (6IS)
In our simplified model interception occurs when the raid and fighter 
positions coincide, so that at this point (P' in Figure B2) we may 
replace x* and y* in (B17) by x* and y* to give
1 - / -----------------
Write
X = X - x^
and ® (B19)
Y = Ÿ3 - ÿf ;
rewriting equation (B18) in terms of (t-t*) then gives 
(t-tA-)^(U^-V^)-2p(t-t*)(xi^-Y(y^-ÿp) + (X^+Y^) = 0 . (B20)
From Figure B2, (X,Y) is the position vector of C relative to F 
and > (yg'y-j-)) is the position vector of C relative to T. If 
we define a, c and w as shown, then
p(XXg-Y(y^-yg)) = Uc.cosw (QZI)
and
+ Y^ = c^ . (B22)
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By substituting from equations (B21) and (B22), equation (B20) 
can be seen to be of the form of equation (A2), so that from 
equations (A5) and (A6) we may write
t-L'f =  £  (U=V) (B23)
2 U  co% u)
and
_ C f i (U T^V) ( B Z Q
where the condition t-t* < — corresponds to
s M
/FT/ < / ^  . (B25)
V U
In terms of the coordinate system, equation (B20) has solutions 
and, if K^O,
/ ' - / ' /  = {yr-9s)}-JK {uyv) {szi,)'
where 9 9 9 9  9
K = V^(X^+Y^) - p^CYXg+XCyy-ÿg)) . (B26)
In the limiting case in which interception occurs over the target, 
we have
L tu  _  / C T /
\! ' u
From Figure B2, this gives
(\iZ ■ ,,2 2 2 2.
 ^ s ~ ^T = V_ a - y^ cos (}) ,
so that
Vt = y^ sincj) ± (V^ a^ - y_^ cos^O)^ » (B27)S I
where from (B12)
and
t = t + D - D 
s s c
= /CT/2 = + (y^ - y^)2 .
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Application
Although (j) has been referred to as the heading of the initial 
fighter interception course, this assumption is not used in the 
analysis and indeed ({) may be an arbitrary initial fighter heading. 
We consider here a scramble policy which enables fighters to 
intercept successfully, although the initial fighter heading (j) 
need not correspond to an interception course against the raid 
on its feint leg. We concentrate on the limiting case of 
interceptions directly over the target, and conditions are found 
whereby the point at which the raid abandons its feint track does 
not affect the fighter intercept capability. For simplicity, we 
suppose that the fighter reaction delay to the track-change is 
zero, so that
= 0 . (B28)
Referring to Figure B2, suppose we choose (j) in equation (B27) 
such that
A t  t o s 4 /  _  I
y  ' U  ' (B29)
This gives
where
Now
Also
Vtg = y^ sin* ± ^ . (a^-q^)^ , (B30)
%
t = t = t -D . 
s s s
/RC/ = = I (Vt^) = I (y^ sin# + g (B31)
/RC/ = /RN/ ± /NC/
/RN/ ± ,
(B32)
where the positive sign is taken if the track-change occurs before 
the point N (8 < %) and the negative sign if it occurs after the 
point N (0 > ^ ) .
From equations (B31) and (B32) we have
^ y^ sin* = /RN/
so that
= (x^sec* - x^sin* tan*) - UD ,
D = g (x^sec*-x^sin* tan* ) - ^ y^ sin* . (B34)
(B33)
49
Equation (B34) shows that we have eliminated the point at which the 
raid changes track from the expression for fighter intercept 
capability, as measured by the maximum take-off delay D for scramble 
and eventual interception over the target.
Figure B3 illustrates this application for the case U = 2V, with the 
standard raid feint pattern, case (1). From the preceding analysis, 
without loss of generality we may take a raid track-change angle of 
0= 2 * For a given feint angle *, a circle of radius r is drawn 
centred on the target T, where
r = q.g . (B35)
The tangent to this circle through the origin (i.e., the fighter 
base) is then drawn as shown. This defines the initial fighter 
heading * against the feint track, with
/y^cos*/ = r = q.^ , (B36)
as specified in equation (B29).
Note that the fighter track given by the heading * does not 
correspond to an interception course against the feint track, for a 
fighter which takes off when the raid is at the point R. Indeed, 
since the angle a is such that
Of > sin ^(^) = 30° ,
a fighter taking off when the raid is at the point R cannot intercept 
the raid on its feint track. The point R ' shown in Figure B3 denotes 
the raid position at fighter take-off if the fighter heading * is to 
correspond to an interception course against the feint track. Hence 
although a fighter with a delay before take-off such that the raid is 
at the point R when it scrambles cannot intercept on the feint track, 
it can still intercept the raid over the target, regardless of the 
point at which it abandons its feint track.
Such a scramble policy does not of course allow as great a fighter 
take-off delay (or as many fighters scrambled against the raid) as 
scramble policy III; under this policy the maximum take-off delay 
for interception is such that the raid is at the point R" (see Figure 
B3) when the fighter scrambles. As with policy III, this policy 
implies some knowledge of the raid target T, since its distance y^ 
along the target axis from the fighter base is used in the 
calculation of * (equation (B29)). Nevertheless, it serves to 
emphasise the value to the fighter defences of a more 'liberal' 
scramble policy, under which fighters are prepared to scramble 
without close regard to the estimated position of interception.
It should be noted that, at the level at which this analysis is set, 
the possible disadvantages of such scramble policies are not 
considered here. These include, for example, the situation in which 
fighters are out of action at base for refuelling after an 
'optimistic' scramble when further raids penetrate their specified 
area of cover.
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Finally, Figure B4 presents a similar illustration of interception 
over the target, in the case of equal fighter and raid speeds, 
i.e., U = V; this special case is examined in more detail in 
Chapter 2 of the main text. Equation (B27) is illustrated by 
showing the interceptions over the target corresponding to 
arbitrary track-change angles 0 and (tt-0) .
In this case the maximum fighter heading * at take-off for successful 
interception derived from (B36) not only guarantees an interception 
over the target regardless of where the track-change occurs, but 
easily it also corresponds to an interception course against the raid 
feint track. Thus, in the notation of Figures B3 and B^;
R = R' .
Hence the maximum acceptable take-off delay such that a fighter 
scrambled onto an interception course against the feint track 
can still intercept the raid before or over the target is such 
that the raid is at the point R when the fighter takes off; the 
corresponding fighter heading is denoted by *, given by (B36). 
Further, this result holds independently of where the raid track- 
change occurs.
Category (iii) - Interceptions by fighters scrambled against the 
second track-leg
Interceptions under scramble policy III may be regarded as in this 
category, with the maximum take-off delay for successful intercept­
ion given by equations (A22) and (A24); the relationship between 
take-off delay D, relative to first detection, and the serial I 
of the corresponding fighter scrambled is given by equation 
(1.5). Under the other scramble policies it is assumed that, 
if the information processing delay D has elapsed between 
first detection of the raid at the poînt S and its track-change, 
then there is no further such delay imposed on fighters scrambled 
after the track-change,merely the delay D representing their 
readiness level. If D ' denotes the maximum allowable 
take-off delay, relative to the time of the track-change, and 
I is the serial of the corresponding fighter scrambled (and, 
easily, the corresponding number of interceptions achieved), 
then D' and I are related by
D' = + I.Dg . (1= 1,2,3,...... ) (B37)
The maximum take-off delay for successful interception is most easily 
expressed in terms of 0, and from Figure 1.2 this is given by
^ = q/cosec0/-UD' ,
1 . e
V ^T
U'= ^ (/y^ cos* cosec0/ - ^ y^) . (B38)
If the raid changes track before the information processing delay 
D is complete, or if it is not detected until after it changes 
tfack, then the maximum allowable take-off delay is again given 
by equations (A22) and (A24) respectively.
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F ig h te r  Base
FIGURE fi l  THREE TYPES OF INTERCEPTION
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INTRODUCTION
In this Part of the thesis we present a fairly detailed mathematical 
analysis of the effect of sensor errors on fighter intercept capability, 
Errors in the initial Ground Control (GC) estimates of raid position, 
speed and heading at initial detection are considered. A pessimistic 
case for the fighter defences is examined, in which the initial and 
possibly erroneous GC estimate of the raid track is not updated, with 
presumably more accurate information, as the raid continues its 
approach. This is not a very realistic assumption, but it does 
provide a 'worst case' background for the analysis. As mentioned 
later, the fighter model (see Part 2) was also used a great deal in 
this study. An assessment of the effect of regular (or irregular) 
updating of GC information on fighter intercept capability would be 
better suited to the fighter model simulation. To extend this 
analysis for the purpose would push it beyond the bounds of 
acceptable complexity.
The studies of sensor information errors and raid indirect routing are 
both derived from DOAE Study 250. The relevance of these two aspects 
of fighter intercept capability is assessed separately, so that in 
the analysis of GC sensor information errors we assume that raids do 
not engage in indirect routing but fly directly towards their 
targets. Otherwise the input assumptions underlying these two 
studies are the same - a single fighter base defending a single 
target against attack from an overflying, concentrated (point) raid; 
low-level attacks at high subsonic speeds, etc. - and we refer to % 
Chapter 1 of Part 3 for details. In particular. Figure 1.1 of Part 3 
illustrates the derivation of the coordinate system which is used in 
the numerical examples presented later. This enables us to introduce 
a concept of 'area defence' by fighters, rather than 'point defence' 
of particular, well-defined targets. Thus we require that, for a 
fighter interception to be deemed successful,it must occur before the 
raid crosses the y-axis, which is also termed the target axis. For 
the purpose of obtaining a broad assessment of fighter effectiveness, 
we may then regard the raid target as being at the intersection of 
its track with the target axis, and interceptions must occur before 
the raid reaches this point.
SCOPE
The analysis is first developed in Annex A, in which the measure of 
fighter effectiveness is the maximum acceptable systematic error in 
the estimated raid track for interception by a single fighter, 
expressed as a function of the timeliness of the warning provided by 
GC. Systematic errors in the GC sensors could correspond, for 
example, to biases in the detection and information extraction 
subsystems. The analysis is then extended, by use of the fighter 
model, to give values of mean fighter intercept effectiveness for 
random errors with a known distribution (see Appendix B ) . To 
illustrate this, we present the fighter effectiveness as a function 
of the standard deviation of normally distributed errors with zero 
mean.
The GC estimates of raid position, speed and track at first detection 
are not updated, and the fighters must themselves detect the raid 
before they correct their courses (a pessimistic condition). Errors 
in estimating the initial raid coordinates, speed and track are 
studied independently. The numerical examples apply only to raid 
tracks which are direct and perpendicular to the target axis.
Finally, no attempt is made to study the long-term consequences of 
errors by GC in estimating the raid size, i.e., the number of 
afrcraft in the raid.
There is no explicit representation of jamming in this study, whether 
by stand-off jammers, self-screening or escort jammers. Nevertheless 
the magnitude of the errors in GC sensor information considered in 
the numerical examples presented is sufficiently great so as to 
correspond to fairly severe jamming of GC surveillance radars in 
support of the raid. It is also assumed that the fighters can 
respond quickly when they detect the raid and that they maintain 
their detection capability during attempted interceptions. However, 
if their AI radars are jammed, in either search or tracking mode, 
these assumptions will generally not hold, unless the fighters can 
carry out some form of rapid and accurate bearings - only analysis. 
For example, this could be by triangulation of the jamming strobes, 
using data-links between fighters. Conversely, if fighters must 
resort, in the face of AI radar jamming, to some form of kinematic 
ranging, in which large changes in course are required in order to 
measure the rate of change of bearing of the raid, then their ability 
to react quickly and effectively when they detect the raid may be 
seriously degraded.
3. ANALYTICAL METHODS
Both the mathematical analysis described in the Appendices and the 
fighter model described in Part 2 are used in the study of 
information errors. The mathematical analysis is used to derive 
expressions for the maximum acceptable errors which still enable a 
fighter to scramble, detect and intercept the raid before it reaches 
the target axis, for a fixed fighter take-off delay (corresponding, 
in the numerical examples presented, to the first fighter scrambled). 
Given the number of fighters assumed available at the base, the 
fighter model is then used to derive the effect of information errors 
in terms of the standard measure of effectiveness, namely the total 
number of interceptions achieved before the raid reaches the target 
axis. Of the scramble policies considered in the study of raid 
indirect routing, only policies I and II have practical application 
here. Scramble policy III need not be considered, for if the point 
at which the raid is expected to cross the target axis is known, GC 
sensor errors may be ignored. In addition, scramble policy IV (a 
fuel-limitation policy) has little effect in the numerical examples 
considered, although for completeness the maximum allowable GC sensor 
errors for scramble under this policy are derived in Appendix A. The 
dominant factors determining fighter intercept capability are the 
amount of warning available to Ground Control, the fighter detection 
capability and the time taken by fighters to react to a detection.
The fighter endurance capability when scrambled from ground alert 
with a realistic fuel load is rarely a limiting factor in the 
scenarios examined in this study.
We assume fighters have a deterministic radar detection capability, 
defined by the radar range and angle of scan. Within the sector of 
the circle defined by these parameters a fighter detects with 100% 
probability, while it has zero probability of detection outside this 
sector. We consider the problem of fighter detection from a 
geometrical standpoint only; the fighter model could be used to 
investigate the effect of pulse and pulse dopp/gr clutter on the 
fighter detection capability.
An extra factor is incorporated in the fighter model study which is 
difficult to represent analytically. In the fighter model, it is 
assumed that if a fighter reaches its expected interception point 
without achieving a detection, it turns outbound (parallel to the 
x-axis and in the direction of x increasing), towards a holding 
Combat Air Patrol position (CAP), where it continues to seach for the 
raid. In the mathematical analysis the fighter is assumed to 
continue indefinitely along its initial course. This track-change is 
generally advantageous to the fighters, improving their chances of 
detecting and subsequently intercepting the raid.
44. NUMERICAL INPUTS
The numerical inputs used in the specific examples presented are 
summarised in Table 1. As in the study of raid indirect routing,the 
point at which the raid crosses the target axis, i.e., the point 
which under our area defence system we regard as the raid target, is 
half-way between the fighter base considered and its nearest 
neighbour along the target axis.
5. RESULTS
The results are presented in Figures 1-8, where the GC estimates of 
the raid’s x- and y- coordinates at first detection are termed the 
estimated warning distance and offset respectively. Figures 1-4 are 
derived analytically, and show the maximum acceptable error in each 
of the raid parameters, for interception by the first fighter 
scrambled. The maximum error is shown as a function of the actual 
warning distance achieved against the raid, i.e. the perpendicular 
distance of the raid from the target axis when it is first detected. 
The limitations of adopting scramble policy I rather than policy II 
are also shown. The derivation of the various components of these 
figures is given in Appendix A.
The fighter model was used to determine the number of interceptions 
achieved as a function of the error in the initial GC estimate of the 
raid parameters, for a fixed warning distance of 360 nm; these 
results are presented in Appendix B. Figures 5-8 present the 
corresponding results for random (normal) errors, assumed normally 
distributed with zero mean. The number of interceptions achieved is 
shown as a function of the standard deviation of the error in the 
estimate of each of the raid parameters. A maximum of 20 fighters 
available is assumed, operating under scramble and control procedure 
II, modified as explained in Chapter 3.
6. DISCUSSION
The results show the relatively large errors which can be tolerated 
in the initial estimates of the raid parameters, when an AI radar 
detection range of about 90 nm is available and the fighters can 
respond quickly when they detect the raid. For example, Figure 1 
shows the acceptable error in the estimated warning distance of the 
raid at first detection. Although no error can be tolerated if the 
raid is not detected until it is 200 nm from the target axis, if this 
warning distance is increased to, say, 240 nm, this can be estimated 
at as much as 500 nm or as little as 200 nm before the first fighter 
scrambled fails to intercept. If scramble policy I is adopted rather 
than policy II, the acceptable underestimate in the raid's warning 
distance is only reduced for warning distances less than 230 nm.
Thus, as in the indirect routing study, with sufficiently large 
warning distances the significance of the scramble policy is 
diminished. Figure 1 also shows that an overestimate of the distance 
of the raid at first detection is less serious than a corresponding 
underestimate.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding results for the estimated raid 
offset at first detection. Again, realistic errors in the estimated 
raid offset can be tolerated for reasonable warning distances. The 
actual raid offset is 108 nm; with a warning distance of only 240 nm 
this can be estimated at between 144 nm and 45 nm before the first 
fighter scrambled fails to intercept. With this warning distance, the 
acceptable error in estimating the raid offset is unaltered if 
scramble policy I is adopted.
Figure 3 shows the acceptable error in the estimate of the raid
heading, defined to be the angle which the raid track is believed to
make with the x-axis. The actual direction of the raid is defined as 
0 . Again, realistic errors in estimating this parameter do not 
affect the interception capability of the first fighter scrambled.
With the above warning distance the raid heading can be estimated to
be +10 or -20 before interception fails. With the same warning
distance of 240 nm. Figure 4 shows that the raid speed of 9 nm/min 
can be overestimated by 1.5 nm/min (90 knots), or enormously 
underestimated before the first fighter scrambled fails to intercept.
Figures 5-8 apply to the case when very good early warning is 
available to the fighter defences. Together with an AI detection 
range of 90 nm, this prevents any realistic random error in the 
estimates of any of the raid parameters from seriously degrading the 
fighter intercept capability. For example, a standard deviation of 
200 knots in estimating the raid speed, or 100 nm in estimating the 
raid's warning distance, decreases the mean number of possible 
interceptions by 1. A standard deviation of 10 in estimating the 
raid heading decreases the mean number of interceptions by 1, as does 
a standard deviation of 30 nm in estimating the raid offset.
7. CONCLUSIONS
If a reasonable warning distance can be achieved realistic errors in 
estimating the raid parameters do not degrade the fighter intercept 
capability, provided the range at which the fighters detect is not 
itself seriously degraded. The warning distance required depends on 
the number of fighters required to intercept the raid. To achieve 20 
interceptions from a single fighter base against a raid on a 
perpendicular track to a target offset by about lOOnm, errors in 
estimated offset distance and raid heading appear to be potentially 
the most serious. The assumed ability of the fighter radar to 
maintain its detection capability (by bearings-only analysis against 
self-screening jamming), together with the fighters' assumed ability 
to respond quickly to a detection, contribute significantly to their 
ability to tolerate GC sensor information errors.
TABLE 1
NUMERICAL INPUTS TO THE STUDY OF SENSOR INFORMATION ERRORS
(A)
RAII
Target
) PARAMETERS
lOBnm along the target axis
(B) Track Direct track to the target, 
perpendicular to the target axis
(C) Raid speed (constant) 9nm/min
(D) Raid length - concentrated 
raid
zero
(A)
GC AND FIGHTER PARAMETERS
Actual warning distance at 
first detection of the raid
arbitrary
(B) Sensor & GC processing and 
transmission delay at first 
detection
5 minutes
(C) Fighter readiness level 5 minutes
(D) Scramble Policy:
I : Scramble if expect to intercept before the target axis
II : Scramble unless interception of estimated track
appears impossible
(E) Delay between take-offs 30 secs (ie scramble rate = two per 
minute)
(F) Number of fighters available 
at the base
twenty
(G) Fighter speed (constant) 9nm/min
(H) Delay between a fighter 
detecting the raid and 
correcting its intercep­
tion course
zero
(I) Initial GC estimate of 
raid speed
Initial GC estimate of 
raid heading 
Inital GC estimate of 
raid position:
(i) x-coordinate (warning 
distance)
(ii) y-coordinate (offset)
arbitrary
II
arbitrary
II
(J) Fighter radar range 90nm
(K) Fighter radar angle of scan ±60°
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APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION
This Appendix studies the effect of sensor errors on fighter 
intercept capability. The primary measure of effectiveness of the 
fighter defences is the number of interceptions achieved before the 
raid reaches its target. Errors in the initial GC estimates of raid 
position, speed and heading are considered. The analysis is 
concerned primarily with fixed errors, although a procedure is 
derived which provides the corresponding results for random (normally 
distributed) errors. Expressions are first derived for the errors 
which prevent fighter scramble, under each of two scramble policies. 
The maximum acceptable errors that still enable a scrambled fighter 
to achieve AI radar detection of the raid are then determined. 
Finally, if a fighter detects the raid, the feasibility of it 
correcting its course and intercepting the raid is determined and, if 
an interception is possible, the final interception point is 
calculated. The analysis is primarily geometric in nature, and as 
such requires a pre-defined coordinate system. This could be 
derived, for example, as in Figure 1.1 of Part 3, in which the y-axis 
represents a 'target axis', while the fighter base is at the origin 
of coordinates. We consider a fighter area defence system in which 
interceptions are regarded as successful only if they are achieved 
before the raid penetrates the target axis. We refer to the point 
of intersection of the raid track with the target axis as the raid 
target.
As in the study of raid indirect routing, just one fighter base is 
considered, defending a single target against attack from an 
overflying, concentrated (point) raid. The raid is assumed to fly 
directly towards its target. Interception is represented by 
'collision', the coincidence of the fighter and the raid on their 
respective tracks, with no allowance made for offsets for forward 
or rear engagements, or for re-attacks.
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OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Raid Parameters
Table A1 and Figure A1 summarise the raid parameters considered in 
the analysis. The x- and y-coordinates of the raid at first 
detection are termed the warning distance and offset respectively.
The analysis considers the raid position, actual and estimated, 
expressed in terms of (x,y) coordinates and in terms of range and 
bearing from the fighter base. Throughout, the suffixes 't ' and 'f ' 
denote actual (true) and estimated (false) raid parameters 
respectively. Thus the raid is believed to be first detected at the 
point S with coordinates (x^,y^), with estimated speed U^ (assumed 
constant) and estimated heading , measured as shown; it is in fact 
first detected at the point S with coordinates (x^,y^), while it 
actually has speed U^ and heading i|)^.
Fighter Parameters
Given the scramble time and the initial fighter heading, determined 
by the GC estimates of the raid parameters, three parameters 
determine the fighters’ capabilities - speed V (assumed constant), 
radar range R and radar angle of scan ±a. The GC estimates of the 
raid parameters are not updated, and the fighters must themselves 
detect the raid before they correct their courses (a pessimistic ' 
condition). Following initial detection of the raid there is taken 
to be a fixed delay for sensor and GC processing and transmission of 
the information, followed by a further reaction delay representing 
the readiness level of the fighters. It is assumed that during these 
delays the raid is identified as hostile and approaching in 
sufficient strength to warrant fighter scramble (subject to the 
limitations of the scramble policy). There is also a delay between 
each fighter take-off.
From Figure A 1 , if a fighter suffers a total delay D between initial 
detection of the raid by GC sensors and its subsequent scramble, the 
raid is believed to be at the point with coordinates (X^,Y^) when 
the fighter takes off, where
and (Al)
Sen .
The corresponding actual raid position is at the point with 
coordinates (X^, Y^), where
’ (A2)
The numerical examples presented in the main text refer only to a 
raid which is flying at the same constant speed as the fighter and on 
a direct track to the target which is perpendicular to the target 
axis, so that
uand (A3)
O .
In the analysis which follows of conditions for fighter scramble and 
detection of the raid, etc., some results are derived only for the 
special case given by equations (A3). In addition, in order to 
compare the relative importance of errors in each of the raid 
parameters, a number of results are presented under the further 
assumption that just one of the raid parameters has been estimated 
incorrectly. To this end we define the following error expressions ;
(A4)
It is felt that the timeliness of the attack information, i.e. the 
warning distance achieved, is one of the most crucial fighter 
parameters. The principal results of this Appendix are illustrated 
in Figures A4-A7, in which we present, for a fixed fighter take-off 
delay D, the maximum acceptable error for each of the raid parameters 
considered separately (i.e. ^f/ j ^ y» and ), as a function
of the actual warning distance, x^. Tables t c o i J , respectively, 
summarise the numerical inputs in the examples presented and define the 
symbols used to distinguish the different components of the graphs. 
Figures A4-A7 are discussed in more detail later.
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3. FIGHTER SCRAMBLE LIMITATIONS
We derive expressions for the maximum acceptable error for a fighter
to scramble, with a delay D before take-off, given that Ground
Control may estimate incorrectly the raid's position and track (speed
and heading) at first detection. Scramble policies I, II and IV, as
defined in Part 3, are considered. The general expressions for the
maximum error for scramble are obtained from Part 3; we then simplify
these by considering in turn errors in only one of the raid
parameters, for the special case given by equation (A3). The
resultant equations are manipulated to give expressions linking the
error - E , E , E, or E_ - with the actual warning distance x. .
X y' ^ U ° t
3.1 Scramble Policy I
Under this policy a fighter is scrambled only if it expects to 
intercept before the raid penetrates the target axis. From equation 
(All) of Part 3 this condition is given by
^  XçSeol'f, -UfP  (A5)
V Up
This gives the following expressions for the range of errors under 
which scramble is permissible under this policy, when each of the 
raid parameters is considered separately, in the special case given 
by equations (A3):-
£ x  ^  / y ^ /  ^ y ^
f y  ^  (D7)
^  /  r VD - v
^  4: : x ^ î e c  t y .  ~ V D
Equation (A9) gives the pair of inequalities
( v'i> - H r )  Sl'rt (AlO)
and
In the graphs illustrating the limiting conditions under scramble 
policy I, presented in Figures A4-A7, we do not show, in general, the 
solutions to inequalities (A6)-(A11) corresponding to unrealistic 
values of the errors E^, E , E^ and E^.
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3.2 Scramble Policy II
Under this policy a fighter is scrambled as long as it possesses 
a geometrically feasible interception course. From equation (A14) 
of Part 3 the limiting case is given by
where
Xp. = cos ij'p. 7 f^ /3^
V  "  ^  ^
and ^  is the shortest distance from the fighter base to 
the estimated raid track:
fp = f y. £04 /y. .
This gives the following expressions for the maximum acceptable 
error for scramble, when each of the raid parameters is considered 
separately, in the special case given by equations (A3).
(i) Error in estimated warning distance, x, only
£ x = - X ^  + V P  . (A16)
(ii) Error in estimated raid offset, y , only 
Scramble occurs for all values of E provided
y
. (A17)
(iif) Error in estimated raid speed, U, only
Equation (A14) gives
Up ( ^ l - ( v d T )  , (A18)
where
This has the following solutions:
(a) I I = V p
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(b) l y t l  y  v p
(iv) Error in estimated raid heading, only
-ice f  tcLrt,
3.3 Scramble policy IV
Under this policy a fighter is scrambled only if it is expected 
to intercept within a specified time say %" , after take-off.
From equation (A26) of Part 3 the limiting condition for 
interception is given by
Xp^  CiA fp ^  /  T / )  -  (
This gives the following expressions for the maximum error in 
each of the raid parameters x, y and U for scramble in the 
special case given by equations (A3); the expression for E, may 
also be obtained with a little manipulation.
£  . -  u ,  , « s ;
^  r Z>Y'T)
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4. FIGHTER HEADING
Given that a fighter has scrambled onto an expected interception 
course under policy I, II or IV, its initial heading ^  , measured
from the positive x-axis (see Figure Al), is given by equation 
(AlO) of Part 3,
. g ■ h - ^ +  ini)
si/i (f =--- --------- Ï— :___________   .
/? ;
where R^ is the estimated distance of the raid from the fighter 
base at the moment the fighter takes-off;
- -  X /
If we assume that the estimated raid speed equals the fighter 
speed, so that
V= , (A26)
then we easily obtain the following useful expression for the 
half-angle ^  :
, ^  t â n î t  -h ^
la > ^ i ,  &-----Xg------- (A27)
'4
%
laA-
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5. RAID VELOCITY RELATIVE TO THE FIGHTER
As might be expected, the analysis is simplified if we regard 
the fighter as ‘reduced to rest' at the fighter base at the 
moment it takes off, by considering the velocity W of the raid 
relative to the fighter. If the raid has relative speed W and 
heading w as shown in Figure A2(a,b), then W and UJ are given by
Wsin U) = Vsin ^ sin ,
Wcos UJ = Vcos (j) + cos ijj^ ,
(A28)
so that
and
= V^ + + 2VU^ cos (*+^i )
Figure A2(a,b) also shows for later use, -W, the fighter velocity 
relative to the raid.
5.1 Example
In the standard example given by equations (A3), in which the 
raid attacks the target along a track perpendicular to the 
target axis and the fighter speed equals the raid speed, then
and (A30)
W - 2 V c a ^ iz
2 0
6. FIGHTER DETECTION OF THE RAID
Given that a fighter has scrambled to attempt an interception, we now 
determine the conditions under which it can detect the raid while on 
its initial interception course. The fighter is assumed to have a 
deterministic detection sector, with radar range R and angle of scan 
±a (0 < a < 7l) . Within this sector a
fighter detects with 100% probability, while it has zero probability 
of detection ouside it. Furthermore, we adopt a geometrical analysis 
only,and do not consider the problems of detecting targets with 
relative velocities such that they are in high clutter regions when 
the fighter's radar is in pulse doppler mode. The fighter model 
could be used if, instead of a broad and relatively straightforward 
geometrical approach, a detailed model of the fighters' radar 
detection capability and clutter rejection ability was required.
As shown in Figure A2(a,b), the angle is defined by
* = . (A31)
Thus 4) is the angle made by the fighter track relative to the raid 
with the initial fighter heading. If the angle *5 is defined as 
shown in Figure A2(a,b), then we define P by
f ^  . (A32)
Hence p denotes the angle made by the raid with the fighter track 
when it first comes within radar range R; our convention is that p 
is positive if the fighter track passes ahead of the raid and
negative if it passes behind the raid. If we define p to be the
shortest distance from the fighter base (at the origin of 
coordinates) to the raid track W relative to the fighter, then
/V - X ^  y^ Ccr^  CO , (A33)
and is given by
R sin \ . (A34)
Annex C investigates the conditions on a and * necessary for 
detection; these may be summarised as follows.
(a) 0 < a < 5
The fighter eventually detects the raid if and only if
^  ^  ^  niax{\A,§) . (DiS)
2 1
(b) ^ < a C 71
The fighter eventually detects the raid if and only if
- ^ /vin j oi) . (^Sè>)
The criteria (A35) and (A36) for fighter detection of the raid will 
now be considered in more detail. For simplicity we restrict 
attention to the case 0 ^  ^ ^ / Z  » although the analysis can
easily be extended to the case VX/x S  oC ^ fX
Example
In the standard example given by equations (A3), substituting from 
equation (A30) into (A31) and (A32) gives
and
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6.1 Detection at limits of fighter radar scan (p = ±d)
If detection occurs at the limit of the fighter radar scan then 
either P = +cx or p = -Of, depending on whether the fighter passes 
ahead of or behind the raid respectively. Note that from (A35) the 
limiting condition for detection when the fighter passes ahead of the 
raid is given by p = +of only if
^  ^  (A39)
Similarly, the limiting condition for detection if the fighter
passes behind the raid is given by P = -Of only if
(A40)
From equation (A32), if P = ±0f we have
= (A41)
Substituting from (A33) and (A34) gives
sinuj-Y^ cosu) = R sin(±0f-4») (A42)
Equations (A25), (A29), (A31) and (A42) may be solved numerically to 
give the relationships between the maximum acceptable error for 
fighter detection, in the estimate of each of the raid parameters, 
and the actual warning distance x^ at which the raid is first 
detected by GC sensors.
Examples
(i) In the particular case given by (A3), equations (A39) and
(A40) reduce respectively to
f  ( A 4 3 )
2
and
< f? - Ü (A44)
2 %
Equation (A42) easily reduces to
where
and
/ « n i  =  ..4  Y
^ f /? COSK
4  ' Y *
X y = x ^ ' V i )
The simplified expression (A45) may again be solved 
numerically with (A25) to give the relationships between the 
maximum allowable errors for detection - E , E , E and E^ - 
and the actual warning distance x^. ^ ^
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(ii) As a further illustration, consider the additional
assumption that only the initial estimate of the raid 
position is in error, as shown in Figures A3 and A4.
Hence
= 0
and
Substituting into equation (A27) then gives the following 
simple expression for //2
4 n  i  = . (A47)
2 Xp-VV
Finally, by substituting from (A47) into (A45) we obtain
the following expressions if we consider the errors
E^, E^ in the raid warning distance and offset separately ;
(a) Warning distance only in error
^ R ±Vi)sL/lU.) f f s^cKtH.X^  ,
(b) Raid offset only in error
6 '  = îRs t 'na (x^-Vp )  -Rcosu.yi.  .
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6.2 Limit on detection as fighter passes ahead of the raid (P = 4>)
From (A35), if the fighter passes ahead of the raid and Of < 4>, the 
limiting condition for detection is given by
P = 4> . (A50)
From equation (A32) this is equivalent to
^ = 0  . (A51)
In this limiting case the errors E , E , E^, E. in the estimates of 
the raid parameters combine so tha^ th? fighter is actually on a 
valid interception course. Note that the actual interception point 
will in general be different from the expected interception point. 
From (A33) and (A34) equation (A51) gives
lÔÆ U) = . (A52)
4
Example
If equations (A3) hold and if also only the initial estimate of 
the raid position is in error, then substituting from (A47) and 
(A30) into (A52) gives
i//rI ' = Xp-~vT ' (^ 3^)
I.e.
(A54)
In the numerical examples presented later we evaluate the maximum 
allowable error for successful interception, when each of the raid 
parameters is considered separately; equation (A51) then corresponds 
simply to zero error in the estimate of the appropriate raid 
parameter.
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6.3 Limit on detection as fighter passes behind the raid
If the fighter passes behind the raid and ^/z“f<OC, the limiting 
condition for detection is given, from (A35), by
^  = - ( y - § )  (A55)
From equation (A32) this reduces to
\ - - S  (A56)
 ^ z
Substituting into (A34) gives
Pr = - £  (A57)
As can be seen from Figures C2 of Annex C, in this case the 
limiting detection occurs when the relative raid track is tangential 
to the fighter's radar detection sector. In the general case 
equation (A57) is solved by substituting from (A33), (A28) and (A25) 
to give an expression linking the maximum acceptable errors in the 
initial estimates of the raid parameters for detection, with the 
warning distance at which the raid is first detected by Ground 
Control sensors.
In the particular case defined by equations (A3) and considering 
positional errors only, the solution of (A57) simplifies 
considerably. We find from (A30), (A33) and (A47) that
This gives the following expressions.
(A58)
(i) . Error in estimated warning distance, x, only
(A59)
(ii) Error in estimated raid offset, y , only
In equations (A59) and (A60) we take the top-most sign. The 
other sign also gives a solution for 'detection' at a 
tangent to the fighter's arc of radar cover (extended in 
azimuth if necessary); in this case it corresponds to the 
fighter passing ahead of the raid and if 0 ^  ^ H
does not give a valid solution. 2
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7. FINAL INTERCEPTION POINT
Given that a fighter has scrambled in response to a threat warning 
and has detected the enemy raid, we consider finally the maximum 
acceptable errors such that the fighter can successfully intercept 
the raid as a result of this detection. We restrict ourselves for 
simplicity to the particular case given by equation (A3), on which 
Figures A4-A7 are based. We use the general interception algorithm 
developed in Part 3, assuming that fighters can respond immediately 
to the track-change and that interception courses are calculated 
purely on their geometrical feasibility, ignoring fuel limitations.
In fact in realistic scenarios the limitations on fighter intercept 
capability consequent upon detection, for a raid to be intercepted on 
or before the target axis, are generally independent of the fighter 
endurance. If D denotes the fighter reaction delay after a detection, 
then to simplify the computation we assume that
D = 0 . (A61)
c
Figures A 3 (a,b) illustrate the raid and fighter geometry under 
consideration, for the cases in which the fighter passes ahead of and 
behind the raid respectively. Here F^ denotes the fighter position 
when it detects the raid and R, denotes the corresponding raid 
position. We concentrate on the conditions for successful 
interception of the raid, before it reaches the target axis; for 
completeness we first calculate the conditions under which the 
fighter possesses an interception course, regardless of the final 
interception point.
7.1 Geometrically feasible interception course
If the angle a is defined as shown in Figures A 3 (a) and A3 (b), we may 
write respectively
r /(3/ -f (X
(A62)
= g f K
and
C( = 1^1 -f- ^  (A63)
^ -h (f .
Hence, taking a = ^ and substituting for p from equation (A38), we 
find from (A62) and (A63) that
- -J • (A64)
Substituting from (A33) and (A34) gives
kajt i- - 4  - R  _ (A65)
^ hj.
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Equation (A65) may be solved numerically to give the maximum errors 
E , E , E . and E^ for a geometrically feasible interception course, 
as a function of the warning distance x^. Similarly (although this 
case has little practical significance), if in (A62) and (A63) we 
take a = - ^ we find
2 z (A66)
from which
Example
ciyi j  - -" y  —  (A67)
If we consider positional errors only in the GC initial estimate of 
the raid track, so that E^ = E . = 0, then from equation (A47)
h i .  'h -  & _____
2 tf ' A y -  VD
Substituting into (A65) gives
E^(y^-R) - R%t = Ey (A68)
Similarly, substituting into (A67) gives
E (y„+R) + RX_ = E X^ (A69)
X t t y t
Finally, if we consider the errors in the initial estimates of the 
raid's x- and y- coordinates separately, equations (A68) and (A69) 
reduce as follows.
(i) Ey = 0
(ii) E = 0
X
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7.2 Interception before the raid reaches the target
From Figure A3(a,b) it may be seen that, under the assumptions given 
by equations (A3), the coordinates of the final interception point may 
be calculated directly from the relative fighter and raid positions 
when the fighter detects the raid - shown as the points F and 
respectively. If X denotes the x-coordinate of the final 
interception point relative to the point F , then the actual 
x-coordinate X^ of the interception point is simply given by
X = X + X , . (A72)
a d
Here x^ is the x-coordinate of the point F^, the actual position of 
the fighter at detection. Expressions for X and x^ are derived 
below. An interception is deemed to be successful if it occurs 
before the raid reaches the target axis, i.e., if
X^ >. 0 . (A73)
If the point F^ has coordinates (x^, y^), then from Figure A3(a,b)
(A74)
and .
Yr = tan | . (A75)
Substituting from (A75) and (A33) into (A74) leads to
Now, if T is the time taken for the fighter to reach the point F on 
its relative track, then
T  = , (A77)
where W is the fighter speed relative to the raid; from (A30) this 
reduces to
'f - , (A78)
Z Z
Hence the coordinates of the point F^ are given by
and similarly ^
yr ■
Finally, knowing the coordinates (x ,y ) of the point F , the 
coordinates (X,Y) of the final interception point relative to F and 
may be derived from equation (A5) of Part 3; this gives
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Z (X^ - X/,)
and (A81)
Y = Y^-y^ .
Hence the coordinates (X ,Y ) of the interception point relative 
to the origin are given By
X =X+x , 
a d
and of course
\  -Yr +Ya = Y^ =
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8. EXAMPLES
8.1 Numerical Inputs
The numerical inputs used in the specific examples presented are 
summarised in Table 1 The fighter base is taken to be Coningsby,
with the target at the maximum offset between Coningsby and Leuchars, 
i.e. 108 nm. along the target axis. The fighters and raid travel at 
equal speed and the raid is actually flying along a direct track 
perpendicular to the target axis, so that 
V=U
and
ijjt=0
8.2 Results
The results are presented in Figures A4-A7, while Table A 2 contains
a key to the notation. The maximum acceptable error is plotted as a
function of the actual warning distance of the raid at first GC 
sensor detection. Results are presented for errors in the GC 
estimates of the raid's warning distance (x-coordinate), offset 
(y-coordinate), heading and speed, each considered separately. A 
delay of 10 minutes is assumed between first detection of the raid 
and fighter scramble ; from Table 1 it can be seen that these figures 
therefore refer to the first fighter scrambled. We suppose an 
expression for the total delay before take-off, D, for the I-th 
fighter scrambled given by
D=(Dp+D^) + I.Dg . (A82)
Here D and D represent the GC processing and transmission time and 
the fighters'^readiness level respectively, while is a delay
between successive fighter scrambles. s
The expressions for the maximum acceptable errors such that the 
fighter can still detect the raid, and then successfully intercept 
it, depend in a complex manner on the fighter take-off delay D. Note 
that the technique adopted in Part 3 does not apply here; this would 
correspond to finding the maximum take-off delay for interception (or 
detection, or scramble) for given error or errors, then determining 
the corresponding number of interceptions from equation (A82). This 
is not valid, for the possibility exists of a penalty for premature 
scramble - if a specified fighter can intercept, it does not follow 
that fighters scrambled earlier can also intercept. It is 
impractical to perform the complete analysis described in this 
Appendix for each fighter scrambled, so the Fighter Model (see Part 
2) was used in order to express the consequences of sensor errors in 
terms of the measure of effectiveness adopted in the main text, viz. 
the number of fighters which achieve interceptions before the raid 
reaches the target axis.
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The essential conclusions from Figures A4-A7 are quite simple. With 
reasonable warning distance realistic systematic errors, considered 
independently, in the initial GC estimates of the raid parameters 
have no appreciable effect on fighter intercept capability. Figure 
A4 shows that an overestimate of the distance of the raid at first 
detection is less serious than a corresponding underestimate, while 
Figure A7 shows that very large underestimates in the raid speed can 
be tolerated.
PARAMETERS
TABLE A1 
INVOLVED IN THE ANALYSIS
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RAID PARAMETERS AT INITIAL DETECTION
Actual Estimated by Ground Control (GC)
x-coordinate(warning distance)
y-coordinate (offset)
yf
range from fighter base
bearing " " "
heading
speed (constant)
FIGHTER PARAMETERS
speed (constant) V
delay before take-off D
radar range R
radar angle of scan ±a
TABLE k Z  
KEY TO FIGURES A4-A7
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Symbol
II
D
D
-a
D
Meaning
Maximum error under which fighters are scrambled (Policy I)
(Policy II)
can detect the raid (p= a)
It If It M
II II II It (p=4))
It It II II
graph of ^ = a 
graph of I = ^ - a
maximum error such that the raid can still be intercepted before 
it reaches the target axis
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APPENDIX B
FIGHTER MODEL RESULTS
The numerical inputs used in the fighter model runs are as shown in Table 1 of 
the main text, except that in the examples presented a fixed actual warning 
distance of 360nm was taken. Also, the fighter model - a computer 
simulation - includes a factor which is difficult to study analytically. If 
in the model a fighter reaches its expected interception point without 
achieving a detection, it does not continue along its assigned course 
indefinitely but turns and heads along the positive x-axis towards a holding 
CAP. It thus flies towards the expected direction of the enemy attack and 
generally does better than if it simply continues along its initial track.
The model results are presented in Figures B1-B4. They reinforce the basic 
conclusions of Appendix A, viz with reasonable warning distance practical 
systematic errors, considered independently, in the initial GC estimates of 
the raid parameters have no appreciable effect on fighter intercept 
capability.
Systematic Error to Random Error Conversion
Systematic sensor errors are of less practical relevance than random errors.
If the distributions of the errors are known, it is a straightforward 
calculation to derive the expected number of interceptions from the 
corresponding results for systematic errors. Random errors, in the numerical, 
examples presented, are assumed to be normally distributed, with zero mean, 
while a range of variances is considered. The technique is applied to the 
fighter model results illustrated in Figures B1-B4, to give the expected 
number of interceptions as a function of the standard deviation of the normal 
error in each of the raid parameters. These results are presented in Figures 
5-8 of the main text.
Suppose l(x) denotes the number of interceptions achieved (out of a maximum of 
20) with a systematic error, x, in one of the raid parameters - warning 
distance, offset, heading or speed. If $ denotes the probability ^ensity 
function of a normal random variable with zero mean and variance CT , the 
expected number of interceptions, E(a), is given by
E(a) = J°° l(x).(j)(x) dx (Bl)
-CD
The integral in equation (Bl) is calculated numerically to any given accuracy, 
with values of l(x) obtained from Figures B1-B4.
A3
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APPENDIX C
FIGHTER DETECTION OF THE RAID
In this Appendix we derive the limiting conditions on fighter detection of 
the raid. Without loss of generality the coordinate system may be chosen 
such that the fighter track is along the y-axis, as shown in Figure Cl.
The fighter has speed V, while the raid travels with speed U and makes an 
angle < — ) with the perpendicular to the fighter track. The raid
has speed w relative to the fighter, while the raid velocity relative to 
the fighter makes an angle 4> with the fighter track. This gives
and
Hence
and
Wsin * = Ucos ijj 
Wcos <J> = V - Usin i)j,
-  2VUsinili
tan * =
COSlji
V -  siniji 
U
The fighter detection area is represented by a sector of a circle, 
defined by the radar range R and angle of scan + Of. A fighter 
detects with 100% probability inside this sector while it has 
zero probability of detection outside it. Five cases then arise 
in defining the limiting conditions upon fighter detection of 
the raid. These are denoted by (A)-(E) and are illustrated 
in Figures C2(a-f). Note that we consider only geometrical 
constraints on detection and do not examine problems caused, 
for example, by pulse doppler clutter or track resolution.
The fighter detection capability depends upon the angles a and 
Figure C3 illustrates, for given values of O f, the ranges of values 
of 0 in which each of the five cases (A)-(E) hold. This is amplified 
in Figure C4, which shows the regions in the (a,*) - plane 
(0 < a, < 7T) in which the five cases apply; it also gives the 
equations of the boundaries between these regions. The symmetry 
about the axis $ = ^ is apparent.
A6
^ ^ a lc l  tracl(  / / /o
tJiz Piühl'cr
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